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 SUMMARY 
The evolution of technology is a key driver of economic and societal change. To achieve a sound 
understanding of the process of economic development it is crucial to show how firms invent, 
learn and improve technology, and how technology and firms’ strategies co-evolve. This thesis 
analyses firms’ inventive strategies and technological catching-up in the semiconductor industry 
between the 1980s and the first half of the 2000s. Technological catching-up is intended here as 
the ability of new entrant firms to quickly reduce or revert the gap with the leaders and engage 
in research at the technological frontier, i.e. of affecting the direction of technological change. 
The Semiconductor industry is chosen as field of study because of the peculiar transformation of 
its industrial and technological ecosystem over the years. The industry was globally dominated 
by US firms until the end of the 1970s. It then witnessed the successful technological and market 
catch-up achieved by Japanese companies in the 1980s and, subsequently, by firms from South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore in the 1990s. In this thesis, we identify the strategies that incum-
bents and catching-up firms have followed when navigating through the technology space by 
means of statistical analysis of complex patent citations networks. We use patent data as proxies 
of inventions and patent citations as indicator of similarity in engineering challenges and prob-
lem-solving approaches.  
 This doctoral dissertation provides a new way of looking at catching-up, which departs 
from the usual focus on technological trajectories defined at the product level. We argue that 
products are not necessarily the correct unit of analysis for a study on firms’ inventive strate-
gies. The inventive process is largely an engineering problem-solving activity. Learning occurs 
by finding the right approach to tackle engineering challenges and overcome technical bottle-
necks. Consequently, we choose to study paths of solutions (i.e. engineering design trajectories) 
on the space of engineering problems, which, potentially, can affect several products at once.   
 In Chapter 2, we provide a data-driven description of industrial dynamics and catching-up 
in the Semiconductor industry and highlight similarities and differences between successful and 
unsuccessful catching-up cases. Our findings show how the local Semiconductor industries in 
S.Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, China and Malaysia shared similar initial national focus 
on semiconductors and strength of technical capabilities in this industry, up to the beginning of 
the 1990s. Yet, prominent catching-up countries (S.Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) later followed 
very different inventive strategies than less successful ones, especially regarding which technol-
ogies they improved upon.  
 In Chapter 3, we analyse in more detail the peculiar inventive strategies that have been fol-
lowed by Korean, Taiwanese and Singaporean firms and how their actions affected the direction 
of technological change in the industry. We show that, up to the 1990s, firms from these coun-
tries prevalently devoted inventive effort to solving common engineering challenges by applying 
established approaches to problem solving. In other words, they followed the prevailing engi-
neering trajectories. However, from the beginning of the 2000s, some of these firms began allo-
cating more inventive effort to new engineering challenges now faced by the Semiconductor in-
dustry. This is especially true for those related to LCD monitor technologies and advances in 
metal–oxide–semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs).   
 In Chapter 4, we assess the evolution of the revealed technological advantage of incumbents 
and new entrants. To accomplish this, we develop a method to identify technology domains and 
their life cycle stage. Technology domains are defined as areas of research that share a set of 
common technological problems that are tackled by applying similar approaches. Our method is 
able to infer the life cycle stage of technology domains by analysing their engineering trajectory. 
 We then investigate in which domains new entrants and incumbents have a revealed compara-
tive advantage. We show how new entrants from latecomer countries were able to upgrade their 
comparative advantage from relatively mature and declining technology domains to emerging 
ones in the period between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s.   
 In Chapter 5, we map firms’ technical knowledge genome along two dimensions, depth and 
breath. We do this by building on an analogy between knowledge and genetic evolution. We look 
at how much of the knowledge of technical solutions that has been generated historically in a 
given technology domain is inherited by a firm (i.e. the firm’s knowledge depth), and how a 
firm’s knowledge is distributed across domains (i.e. the firms’ knowledge breadth). We hypothe-
size that firms’ knowledge depth and breadth crucially affect their probability to persist innovat-
ing at the frontier. We show how the Semiconductor industry is characterized by a strong level 
of technical knowledge modularity. This means that what has been learned in a given domain is 
not particularly useful in other domains. Our findings show that, in this context, knowledge di-
versification is necessary to survive technological shocks that take the form of a change in the 
way semiconductor-related engineering challenges are tackled (i.e. a change in engineering tra-
jectory). Firms that have a large knowledge breadth are more likely to persist innovating at the 
frontier after a change in engineering trajectory. This is because they have better chances that at 
least some of their current knowledge will still be useful in the future. This effect is positively 
enhanced by also having a large knowledge depth.  
 The theoretical framework and quantitative methods developed in this thesis open a path 
to better understand the fundamental cognitive drivers of technical change and to assess multi-
dimensional technological determinants of firms’ success. Knowing which firms are special and 
in which respect eventually makes it possible to investigate what makes them so. In the last part 
of the dissertation, we present a research agenda for unleashing the potential of this new theo-
retical and methodological approach for improving our understanding of the complex co-
evolutionary pattern of technical change and industrial dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Introduction: Complexity, technological change and catching up 1 
1 INTRODUCTION: COMPLEXITY, 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 
CATCHING UP 
“More than anything else technology creates our world. It creates our wealth, our economy, our 
very way of being”  
W. Brian Arthur (2009) 
 
“...agents, organizations and technology do not steadily proceed toward a global optimum. Rather 
they are linked to one another and their interactions create (and also prohibit) pathways for their 
future development” 
Magda Fontana (2014) 
 
“While innovation has been the main source of economic progress in the West, learning has also 
been important for the catch-up of the rest of the non-Western latecomers”  
Keun Lee (2015) 
 
 
  
 2 Introduction: Complexity, technological change and catching up 
This PhD thesis provides a micro-founded and data-driven narrative of the successful catching-
up in technical capabilities and market shares achieved by firms from latecomer countries in the 
Semiconductor industry. It does so by combining in an original way theories, concepts and sta-
tistical methods from technology dynamics, complexity, innovation, catching-up and network 
sciences.  
 Economic development can be described as a process of structural transformation and 
technological change characterized by discontinuities. There is a wide agreement in the litera-
ture on catching-up that some of the key drivers of growth rate differentials are technology and 
knowledge gaps and the presence (or the absence) of particular social and economic conditions 
that allow (or prevent) countries to absorb foreign technologies successfully (Fagerberg and 
Godinho, 2002, Fagerberg, 1994 and 1987, Abramovitz, 1994, Verspagen, 1991, Gerschenrkon, 
1962). Yet, catching-up has been mostly studied at the macro-level, despite being based on inno-
vation and learning processes, which happen at the micro-level. Plenty of work provided anec-
dotal evidence on learning strategies applied by successful catching-up firms (e.g. Lee and Lim, 
2001; Mathews and Cho, 1999, Cho et al., 1998) and related policies implemented by latecomer 
countries (e.g. Bell and Juma, 2008; Chang and Tsai, 2002; Chang et al., 1994). However, there is 
a scarcity of data-driven and firm-level studies that simultaneously analyse technology dynamics 
and firms inventive strategies, in the context of catching-up (with the notable exception of Lee 
(2014)).   This PhD thesis contributes to fill this gap. We chose to study the Semiconductor in-
dustry because of the peculiar evolution of its technological and industrial ecosystem. It is a dy-
namic high-tech industry in which catching-up prominently occurred (Langlois and 
Steinmueller, 1999). Consequently, it provides a very interesting example of co-evolution of 
technological change, inventive strategies and catching-up. We deliver a data-driven statistical 
answer to two key questions: (i) How did the technological environment evolve in the Semicon-
ductor industry at the time that firms from latecomer countries successfully catch-up with the 
leaders?  (ii) Which inventive strategies have been followed by successful catching-up firms? An-
swering the former question allows understanding if any idiosyncrasy at the technology level 
favoured the catching-up process and if the technological landscape of the industry significantly 
changed after the emergence of new players. At the same time, revealing which inventive strate-
gies have been followed by latecomer firms allow understanding how they interacted with the 
technological landscape during the catching-up process. The reader might wonder, what do we 
mean by inventive strategies? Throughout this work, we intend them as a multidimensional con-
cept. In its essence the term ‘inventive strategies’ refers to the common denominator that links 
together the following questions: which technologies do you improve upon? Are they local or for-
eign-invented? How quickly do you go through improvement cycles? Do you venture to upgrade 
your skills to emerging technology domains or you rather strengthen your comparative advantage 
in mature technologies? Do you opt to specialize in a narrow set of technologies or do you attempt 
building a broad technical knowledge base? In this thesis, we answer these questions by analys-
ing patent data, which are the largest available records of technology developments and provide 
information on firms’ inventive histories. To do that we design novel analytic tools that extract 
significant information out of noisy, complex and dynamic citation networks.  
 Since, in this work, we focus our analysis on inventive strategies and catching-up, we need 
to ask ourselves an additional crucial question: Are there universally valid and replicable catch-
ing-up recipes? It is very tempting to search for generalizable lessons for rapid economic devel-
opment. This exercise is, however, prone to oversimplifying the problem. This is due to the na-
ture of the co-evolution of the technological landscape, the industrial ecosystem, the strategic 
decisions made by the actors that populate them and their capabilities. Long run market success 
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is ultimately based on the development of frontier technological capabilities (Lee and Lim, 
2001). Technological capabilities are defined as the knowledge and skills that an agent needs to 
create, use, adapt and improve technology (Lall, 1993)1. Technological capabilities are necessary 
to adapt to changes in the technology environment. At the same time, their development is also a 
direct source of technological change. Consequently, any meaningful theory, explanation or dis-
cussion of industrial dynamics and catching-up needs to be tied to the discussion of how the 
technical system underlying the industry or products of interest evolves and how inventive 
agents interact with the technology landscape. Thinking in terms of complexity and evolution 
helps improving our understanding of these interconnected phenomena (Frenken, 2006). It is 
also crucial to understand whether general catching-up recipes may exist. 
 There are at least three key features of technological change that make it a complex phe-
nomenon: uncertainty, interactions and path-dependence. Neglecting these features might lead to 
misleading conclusions about the existence of catching-up recipes. The process of technological 
innovation can be seen as searching for better technical solutions in a technology space (Silver-
berg and Verspagen, 2003, Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). As such, the outcome of technological 
progress, for instance which features of existing technologies are improved or which new tech-
nologies are developed, is characterized by uncertainty. Depending on the magnitude of tech-
nical change and the level of heterogeneity of players’ inventive strategies, this outcome can also 
be unpredictable. In its mildest form, technical progress is a stochastic process in which players 
do not know the best inventive strategies to follow at a given point in time, but they are able to 
associate probabilities to the different future directions of improvements. In this case, if we 
could observe several realizations of the same system starting from the same initial conditions, 
we would converge to an expected direction of improvements, even though individual runs 
might look very different. This would mean that the same inventive trajectories and catching-up 
pathways would be replicable in the same context. However, the arrival of radical innovations 
that revolutionize a technology domain or create an entirely new one, is usually characterized by 
Knightian uncertainty.  This makes it impossible to even define the probabilities of the different 
outcomes. To some extent, innovations of such a large scale are idiosyncratic strokes of individ-
ual genius sometimes with a strong component of luck, like the discovery of Penicillin by Alex-
ander Fleming. Even when they are the results of a collective process, radical innovations need a 
particular combination of talented researchers and engineers, forward-looking managers and 
risk-taking investors that make their realization a process that is highly sensible to small per-
turbations and, therefore, chaotic in nature. In this case, even rewinding the system and running 
it again might lead to different outcomes. In a Knightian kind of world, replicable catching-up 
recipes cannot exist. However, radical innovations and paradigm shifts are rare events (Fleming, 
2007, Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005 and 2007) and a lot of novelty is cumulated through in-
cremental improvements whose trajectory can be subject to educated guesses. The most famous 
of them is perhaps Gordon Moore’s law. Moore, one of Intel’s founder, predicted in a 1965 paper 
that the number of transistors on a chip would have duplicate every 18 months (Moore, 1965), 
as it indeed happened since then. 
 A lot of the uncertainty intrinsic in the process of technological change comes from the in-
teractions between players’ inventive strategies, the technological structure of a given industry 
                                                             
1 They are also known as technology-based design capabilities or engineering design capabilities (Luo et al., 2012; 
Dym et al., 2005). 
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and the technology and industrial policies that different governments overlay on the system 
(Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997). These interactions make the trajectory of technology improve-
ments and catching-up pathways context specific. Similar strategies might lead to dissimilar out-
comes in different national and sectoral contexts. Moreover, there are many different sorts of 
interdependencies between technologies which make them complex adaptive systems (Frenken, 
2006; Foster, 2005), or, as defined in the engineering literature, complex engineering systems, 
which are rich in human and technology complexity (De Weck et al., 2011). Technologies have 
within, between and inter-temporal connections. Current technologies are related with their 
previous generations by a relationship of improvement and are connected to current genera-
tions by a relationship of possible cross-fertilization. Technical progress in a given technology 
can spill to others depending on the relatedness of the engineering problems driving its im-
provement. Arthur argues that “new technologies are not ‘inventions’ that came from nowhere [. . 
.] They are created, - constructed, put together, assembled – from previously existing technologies” 
(Arthur, 2009, p. 2, words in regular font style are adapted from the original quote).2 Knowledge 
spillovers and cross-fertilization effect can be better understood if we consider technologies as 
part of a nested system, or, borrowing once again Brian Arthur’s words, as “systems of technolo-
gies” where “each component of technology is itself in miniature a technology” (Arthur, 2009, p. 
23).  The interdependence between different components reveals the structure that explains 
why technical advances differently diffuse across technologies and why technological opportuni-
ties are not evenly distributed across industries and domains, and are clustered in time. This ul-
timately affects catching-up prospects of latecomers and casts doubts on the existence of context 
independent catching-up recipes. 
 The nested nature of technologies and the direction taken by past improvements are ulti-
mately responsible for the third key feature that make technological change a complex phenom-
enon, namely path-dependence. As argued by Foster (2005), “such a system must exhibit some 
degree of structural irreversibility due to the inherent hierarchical and ‘bonding’ nature of the con-
nections between components that are formed as structural development proceeds. It is this that 
results in the inflexibility and maladaptiveness that precipitates a structural discontinuity of some 
kind.” (Foster, 2005, p.3) From the perspective of catch-up, the structural and intertemporal 
connections across technologies not only channel novelty along rigid pathways, but also make 
firms’ learning choices irreversible. Several authors stressed the relationship between the de-
gree of cumulativeness of technological change and the ease of entrance of new players (Lee and 
Lim, 2001; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997; Dosi, 1982). The important lesson is that the irreversi-
bility of the learning trajectory makes catching-up reversible. What appears to be a lexical oxymo-
ron is actually the reality that latecomer firms face. Learning along the wrong direction, perhaps 
due to initial positive market and technical feedbacks, can lead latecomer firms to get stuck and 
interrupt the process of technical capabilities upgrading. This can push countries into the mid-
dle-income trap or even make them regress along the income ladder (Lee, 2014). Furthermore, 
wrong learning paths can prevent innovation systems to complete the transition from a learn-
ing-based system to a novelty generating-one (Vertesy, 2011). If learning is path-dependent and 
economic development is based on knowledge-upgrading then the latter is also strongly path- 
                                                             
2 Similar thoughts on the existence of knowledge spillovers and percolation effects, have been elaborated by, among 
others, Kauffman (1988), Verspagen (1997), Silverberg and Verspagen (2005; 2007a; 2007b), Krafft and Quatraro 
(2011) and Metcalfe (2014). 
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dependent. The importance of looking for the right path is therefore crucial for the growth pro-
spects of countries and firms.  
 Path-dependence can be a blessing or a curse. Obviously, incumbents favour cumulative 
technical improvements as long as they follow the direction that rewards the knowledge that 
they accumulated. When that is the case, incumbents enjoy a large advantage over latecomers. 
The emergence of discontinuities brakes that advantage. Thus, the faster those discontinuities 
arise (i.e. the shorter the technology life cycle), the more windows of opportunities for new en-
trants open up (Lee, 2014). Path-dependence also plays against the effectiveness of applying 
what has been learned in one national and sectoral context to different ones. Systems that are 
subject to path-dependence have an intrinsic resistance to radical changes. For this reasons, ap-
plying a set of policies or following a specific inventive strategy just because it has been success-
fully applied elsewhere has no guarantee to succeed, unless the given industry or firms share 
similar histories with those intended to be imitated.  
 The characterization of technology and catching-up dynamics as complex adaptive systems 
that we sketched here raises scepticism on the existence of universally valid and replicable 
catching-up recipes. Does this mean that we are condemned to ignorance? Does this imply the 
irrelevance of studying these phenomena? Absolutely not. Characterizing the dynamics of eco-
nomic and technical systems as complex phenomena must not be mistaken as stating that they 
are purely random processes (Baofu, 2007). In contrast, thinking in terms of complexity helps 
analysing the emergence of patterns and study their properties. The essence of complexity 
thinking applied to technology and catching-up dynamics lays in understanding two crucial mes-
sages. First, one should devote great efforts in separating signal from noise and identify statisti-
cally significant peculiarities in terms of inventive strategies followed by successful players 
along their development path. Second, this exercise should attempt to unfold history by reveal-
ing what makes successful latecomers really special, rather than trying to search for recipes in 
which to trust blindly. This allows revealing historical micro-level trajectories of catching-up. 
These two messages guide the analysis developed in this thesis.   
1.1 Conceptual framework and structure of the thesis 
The thesis analyses technological catching-up in the semiconductor industry at the firm level. 
Semiconductors are the source of catching-up narratives par excellence. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, this industry has seen a profound change in its industrial ecosystem, with the success-
ful technological and market catch-up of firms from latecomer countries like South Korea, Tai-
wan and Singapore. In this thesis, by technological catching-up we mean the ability of new en-
trant firms to engage in research at the technological frontier, i.e. of affecting the direction of 
technological change.  
 The three main characteristics of technology that makes it a complex adaptive system ex-
plained above, namely uncertainty, interdependence and path-dependence, have pushed scholars 
to focus mainly on the direction, cumulativeness and speed of technical change as drivers of 
catching-up processes. These dimensions have proven to be key determinants of the ease of en-
try (Lee and Lim, 2001, Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997, Klepper 1997 and 1996, Dosi, 1982). How-
ever, we argue that, if we conceptualize technologies as part of a structured system in which op-
portunities of advances are unevenly distributed and irregularly connected, as done by Arthur 
(2009), Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) and Thurner et al. (2010), four additional properties of 
the system of technologies become crucial in the context of catching-up: the structure and rank-
ing  of the system of technologies, the magnitude of change in problem-solving approaches 
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(which we later define as engineering trajectories) and the heterogeneity of life cycle stages of 
technology domains. Throughout the thesis we intend technology domains as areas of research 
that define a set of common technological problems that are tackled applying similar mindsets 
and toolboxes. A high-tech industry like the Semiconductors is characterized by an heterogene-
ous set of technologies. Technologies are solutions to particular needs. Satisfying those needs 
requires solving given technical challenges. Engineering problems can be tackled from a variety 
of approaches. As will be extensively discussed in Chapter 3, 4 and 5, the sequences of improve-
ments within a given technological domain highlight which approaches to problem solving have 
been used. We define these technical paths as engineering design trajectories, which are the pro-
jection in the engineering design space of trade-offs between technical characteristics deter-
mined at the product level, i.e. of technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982). Decisions on which fea-
tures of a given product need to be improved and how the product is intended to be designed 
define which engineering challenges need to be overcome.  Throughout this thesis, we will also 
discuss how the similarity in the kind of technical problems faced in an industry generates the 
structure of the system of engineering problems. Engineering challenges can be interconnected 
and solving bottlenecks opens up large and widespread opportunities for technical improve-
ments. The structure of the system determines the availability of technological diversification 
pathways and, ultimately, the likelihood of being a persistent core innovator (Chapter 5). The 
heterogeneity of beliefs and search strategies in the technology design space, at the firm level, 
determines the simultaneous existence of different approaches to problem solving and the level 
of inventive efforts devoted to different problems (Chapter 3). Therefore, engineering problems 
can be ranked based on how much inventive efforts they attract. The level of inventive effort is 
also related to the breadth of problem-solving approaches applied to tackle engineering chal-
lenges. Problems that are collectively determined to have high priority attract a lot of inventive 
effort that is likely to cover a wide spectrum of approaches. Therefore, emerging technology do-
mains are likely to be characterized by heterogeneous beliefs on which are the most promising 
approaches to solve a technical problem (Chapter 4). Eventually market selection will foster 
convergence to a subset of search strategies. However, the entrance of new players may bring 
back a large variety of approaches to problem solving into the system. Therefore, as will be 
shown in Chapter 4, technology domains have life cycles, and, at each point in time, there will be 
several domains at different stages of their life cycles within an industry.  
 The structure and ranking of the system of technologies, the magnitude of change in ap-
proaches to problem solving and the heterogeneity of life cycle stages, play an important role in 
determining the ease of catching-up. This role is related to the different ways in which they af-
fect path-dependence. Suppose that the structure of the system of technologies is such that dif-
ferent technology domains and their components are largely and equally connected to each oth-
er in terms of knowledge relatedness. Suppose also that change is localized in one or few com-
ponents. In this case, the probability of breaking path-dependence in the learning advantage of 
incumbents is at its lowest level. The capabilities that incumbents have developed in the past are 
still useful for their survival, or at least allow them to diversify into areas not affected by change 
in the approaches to problem solving. When change is still localized but the system is more 
sparsely connected then the probability that a small window of opportunity for latecomer opens 
up is slightly larger. This is because now incumbents specialized in the components subject to 
change have less chances to use their accumulated knowledge in related areas. Suppose now 
that the magnitude of changes in the approaches to problem solving is larger and pervades to 
several domains. If the system is highly connected, incumbents might still enjoy a small ad-
vantage but only provided that are able to successfully recombine their knowledge. If the system 
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is sparsely connected then path-dependence is fully broken and a pathway of entry opportuni-
ties lay before latecomers. Similarly, the existence of multiple technology domains at different 
stages of their life cycle also interacts with firms’ inventive histories and their strategic options 
for the future. New entrants can decide to focus on emerging domains and enjoy the potential 
early-mover advantage (but also face the hazard) associated with being the first to tackle new 
engineering challenges or explore new problem solving approaches. They can also decide to fo-
cus on more mature or declining domains, in which niches with less competition might be avail-
able for entrance and provide a safe environment for technical learning. 
 The novel theoretical contribution of this thesis resides in making the first attempt toward 
including the structure and ranking of the system of engineering design problems, the magni-
tude of change in approaches to problem-solving and the heterogeneity of life cycle stages of 
technology domains in the discussion of technical catching-up. We use a combination of meth-
odologies based on patent citation network analysis to study catching-up and inventive strate-
gies in the semiconductor industry. The thesis is composed of four essays that are theoretically 
and methodologically intertwined. We analyse patent citation networks to identify the main en-
gineering design trajectories followed by the industry. This is done by applying a methodology 
that identifies the network of main paths (NMPs) within large citation networks (Vespagen, 
2007, Martinelli, 2010, 2012; Hummon and Doreian, 1989). More specifically, citations are in-
terpreted as footprints of similarity in approaches to problem solving. The NMPs highlights the 
sequences of citations that are more central across the system of technologies. The main path ap-
proach is then complemented by two other methodologies. We apply network community-
detection techniques to identifying sub-technology domains in the industry, their structural rela-
tionship and the stage of their life cycle. Finally, we make use of a genetic approach to patent ci-
tation networks (Martinelli and Nomaler, 2014) to measure persistence and modularity of tech-
nical knowledge and the breadth and depth of firm’s technical capabilities. In this approach, the 
knowledge of a specific solution to a selected engineering problem, which is represented by a 
given patent, is seen as a gene that spreads to the population of inventors. Citations therefore 
represent genetic heritage that persists from parent (the cited patent) to offspring (the citing 
patent). As a note for the reader, we stress that the methodologies developed in this thesis are 
also nested. The main path approach is used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 as the basic building block, 
whose function is to reduce large citation networks to their backbone. Then further analysis is 
done on top of the network of main paths. Yet, despite the risk of redundancies, we decided to 
briefly introduce the whole procedure from the very beginning each time such that each chapter 
can be read as a stand-alone essay. 
 In Chapter 2, we provide a data-driven description of industrial dynamics and catching-up 
in the Semiconductor industry and highlight similarity and differences between successful and 
unsuccessful catching-up cases. In particular, we reveal how the Semiconductor industries in 
S.Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, China and Malaysia shared similar initial national condi-
tions at the technology level, up to the beginning of the 1990s. However, we unfold how they lat-
er followed very different inventive strategies in terms of source and speed of technical im-
provements. In the second essay (Chapter 3) we investigate whether we observe stability or dis-
continuity in the approach to problem solving and in the ranking of engineering problems of 
semiconductor technologies between 1976 and 2006. We also analyse which firms were pushing 
the trajectories toward either stability or discontinuity and how latecomer firms behaved in this 
respect. Findings show that the innovative entrance of firms from Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
occurred in the mid-1990s in a moment in which the technological trajectory was stable. Up to 
the end of the 1990s, their learning strategy was prevalently focused on following long-
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established paths of technical improvements and allocating their inventive efforts in accordance 
with the then prevailing ranking of engineering problems. Yet, in the beginning of the 2000s, 
some of them became active ranking-changers and start focusing on a new set of engineering 
challenges related to LCD monitor technologies and advances in metal–oxide–semiconductor 
field-effect transistors (MOSFETs).   
 Although very successful in terms of quickly acquiring influence on the direction of the en-
gineering trajectories, the path following type of entrance applied by latecomers, raises a fun-
damental question concerning the sustainability of their specialization patterns. Did latecomers 
succeed in upgrading their comparative technical advantage from relatively old technology do-
mains to young and emerging ones? This question is answered in the third essay (Chapter 4), 
where we develop a methodology to identify sub-domains of semiconductor technologies and 
categorize the stage of their life cycle. Our results show that, up to the end of the 1990s firms 
from Taiwan, Korea and Singapore specialized mainly in mature and exhausting technologies, 
sometimes attempting to renew them, whereas American and Japanese firms were comparative-
ly better in younger areas. This learning process allowed capability building by Korean and Tai-
wanese latecomers that resulted in a revealed technological advantage in emerging areas at the 
beginning of the 2000s.  
 These results lead to a series of further research questions that are analysed in the fourth 
and last essay (Chapter 5). The fragmentation of the semiconductors’ value chain from the 1990s 
onwards increased the degree of functional specialization of the players involved. Nowadays de-
sign, manufacturing, testing and commercialization of semiconductor devices are made by dif-
ferent firms. However, costs, profit margins and the level of competition differ widely across dif-
ferent stages of the value chain. In particular, the manufacturing stage of the semiconductor in-
dustry shows increasing costs (due to increasing product complexity), decreasing profit margins 
and increasing competition, the latter mainly due to the entrance of China. Therefore, to escape 
the low profitability and high competition trap Taiwanese, Korean and Singaporean firms need 
to move along the semiconductor value chain. The ease of this specialization upgrading crucially 
depends on their ability to diversify their technical knowledge. This is what we analyse in Chap-
ter 5, where we study firms’ innovative survival in the semiconductor industry as a function of 
knowledge diversification and accumulation. As we discussed earlier, the semiconductor indus-
try is characterized by high levels of technical modularity. We hypothesize that, in such context, 
diversification and knowledge accumulation provide better chances for innovation persistence. 
We argue that, when knowledge is hardly portable across domains, the spread of survival chanc-
es between diversified and specialized players should be larger when technological change is 
knowledge replacing. Survival as core innovator (i.e. innovative survival) is defined as persisting 
having patents located on the main paths of citations. Our findings show that diversification sig-
nificantly improves core innovators’ odds of survival but only for large levels of knowledge 
breadth. The effect is indeed conditional to the level of knowledge persistence. In contrast, 
knowledge depth alone does not affect survival as core innovator. However, there are positive 
complementarities between knowledge breadth and depth. 
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2 TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION OF 
THE GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR 
INDUSTRY 
ABSTRACT 
In a wold pervaded by Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), the Semiconductor 
industry is an engine of economic growth. It is also one of the few high-tech industries that wit-
nessed a significant global diffusion of inventive activities. Several Asian countries attempted to 
narrow their technological gap with the leaders in this industry. Only three of them succeeded. 
These are S.Korea, Taiwan and, albeit to a smaller extent, Singapore. In this chapter we provide 
an overview of how the technological and industrial evolution of semiconductors. We quantify 
the technological and market success of these countries and discuss how their entry was fa-
voured by the increase in the technical modularity of semiconductor devices. We also investigate 
similarities and differences of initial conditions between successful and unsuccessful catching-
up countries. Finally, we show how the former markedly differ from the latter in the extent to 
which, after focusing on improving foreign technologies, they improved upon national ones. 
Firms from successful catching up countries also went through significantly faster cycles of 
technical improvements than their competitor in the US, Japan and the unsuccessful latecomers. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Technology shapes the economy. The success and failure of firms, industries, and countries de-
pends on their ability to keep pace with technological change and being active agents of it. To do 
so they need to constantly introduce, learn and adopt better technologies.  Some technologies 
have wider effects on the economy as a whole. We currently live in a world shaped by infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICTs), whose broad applicability has pervasive effects 
on the economy (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005, Soete, 2000 and Freeman and Soete, 1997).  
The flagship of ICT technologies is represented by the Semiconductor industry, whose products 
are ubiquitous in modern electronics. Improving semiconductor technologies is not only a 
source of pervasive technical change but also a key engine of economic growth. For instance, the 
U.S. semiconductor industry’s share of U.S. GDP is the third largest of all U.S. manufacturing in-
dustries, behind only the petroleum refinery and pharmaceutical preparations industries (Par-
pala, 2014). Interestingly, the Semiconductor industry is one of the few high-tech sectors that 
spread to countries that were still experiencing a large technological gap with the leading ones, 
at the time of their entrance in this industry. Given semiconductors’ pervasive role as general-
purpose technologies and its peculiar globalized industrial structure, it is natural to wonder how 
such inclusive growth has occurred. Did the evolution of semiconductor technology favoured the 
entrance of new players? What does it make successful catching-up firms special? 
 In this chapter, we provide an overview of the evolution of the technological and market 
evolution of the Semiconductor industry. We show how this industry has been characterized by 
inclusive growth of technological innovations since about the beginning of the 1980s. We also 
discuss how technical and market catching-up has prominently occurred in two waves. In the 
first wave, which happened in the 1980s, market and technological advantage of US firms has 
been eroded by the entrance of Japanese companies. In the 1990s, a second wave of entrance 
from Asian Tigers’ firms disrupted market structure. The progressive development of strong 
technical capabilities allowed catching-up firms to rapidly gain market shares. We discuss how 
the evolution of the industry’s product portfolio and underlying technologies, in particular the 
increase technical modularity, have favoured this catching-up waves. By analysing patent rec-
ords, we also provide a preliminary analysis of the inventive strategies followed by firms from 
successful and unsuccessful catching-up countries in terms of the sources and speed of technical 
improvements. We also show how, in successful catching-up countries, the inventive activities of 
local firms have led to the formation of a national industry, with several players that progres-
sively improved upon each other’s technologies.  
2.2 Technological change, industrial dynamics and catching-up 
We study the semiconductor industry because it provides a unique case study to test theories 
and empirical evidence of the interplay between technological change and catch-up. Until the 
mid-1990s, Semiconductor inventive activities used to be more concentrated geographically 
than expected by looking at the overall set of technologies patented at the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO), as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index 
(HHI) of semiconductor patent shares by country of invention reported in Figure 1. Then, Semi-
conductor inventive activities spread out globally considerably more than expected.  
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Figure 1: The globalization of Semiconductor inventive activities 
 
It is natural to wonder then, which geographical locations have become important sources of 
semiconductor inventions over time. Figure 2 shows the evolution of semiconductor patent 
shares by country of invention. In the 1960s (not reported in Figure 2) US firms held about 85% 
of patents granted by the USPTO in the semiconductor technological classes. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, this share collapsed to less than 50%. This decrease was largely due to the rise of Ja-
pan as the US’ main competitor. However, just after matching the US patent share in 1993, Ja-
pan’s one starts decreasing, while the US level remained approximately constant. Japanese com-
petitive edge as top semiconductor innovator was eroded by the catching-up in technical capa-
bilities by S.Korea, Taiwan and, albeit to a smaller but still non-negligible extent, Singapore. 
Hobday (1995), discussed how a wider set of latecomer countries started manufacturing Semi-
conductors at the beginning of the 1990s. These are China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand.   As a comparison, we report their patent shares. Their performance up to 2006 has 
been poor. China, Hong Kong and Malaysia, have recently experienced growth in their Semicon-
ductor patent shares, while Indonesia and Thailand’s shares have been languishing. However, 
despite this recent growth, patent shares for China, Hong Kong and Malaysia were still very 
marginal, until at least 2006, compared to the technological leaders (US and Japan) and the main 
followers (Korea and Taiwan). They were also considerably lower than any of the top European 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands and UK), which are themselves very marginal 
contributors to technological innovation in the Semiconductors.   
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Figure 2: USPTO semiconductor patent shares by country of invention 
Note: author’s elaboration based on the NBER-USPTO data (Hall et al., 2001) 
 
 
Figure 3: Share of semiconductor sales by geographic destination  
Note: author’s elaboration of data from the Global Sales Report (GSR) by the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics 
(WSTS). The GSR is a three-month moving average of semiconductor sales activity by billing country. The  data is 
provided by the WSTS, which represents approximately 55 semiconductor companies worldwide. 
 
 
Figure 4: Share of semiconductor sales by geographic origin 
Note: Figure from Yinug (2015). Market shares based on headquarter of seller. Numbers rounded. Data source: 
SIA/World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS)/HIS/PricewaterhouseCoopers/IC Insights. 
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The catch-up in terms of technological output by Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, is closely 
matched by the rise in sale shares. Figure 3 shows how remarkable the similarity between the 
trends for patent shares by country of invention and the sale shares by billing country is. From 
the beginning of the 2000s the Asia Pacific region became the most important market in the 
world for semiconductor sales3. It is much more difficult to obtain comprehensive disaggregated 
data for semiconductor sales by country of origin. However, for those at our disposal4, which we 
show in Figure 4, we can notice a strong similarity between the trends for market and patent 
shares by country of origin5. The large correlation between these trends suggests that, as argued 
by Lee and Lim (2001), long run market success and improvements of technological capabilities 
co-evolve. 
 Semiconductors then clearly stand out of the crowd in terms of prominent entrance of new 
players from latecomer countries. This suggests that there may be something peculiar to the 
path of technological change in this industry that lowered barriers to entrance. The product 
portfolio of the industry could be broadly defined by two main categories: commodity integrated 
circuits and application specific integrated circuits (ASICs). The former includes all sort of inte-
grated circuits (ICs) that are mass produced in a standardized manner and used in a large num-
ber of applications. Microprocessors, memories, simple standard chips, and transistors belong to 
this category.  The second large category of devices is made by application specific integrated 
circuits (ASICs). The ubiquity of electronics in modern manufacturing process and products of-
ten required, besides standardized microchips, specific devices tailored to the computing needs 
of the given application. ASICs are therefore a very heterogeneous category that includes both 
ICs that are programmed by the producer to suit a specific need required by the user, and field-
programmable gate arrays, which are designed to allow users to customize them to perform a 
specific function. Despite the undifferentiated nature of commodity devices, economic returns 
and the capabilities required to design them differ widely within the category. The microproces-
sors segment is largely dominated by Intel and Advanced Micro Devices and no player from late-
comer countries managed to enter and consolidate in this segment. Memories make the opposite 
case. They are relatively easier to design and produce than microprocessor. Competition in this 
segment is therefore based on cost-advantage. As discussed by Langlois and Steinmueller 
(1999), this made it a particularly favourable area of entry for latecomers with initially limited 
technical capabilities but strong wage advantage. As we have shown in Figure 2, latecomers’ en-
trance in the Semiconductor technological arena, clustered in two distinct waves. First Japanese 
producers successfully entered in the memory market and challenged the US leadership in the 
1980s. Then large conglomerates from South Korea in particular, and Taiwan to a smaller extent, 
like Samsung, LG and Hyundai Electronics, prominently entered into the memory-making mar-
ket.  
 ASICs are a more interesting case, which show the existence of crucial interactions between 
technological change and industrial dynamics even more prominently than memories. The diffu-
sion of ASICs became possible thanks to the persistent miniaturization of integrated circuits 
components, as predicted by Moore’s law, and the introduction of a particular design of ICs 
                                                             
3 The data comes from the US Semiconductor Industry Association's Global Sales Report (GSR) based on data from the 
World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS) organization.  
4 The data source is Yinug (2015). 
5 Note that the SIA report excluded foundry output. Consequently, sales of Taiwanese and, partly, Chinese companies, 
are likely to be largely underestimated. 
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called complementary metal–oxide–semiconductor (CMOS). On the one hand, the miniaturiza-
tion of chips made them ubiquitous and increased computational power. This also created de-
mand for customized ICs. On the other hand, CMOS allowed high-density of logic functions on a 
chip, decreasing production costs. The two effects made it possible to invest in the design and 
manufacturing of ICs for small market segments that would have previously been unprofitable. 
This allowed the entrance of small specialized players which focused on specific technical skills 
and thorough knowledge of users’ needs (Adams et al., 2013; Fontana and Malerba, 2010; Ernst, 
2005; Linden and Somaya, 2003).  
 The combination of the emergence of CMOS technology, the diffusion of ASICs and the verti-
cal disintegration of the value-chain, explain the second wave of globalization of the semicon-
ductor industry, with the emergence of key players in the Asian Tigers (S.Korea, Taiwan, Singa-
pore and Hong Kong), and assembly and test plants in Southeast Asia (Malaysia and Thailand) 
and China. Adams et al. (2013) explain how “the increased adoption of Complementary Metal Ox-
ide Semiconductor (CMOS) production processes weakened the interdependence of product design 
and manufacturing. [...] With the creation of standardized interfaces between components and 
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools a modular system developed. [...] The interdependence 
between product design and manufacturing was weakened in many product segments in semicon-
ductors and specialist firms were able to enter the industry at both the design and the manufactur-
ing stages” (Adams et al., 2013, p.287). Technical modularity is a form of design that makes com-
ponents of a system interdependent within modules but independent across them. (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000). Modular unit can therefore be designed and manufactured in separate steps and 
locations. The emergence of modular designs is one of the forces that fragmented the value chain 
and fostered specialization in the semiconductors industry, in other words, technical modularity 
lead to organizational modularity (Ernst, 2005a, 2005b). However, modularity has not neces-
sarily reduced complexity. As discussed by Ernst technical modularity allowed combining more 
and more layers of components into a single chip, making the design of the whole system more 
complex. In fact, since mid-1990s, ASICs have become so complex to include what were previ-
ously seen as undifferentiated devices like microprocessors and memory blocks into a single 
chip that performs the same functions of an entire system. These chips are indeed known as 
“System on a Chip” (SoC). The design, manufacturing and commercialization of complex SoC is 
certainly the most heterogeneous semiconductor market segment in terms of players, strategies 
and product characteristics (Linden and Somaya, 2003). As a way to reduce uncertainty due to 
the increased design complexity of SoCs, incumbent firms became quite conservative concerning 
exploring new design methodologies to avoid discovering problems in the subsequent manufac-
turing of large yields. This has open a room for risk-taking latecomers “willing to use chip designs 
that they believed could help them to capture market shares” (Ernst, 2005a, p.60). 
 The increased design, testing and manufacturing complexity is only one of the technical and 
business challenges faced by players in the semiconductor industry. Shorter product life cycles, 
shrinking profit margins, and global competition are additional key concerns (Brown and Lin-
den, 2009). This is in particular true for the market segments and the steps of the value chain 
traditionally targeted by latecomer. Starting from the mid-2000s, the entrance of Chinese com-
panies in the memory market and the testing, manufacturing and assembly of semiconductor 
devices has directly challenged the success of previous latecomers. Furthermore, while certainly 
providing entry opportunities for Asian Tiger’s latecomers, as argued by Lee (2013), the short-
ening of the technology life cycle also threatens their ability to sustain their growth path, espe-
cially when facing the competition of more cost-effective Chinese firms. Therefore, sustaining 
technological advantage in the industry requires firms to be alert of the direction of technologi-
  Technological and Industrial evolution of the global Semiconductor Industry 15 
cal change, constant upgrade their technical knowledge to the latest design and manufacturing 
technologies and to be open to the use of new materials and production equipments6. 
2.3 Are successful catching-up countries special? 
We have seen how a few latecomer countries (S.Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) have successfully 
narrowed their gap in terms of patent shares in the semiconductor while others, notably China, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, have failed to do so, at least until 2006. In the rest 
of the thesis, we will study in details which inventive strategies have been followed by Korean, 
Taiwanese and Singaporean firms. Here, we briefly investigate whether successful and unsuc-
cessful catching-up countries started from similar conditions and if and how they differed in 
their sources and speed of technical improvements. 
2.3.1 Similarities and differences of initial conditions 
Since, in this thesis, we analyse catching-up in the Semiconductor industry, we first need to ask 
ourselves whether successful catching-up countries were allocating more inventive effort to this 
industry compared to their competitors, before their catching-up process took off. Figure 5 
shows how, until the mid-1990s, Taiwan’s and Singapore’s focus on Semiconductors was not 
higher than in the unsuccessful catching-up countries. It was also comparable to US, Japan and 
European levels (note that the latter are reported on a different scale). To the contrary, Korea’s 
focus on the Semiconductor industry was preceding the take-off of its world’s patent shares. 
This might signal a pre-existing comparative advantage due to a specific targeting of Semicon-
ductor technologies. Once the catching-up process took-off, however, we the importance of Sem-
iconductors within each of the successful latecomers rapidly increased. At the beginning of the 
2000s, Semiconductors patents accounted for around forty-percent of patent in Singapore and 
around twenty-percent in Korea and Taiwan. Similarly, in the 2000s, the share of semiconductor 
in a country’s patent output increased for Malaysia and Thailand as well, fluctuating between 
twenty- and thirty-five percent for the former and around ten-percent for the latter. It remained 
much lower in China, Hong Kong and Indonesia. 
                                                             
6 Magee estimated that two-thirds of the total technological progress in information storage in the semiconductors is 
due to the use of better materials (Magee, 2010). Advances in industrial lasers and optical lithography also helped 
overcome the physical problems and the complexity of miniaturization. 
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Figure 5: Semiconductor patent shares over country’s total patent count 
Another key dimension of comparison is the number of organizations active in Semiconductor 
patenting in each country. This is reported in Figure 67. In this case, we can see that all latecom-
ers, regardless of their success, had only a few patent assignees until 1997. Then, more and more 
organizations started patenting in Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. About 100 different assignees 
had received at least one patent granted in 2006 in Taiwan, about 40 in Korea and 20 in Singa-
pore. China, Hong Kong and Malaysia also experienced growth in the number of patenting organ-
izations, even though of a smaller magnitude. China had 13 of them in 2006 (after reaching 17 
assignees in 2005), Malaysia 15 and Hong Kong 5.  
 
Figure 6: Number of organizations active in Semiconductor patenting by country 
  
                                                             
7 We use harmonized assignee names included in the 2006 version of the NBER-USPTO database (Hall et al, 2001). We 
further cleaned typos in their names manually. Note that no effort was made to harmonize subsidiaries below the 
same holding. This is done on purpose, as different subsidiaries can follow very different inventive strategies and have 
different technical capabilities.  
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Obviously, the geographic and economic size of these countries differ widely, this may partly ex-
plain differences in the number of patenting organizations. The appropriate way to compare 
these countries is to look at the strength of their national semiconductor industry. If we take the 
world patent shares, the national focus on semiconductors and the first year of patenting as a 
reference, we can conclude that successful and unsuccessful catching-up countries shared rela-
tively similar initial conditions in terms of number of inventive agents, strength of technical ca-
pabilities in the semiconductors and national targeting of semiconductor technologies, from the 
time of appearance of the first patenting activity in Semiconductor technologies until around 
1995. On the other hand, there are two sources of dissimilarities. First, as we discussed, since 
the very beginning Korea showed stronger national focus on the semiconductors. Second, de-
spite relatively similar numbers of patenting organizations in the mid-1990s, their type is mark-
edly different. Patenting organizations from Korea and Taiwan were national firms. The largest 
assignees in Korea, at least until 2006, were Samsung, Hyundai Electronics, Hynix and LG Semi-
conductors. In Taiwan they were, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, United 
Microelectronic Corporation, the Industrial Technology Research Institute, Vanguard and Win-
bond. These are all local organizations. Singapore had a more mixed model. Its largest patent 
assignees up to 2006 were Chartered, a local foundry, and ASTAR, a government agency, but also 
foreign multinationals like Micron Technologies, ST Microelectronics and Texas Instrument. A 
similar strategy has been followed by Hong Kong, with a mix of local (ASAT and the Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology) and foreign (Chartered, Motorola and Freescale) assign-
ees. In contrast, Malaysia, Indonesia and China almost only had foreign companies in the list of 
their top assignees up to 2006. 
2.3.2 Sources of technical improvements 
Given that, as we have argued, the improvement of technical capabilities is a key driver of long 
term market success, two additional key dimensions of comparison between successful and un-
successful catching-up countries are the sources and speed of technical improvements. We 
measure them by looking at patent citations. Patents disclose the technical description of an im-
proved technology. We interpret the existence of a citation between patents as a measure or the 
technical relatedness between the improved (i.e. the cited) and the improving (i.e. the citing) 
technology, rather than speculating on the existence of an intentional knowledge flow between 
the two inventions. This is because, as discussed by Criscuolo and Verspagen (2008) and Alcácer 
and Gittelman (2006) many citations are added by the patent examiners rather than the appli-
cant, during the examination process. We first look at the geographic origin of the improved 
technologies, i.e. at the sources of technical improvements. The inclusive growth of the semicon-
ductor industry and the globalization of its inventive activities would lead one to think that 
technological improvements have a more and more international character. In other words, one 
could think that it would be more likely to observe inventions improving on technologies that 
have been invented elsewhere. However, this is not the case. Indeed, the opposite is true. Semi-
conductor related inventions are more and more likely to improve upon locally invented tech-
nologies than expected by chance. To measure that, we computed the expected number of be-
tween-country and within-country citations, and their standard deviation, if one would random-
ly swap citations while preserving the number of patents granted to each organization and coun-
try, the number of citations made and received by each patent and their time structure (i.e. the 
difference between the citing and the cited grant year). We then computed z-scores by subtract-
ing the expected number from the observed one and dividing by the standard deviation. The z-
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score then indicates whether intra- or inter-country citations are higher, equal or lower than 
expected. Note that, to preserve the characteristic preference for self-citations, we have only 
randomized inter-assignee citations. More information on this randomization process can be 
found in the Appendix A.2.1. Figure 7 shows the results.  
 
 
Figure 7: The increasing reliance on national sources of technical improvements 
 
Approximately since the rise of Japan, and much more strongly after the entrance of the other 
Asian latecomers, there are more and more intra-country citations than expected by chance. 
This means that, when they were not improving upon their own technologies, new entrants, 
progressively increased their preference for improving upon inventions that were developed by 
another organization from the same country, rather than foreign ones. This might sound at odds 
with the globalization narrative. It is not. It is actually a sign of the effectiveness of the globaliza-
tion of inventive activities. As we have seen in Figure 6, despite the rapid growth, there are still 
much less patenting organizations from latecomer countries than from US and Japan. Therefore, 
when citations made by patents granted to assignees from Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the un-
successful catching-up countries are randomly reshuffled, they have a small probability to be 
reconnected to assignees from the same countries. Therefore, the expectation is very low. The 
fact that there are indeed many more intra-country and between-firms citations than expected 
clearly shows that local technical capabilities have improved to the point that locally-invented 
technologies attract more attention from national organizations different from the assignee than 
foreign invented ones do. Is this true to the same extent across leaders, followers, and successful 
and unsuccessful catching-up countries? Figure 8 provides the answer by disaggregating the z-
scores at the country level. For convenience, we only report the z-score for inter-country cita-
tions. US and Japan clearly became increasingly inward oriented, as there are less and less be-
tween-firms and between-countries citations than expected by chance. Similarly, Korea and 
Taiwan also progressively developed a preference for improving upon locally invented technol-
ogies. Interestingly, this is not the case for Singapore, China, Malaysia and Hong Kong. This 
shows how patenting organizations in these countries have still preferred to improve upon for-
eign technologies, and neglect local sources of technical improvements.    
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Figure 8: Industry-building by improving upon local technologies 
2.3.3 Speed of technical improvements 
Inventions typically improve upon existing technologies. By looking at the difference between 
the grant year of the citing and the cited patents, we can determine how old the sources of tech-
nical improvements are. Disaggregating these trends by countries reveal another key difference 
between successful and unsuccessful catching-up countries in the semiconductors. In Figure 9, 
we show the probability of citations to patents of different ages, computed for each country. In 
the left column, we included only citing patents granted between 1995 and 2000. In the second 
one we include citing patents granted between 2001 and 2006. The shape of these curves is fair-
ly typical across technologies, as shown by Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) and Hall and colleagues 
(2001). New technologies need time to be recognized and the improvement of old technologies 
tend to attract much less inventive effort. This causes the particular shape of the probability 
density function. The comparison by country is insightful. In both periods, Korean, Taiwanese 
and Singaporean patenting organizations had a stronger preference for improving upon recently 
improved technologies, compared to firms from the other countries. In contrast, patenting or-
ganizations from unsuccessful catching-up countries do not seem to have any clear preference. 
This could be because probability density functions are noisy when there are few observations. 
This is the case for unsuccessful catching-up countries, which, having fewer patents, also have 
fewer backward citations. To reduce this problem we computed the cumulative distribution 
function (cdf). We report the results in the Appendix A.2.2. Using the cdf, we have also per-
formed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov and an Anderson-Darling test of equality in the distributions be-
tween countries. Both tests confirm that the distributions are statistically different. This showed 
a statistical preference for patenting organizations from successful latecomers in the Semicon-
ductors to perform quick cycles of improvements of existing technologies.  
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Figure 9: Fast improvement of semiconductor technologies by successful catching-up countries 
2.4 Conclusions 
Semiconductors are a fascinating industry for an economist interested in studying the interplay-
ing between technological change, inventive strategies and catching-up. Given its central role as 
engine of economic growth, and the occurrence of both successful and unsuccessful catching-up 
ventures, it is very insightful to analyse the technological and industrial dynamics in this indus-
try and investigate what made successful catching up organizations special. In this chapter, we 
have provided a preliminary overview on that. 
 We have shown that inventive activities in the Semiconductor industry became more and 
more globalized than expected by looking at the overall technologies patented at the USPTO 
starting from the mid-1990s. This corresponds with the prominent entrance of patenting organ-
izations from Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Firms from these countries managed to rapidly gain 
patent shares, mostly by eroding technological competitiveness of Japanese firms. The increase 
in invention output was closely matched by a fast increase in market shares. At the same time, 
the Asia-Pacific region became the most important market in the world for Semiconductors, as 
measured by dollar amounts of billings. We have also discussed how the technology dynamics 
within the industry clearly favoured the entrance of new players. In particular, the increase in  
technical modularity fragmented the value-chain of semiconductor devices and opened entry 
opportunities for specialized players. However, not all latecomers were able to effectively take 
advantage of these opportunities. A few countries, notably China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indone-
sia and Thailand, which started patenting at the USPTO and manufacturing semiconductors ap-
proximately at the same time of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, failed to narrow the gap in terms 
of patent shares. These countries started from relatively similar initial conditions (at the time of 
their first USPTO patents) in terms of national inventive focus on semiconductors and number of 
patenting organizations. However, a number of clear dissimilarities emerged between successful 
and unsuccessful catching-up countries. First, the former had a rapid expansion of the number of 
patenting organizations within their borders. This shows that the number of active agents with-
in the innovation system increased. Second, the composition of these agents was very different 
across successful and unsuccessful catching-up countries. Patenting organizations in Korea and 
Taiwan were mostly local companies. Singapore and Hong Kong had a mix of local firms and for-
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eign multinational corporations. China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand inventive agents were 
mostly foreign companies, at least until 2006. Third, in Korea and Taiwan, more than in any oth-
er catching-up country, patenting organizations progressively developed a strong preference for 
improving locally invented technology. Fourth, patenting organizations in successful catching-up 
countries had a stronger focus on rapid cycles of technological improvements than leader and 
unsuccessful catching-up countries. A similar conclusion has been recently discussed by Lee 
(2014), who showed how Korean and Taiwanese firms preferentially entered industries whit 
short life cycles. Taken together, these findings suggests that successful catching-up countries 
were actively engaged in industry-building activities, more than what could be observed in other 
countries that shared relatively similar initial conditions at the time of their first USPTO semi-
conductor patents. They had a growing number of national patenting organizations; they rapidly 
shifted from improving foreign technologies to focus on national technologies and they went 
thorough rapid cycles of technological improvements.     
 These findings shed some light on the technological path followed by firms from successful 
catching-up countries. They also highlight how their inventive strategies might have been mark-
edly different from those adopted by patenting organizations from the US, Japan and unsuccess-
ful catching-up countries. In the next chapters, we will analyse in detail the inventive trajectories 
that have been followed by these firms across the technology space. We will also reveal if they 
successfully upgraded their comparative advantage along technology life cycle stages.  
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3 ENGINEERING TRAJECTORIES, 
RANKING OF DESIGN PROBLEMS 
AND CATCHING-UP 
ABSTRACT 
Technology is a complex adaptive system whose direction of development depends on the inter-
dependences of engineering problems, on the propagation of technical solutions and on firms’ 
strategic decisions. We argue that the complex interactions determining the direction of change 
at the technology level can be expressed in terms of two key dimensions: the presence or lack of 
persistence in the ranking of the system of engineering problems and the presence or lack of sta-
bility in the approaches to problem solving. These dimensions are the projection in the engineer-
ing design space of technological trajectories defined at the product level. We design a set of 
metrics to identify changes in these two dimensions, and disclose statistically significant path-
followers, path-changers, ranking-followers and ranking-changers. We analyse the global Semi-
conductor industry. We identify two discontinuities in the direction of technological change. In 
the first half of the 1990s, a disruption in the main approaches to problem solving occurred be-
cause of the introduction of new semiconductor device structures. In the first half of the 2000s, 
we observed a change in engineering trajectories, coupled with a change in the ranking of prob-
lems, caused by advances in the miniaturization of semiconductor devices allowed by the diffu-
sion of MOSFET technologies. We show that firms from latecomer countries were in general sig-
nificant path- and ranking-followers in the 1990s. This partially changed in the first half of the 
2000s, when some of them became significant ranking-changers. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Technology is in continuous evolution. Depending on the direction of technological change, ca-
pabilities can be reinforced or outdated. This affects the catching-up fortunes of new entrants 
and the resilience of incumbents. Studies on catching-up emphasized the characteristics of sec-
toral technological regimes as key determinants of the ease of catching-up (Lee, 2014; Lee and 
Lim, 2001; Breschi et al. 2000, Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997, Klepper, 1997). These are defined as 
the peculiar features of the set of technologies underlying a given industry. Malerba and Orseni-
go (1997) empirically showed that the level of concentration of economic activities, entry of new 
players and the stability of the ranking of core innovators, are strongly affected by the availabil-
ity of technological opportunities, the cumulativeness of technological improvements and the 
ease of appropriating returns to innovation.  Lee and Lim (2001) highlighted that, with respect 
to catching-up, the stability or discontinuity in the technological trajectory plays a particularly 
crucial role. The authors define three types of catching-up strategies. Firms that focus their 
learning efforts on reducing the technological gap by replicating what the current leaders have 
been doing are defined as path-followers. In contrast, the term path-creator refers to firms that, 
while learning existing technologies, improve them to a point that they become fundamentally 
different from what they used to be. Finally, Lee and Lim also defined path-skippers. These firms 
jump over generations of technologies during their learning process and are able to engage 
quickly in frontier research, by skipping intermediate learning stages. This classification is not 
exclusive for catching-up firms. If we assume that a set of possible technical paths exist in an in-
dustry at any point in time, and we broaden our focus on all firms populating an industry, we can 
use a similar classification for any firm. Firms, be they large or small, incumbents or new en-
trants, can be path-changers or path-followers, in a similar vein as they can be exploiters of cu-
mulative knowledge or explorers of new research directions. These strategies can be reactive or 
proactive to change, might be explicitly defined within the firm, or just be the result of random 
events that are implicit in the research and development process. They might also have alterna-
tive fortunes depending on the configuration of the system of technologies at a given point in 
time. Yet, firms’ location with respect to the path of technical improvements only refers to one 
dimension of technological change, namely the presence or lack of stability in the approaches to 
engineering problem solving. We argue that the direction of technological change has a second 
crucial dimension: the presence or lack of stability in the ranking of engineering problems. 
 In this paper, we use patent citation data to trace the direction of technological change 
along these two fundamental dimensions, the ranking of engineering problems and the stability 
of problem solving approaches. By doing so, we reconstruct the engineering trajectories fol-
lowed by an industry over time.  We apply the network of main paths (NMPs) methodological 
approach for these purposes. The NMPs is a methodology that helps disentangling the complexi-
ty of large patent citation networks. It builds on the work by Hammond and Doreian (1989), Gar-
field et al. (1964) and Garfield (1979), and has been extended by a branch of research which 
have applied it to the definition and analysis of technological trajectories in several industries 
(Verspagen, 2007, Fontana et al., 2009, Martinelli, 2008; 2009 and Bekkers and Martinelli, 
2010). This line of research provides an extremely promising way to look at patent data and 
technological performance of firms. The NMPs reveals much richer insights than simple patent 
or citations counts. We contribute to this methodology by defining a set of indices that reveals 
the presence or lack of stability in the ranking of the systems of engineering problems and ap-
proaches to problem solving. We also define a method to assess whether players are statistically 
significant path-followers or changers and ranking-followers or changers. Finally, we design an 
  Engineering Trajectories, Ranking of Design Problems and Catching-up 25 
unbiased measure of firms’ centrality on the main paths of engineering improvements , which 
corrects for network characteristics, time of entry and firm size. We use the NBER patent cita-
tions data file (Hall et al., 2001), which contains detailed metadata for patents issued by the 
USPTO between 1976 and 2006.  
 We analyse the Semiconductor industry as a case study. Semiconductors provide the per-
fect ground to study the interplay between the direction of technological change, players’ strate-
gies and catching-up. The industry has been once dominated by US firms. Then, as shown in 
Chapter 2, about four decades ago, Japan has risen as a major player, followed in the 1990s by 
South Korea, Taiwan and, partly, Singapore. The success of these latecomers has been striking. In 
this work, we investigate which strategies have been adopted by latecomers and incumbents to 
guide their search for high-quality engineering solutions in the technology space. We also assess 
the effectiveness of these strategies in building technological capabilities, measured as a firm’s 
ability to affect the direction of technological change. The paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 3.2, we introduce the theoretical framework that guides our analysis and define the two key 
dimensions of the direction of technological change: the ranking of engineering problems and 
the stability of approaches to problem solving. Section 3.3 explains the methodological approach 
and introduces the set of indices used to analyse these two dimensions and players’ strategies. 
Section 3.4 presents the data used. Section 3.5 reports our findings for the analysis of the direc-
tion of technological change in the Semiconductors. Section 3.6 reveals players’ contribution to 
technological change. Finally, Section 3.7 discusses the effectiveness of players’ strategies in 
terms of actively influent the direction of technological change.   
3.2 Theoretical framework 
The evolution of technology determines and constrains entry, catching-up and growth opportu-
nities (Klepper, 1997, Breschi et al. 2000, Lee and Lim, 2001). Malerba and Orsenigo (1997), 
theoretically defined, and empirically showed, how technological regimes determine ease of en-
trance, stability of the ranking of innovators and concentration of inventive activities. The au-
thors define technological regimes as particular combinations of some fundamental properties 
of technologies. These are opportunity and appropriability conditions, degree of cumulativeness 
of technological knowledge and characteristics of the knowledge base. Lee and Lim (2001), con-
jecture that, as far as catching-up is concerned, cumulativeness of technical advance and the 
predictability of the technological trajectory are the most important dimensions of the techno-
logical regime of an industry. They argue that large knowledge cumulativeness requires experi-
ence to succeed in the current technological search, reducing success chances for new entrants. 
On the other hand, they hypothesize that stable technological developments helps latecomers 
fixing their R&D target.  Lee and Lim, define technological trajectories as changes in the vector of 
technical features along the sequence of product generations. Knowledge cumulativeness refers 
to how much working experience in the previous generation help in mastering the subsequent 
generation. They highlight how stability in the trajectory and knowledge cumulativeness does 
not necessarily co-appear. They use the dynamic random access memory (DRAM) industry as an 
example of a case where the future characteristics of the technology are known well in advance 
but require developing a new set of knowledge. They argue that this scenario helps explaining 
the successful entrance of Korean memory makers. Lee and Lim’s definition of the technological 
trajectory builds on the seminal work by Dosi (1982). Dosi theoretically defined the direction of 
technological change as emerging from the interaction between technological paradigms and 
technological trajectories. Dosi defined the former as “. . . [a] ‘model’ and a ‘pattern’ of solution of 
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selected technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on 
selected material technologies" (Dosi 1982). A technological trajectory is then defined by Dosi as 
“. . .the ‘normal’ problem solving activity determined by a paradigm. [It] can be represented by the 
movement of multi-dimensional trade-offs among the technological variables which the paradigm 
defines as relevant. . . " (Dosi 1982). Within the same paradigm, firms can explore different strat-
egies. Therefore, several technological trajectories can co-exist. The same is argued by Malerba 
et al. (1999), who describe trajectories as the outcome of firm’s choices between competing al-
ternatives, like cost and performance of a given product.  
 This show how technological trajectories are usually understood and defined, in the innova-
tion literature, at the product-level. Yet this is not necessarily the best level to study the co-
evolution of technology, industrial dynamics and catching-up. Products are collection of compo-
nents and technologies (Murmann and Frenken, 2006; Arthur, 2009). It is precisely the structure 
of the system of technologies that determines constraints and opportunities for improvements 
along the spectrum of features that stand behind a product. Furthermore, learning is a problem-
solving activity. As such, it happens at the technology level, as it is at this level that engineering 
problems arise. Therefore, we argue that, in order to understand the scale of change in capabili-
ties and, consequently, the availability of entry and catching-up opportunities, technological tra-
jectories need to be studied at the level of technology domains rather than at the product level. 
More precisely, we argue that the direction of change at the technology level can be expressed in 
terms of two dimensions, namely the ranking of engineering problems and the stability of prob-
lem-solving approaches. Figure 10 illustrates this argument.  
 As discussed in the literature (Malerba et al., 1999; Dosi, 1982), technological trajectories 
are intended as the sequence of design choices made by firms when they face trade-offs between 
the features of a given product that they want to improve. Obviously, some features may be 
complementary and can be simultaneously improved; some others may be in contrast. Potential-
ly, one could trace performance improvements over time between complementary and compet-
ing product features, as sketched in the upper-left corner of Figure 10, and done by Malerba et 
al. (1999). For instance, thanks to miniaturization, integrated circuits can be made smaller and 
more powerful at the same time. In contrast, increasing their computing power while simultane-
ously reducing energy consumption or heat dispersion is a much more challenging task. This 
generates implicit relations between product features, which could in principle be described by 
a product features’ space, where features that can be simultaneously improved would be linked 
together, as illustrated in the top right corner of Figure 10. The breadth of features of a given 
product, its functional performance and the ease of breaking trade-offs between features, cru-
cially depend on generating innovative solutions to engineering challenges. Therefore, the 
choice of which product features one would like to improve simultaneously determines the dis-
tribution of inventive efforts across a given set of engineering design problems. Firms might 
have different believes on which product features should be improved and which engineering 
challenges have to be tackled. It follows that the aggregation of firms’ inventive efforts deter-
mines a ranking of engineering problems, based on the amount of collective efforts that they at-
tract. Therefore, one could also assess the evolution of such ranking by tracing the share of in-
ventive efforts devoted to the search of solutions to each problem, as fictitiously illustrated in 
the mid-left panel of Figure 10. Similarly to what described for product features, design prob-
lems are also related to each other’s. Solving a given design challenge may allow finding a solu-
tion to related ones. In other words, the space of engineering problems has a latent structure, 
which is deeply related to the structure of the product feature space. Again, such structure could 
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be represented as a network of engineering problems linked by a relationship similarity in pos-
sible solutions. 
 
 
Figure 10: The relationship between technological trajectories, ranking of 
design problems and engineering design trajectories 
 
Because of the uncertainty intrinsic to the innovation process, solutions to design problems may 
be searched in multiple ways. Different approaches may be followed with different frequencies. 
Despite the variety of possible approaches, problem solving tends to be path dependent. This is 
because agents (be they inventors or firms) tend search for solutions to problems by leveraging 
on knowledge that they have learned in the past through individual and collective effort. This 
generates paths of incremental technical improvements that shares similarity in problem-
solving approaches. Such paths are sketched in the bottom-right panel of Figure 10, where nodes 
represent solutions linked by similarity in problem-solving approaches. Sometimes, new ap-
proaches are pursuit by explorative agents. If successful, they effectively set new paths that oth-
ers can follow. The stability of problem-solving approaches refers to the frequency and the ex-
tent that new paths are created. Therefore, the ranking of engineering problems and the stability 
in problem solving approaches are the projection in the engineering design space of technologi-
cal trajectories defined by decisions on how to tackle trade-offs at the product level. For this rea-
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son, we refer to the paths of technical improvements as engineering trajectories. Paths that keeps 
attracting more and more inventive effort, implicitly reveal which are the prevailing problem-
solving approaches followed by inventors in a given industry. Therefore, they can be defined as 
the main engineering design trajectories historically followed in an industry. In our toy network 
sketched in the bottom-right panel of Figure 10, the main path is highlighted in red. 
 The relationship between technological and engineering trajectories is bidirectional. Prod-
uct design choices, which define technological trajectories, depend on the co-evolution of tech-
nical progress, market needs and firms strategies. In this work, we focus on the first factor of 
influence, namely, technical progress. Solutions to design challenges define the direction of tech-
nical progress at the product level and expand the variety of possible applications of a given 
technology. They also enlarge the set of available features of related products. Therefore, engi-
neering trajectories, defined at the technology level, determine which technological trajectories 
at the product level are possible. This is known in the literature as the technology-push hypothe-
sis. Of course, the opposite direction of causality can also exist. Market demand for certain appli-
cations and features creates incentives for investing resources to solve particular engineering 
problems that characterize them. This is referred to as the demand-pull hypothesis. What is 
sometimes neglected in the technology-push and demand-pull debate is the way change propa-
gates. Problems are interconnected. Solutions to technical bottlenecks spark the emergence of 
new applications, which ultimately define new technical challenges. For instance, miniaturizing 
microchips allows a variety of applications in electronics to emerge. However further miniaturi-
zation defines a set of key technical challenges. For example, as the technology scaling reaches 
channel lengths less than a micron, second order effects, which were ignored in devices with 
longer channel length, become very important. Some of these effects are velocity saturation and 
degradation due to overheat. Solutions to these problems propagate to other technologies. This 
discloses the existence of a system of technology. Finding a solution to these semiconductor-
related technical challenges made it possible to have lighter and more powerful computers, or 
flatter and brighter television and computer screens. It also allowed creating new products, like 
smartphones and tablets. These new products ultimately define new technical challenges. Heat 
dispersion and energy consumption are problems that are much more important in laptops, tab-
lets and smartphones than in desktop personal computers. Similarly, better brightness, image 
sharpness and energy saving features became available for modern screens of TV and portable 
devices because of the miniaturization of semiconductors. However, they also posed different 
engineering problems compared to old generations of these technologies. Therefore, the connec-
tions of the system of engineering problems can change over time. There might always be a cen-
tral problem (like the miniaturization of microchips) but the related problems might change, 
depending on changes in the technological trajectory at the product level.  
 Ultimately, the ranking of engineering problems and the stability of problem-solving ap-
proaches determine the scale of change in the required technical capabilities. These changes af-
fect the success of new ventures and the survival of old ones. This is why analysing the evolution 
of these two dimensions is critical for our understanding of catching-up. As Lee and Lim (2001) 
pointed out, changes in trajectories create entry opportunities but also increase risk because of 
the intrinsic uncertainty related to exploring new paths. Similarly, changes in the ranking of en-
gineering problems can potentially create discontinuities in the otherwise cumulative nature of 
knowledge generation, making prior experience less important.  These changes are the results of 
firms’ strategies. Therefore, based on the two dimensions of technical change discussed here, we 
can categorize firms as path-changers or followers and as ranking-changers or followers. We 
define path-followers as agents that focus on incremental innovation by applying well-
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established approaches to problem solving. In contrast, path-changers attempt to explore new 
paths. This can potentially lead them to become vehicles of radical change. Ranking-followers, 
focuses their innovative effort on seeking solution to engineering problems that are currently 
perceived by the majority as the most important ones. Ranking-changers are relatively more fo-
cused on problems that comparatively attract less attention. This could be because they are re-
lated to niche products or because they are overlooked by the majority. Yet niches can develop 
into large markets depending on the evolution of technology and demand. Similarly, problems 
that are overlooked today can become very central in the future.  
 Now, the question is, how can we empirically trace the evolution of engineering problems and 
approaches to problem solving? Trajectories of technical improvements can be detected by trac-
ing paths of patent citations, as done in Verspagen (2007), Fontana et al. (2009), Martinelli 
(2008 and 2009) and Bekkers and Martinelli (2010). This strategy also makes the identification 
of trajectories empirically possible. To trace technological trajectories defined at the product 
level one would need a great wealth of multidimensional data on functional performance and 
cost, to be able to identify how firms navigated along trade-offs. Studying engineering trajecto-
ries at the technology level can be done by using publicly available patent data. Patents are 
proofs that novel and non-obvious solutions to given engineering problems have been found. A 
few characteristics of the patent systems can be exploited to identify paths of engineering im-
provements, and disclose the system of engineering problems and the approaches to problem 
solving used8. A patent is examined by experts in the subject matter at its claim level. Claims are 
classified into subjects and searched for existing prior art. The goal of this search is to find evi-
dence that what has been claimed is entirely or partly lacks novelty. Such evidence is then used 
to narrow the temporary monopolistic legal protection granted by the patent to what is truly 
new. As stated in the USPTO Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (MPEP)9, any document 
used in the rejection of a claim is used as a reference. This means that patent citations effectively 
highlight the existing prior art of an invention. The definition of what constitutes prior art in the 
USPTO system, clarifies why we claim that citations highlight similarities in the approach to 
problem-solving. In this respect, the MPEP states the following. “During patent examination the 
claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification” (USPTO, 
2014, MPEP Section 904.01). “Not only must the art be searched within which the invention 
claimed is classifiable, but also all analogous arts must be searched regardless of where the claimed 
invention is classifiable. The determination of what arts are analogous to a particular claimed in-
vention […] depends upon the necessary essential function or utility of the subject matter covered 
by the claims, and not upon what it is called by the applicant. For example, for search purposes, a 
tea mixer and a concrete mixer may both be regarded as relating to the mixing art, this being the 
necessary function of each” (USPTO, 2014, MPEP Section 904.01c). 
 Therefore, paths of citations between patents disclose sequences of improvements of exist-
ing prior art. As such, they reveal commonalities in the approaches to problem solving. These 
paths do not have to be necessarily intended as conscious use of prior knowledge. In contrast, 
the addition of citations by examiners allows exploiting expert opinions on what constitutes re-
                                                             
8 In this work we use US patents. Therefore, the characteristics of the patent systems that we discuss here refer to the 
functioning of the system run by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Differences in the way in-
ventions are defined and classified exists with other major patent offices in the world, such as the European Patent 
Office (EPO) and the Japanese one.  
9 The USPTO MPEP is available online at this website: http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ 
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latedness of approaches. Therefore, paths of citations can be legitimately interpreted in terms of 
similarity of approaches to problem solving. This means that changes in the composition of the 
relevant prior art over time reveal changes in the trajectories followed to tackling engineering 
problems. Furthermore, changes in the propensity of some paths of citations to attract further 
inventive efforts reveal changes in the ranking of the system of engineering problems. This theo-
retical argument stands behind the methodological approach used in this work. We introduce 
this approach in the next section. 
3.3 Methodology 
To make our theoretical framework operational we need to perform a number of tasks that will 
ultimately allow us to investigate if the process of technological change in the Semiconductor 
industry followed a cumulative or disruptive path. We will then be able to identify path- and 
ranking-changers in the industry. The tasks needed to accomplish those goals are listed in Table 
1, together with the methodology used to tackle them. In the following subsections, we explain 
the methodology that stands behind each task in details.  
 
Table 1: Methodological framework roadmap 
Task Methodology/Measure used 
Identification of technically influent patents and of the main 
paths of technical solutions 
Network of Main Paths (NMPs) 
Measuring the ranking of the system of engineering 
problems 
Attractiveness of the largest and second largest components of 
the NMPs 
Measuring the stability of problem-solving approaches Patent persistence within and between NMPs two largest 
components 
Measuring centrality on the paths of engineering 
improvements 
Path-centrality index  
Measuring agents’ contribution to the direction of 
technological change 
Path-changing and ranking-changing indices 
3.3.1 Identification of technically influent patents and of the main paths of technical 
solutions 
Patent technical and economic value is highly skewed (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2007). There-
fore, the merit of sampling important patents out of the whole population is twofold. First, we 
reduce noise in the citation network generated by patents of dubious technical and economic 
value. Second, we reduce a large-scale citation network to its backbone. This allows the funda-
mental structure of the network to emerge. We define technical importance as a patent’s ability 
to influence technical change. Therefore, technically important patents are those laying on the 
most central paths of engineering improvements. To identify those paths we rely on the Network 
of Main Paths approach (NMPs). The first step of the methodology consists in assigning weights 
to each citation. To do that we rely on the Search Path Node Pair (SPNP) algorithm as explained 
in Batagelj (2003) and De Nooy et al. (2005). The SPNP algorithm counts the number of times 
that each node lays on all possible paths that connects any node to anyone else. As such, it has a 
very clear interpretation as a measure of connectivity. When normalized over the total number 
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of possible paths, the SPNP value of node i, tells us the probability that a random walk (i.e. fol-
lowing any path regardless of its length) between any pair of nodes in the network passes 
through node i. The flow-normalized SPNP is analogous to the measure of random walk-
betweenness centrality (RWBC) proposed by Newman (2005).  However, the former anticipated 
the latter, as was first discussed in Hummon and Doreian (1989). Both SPNP and RWBC are cal-
culated taking into account all possible paths between any pair of nodes. This distinguishes them 
from the standard measure of betweenness, which takes into account only the shortest path(s). 
We argue that this is a better measure of centrality in the context of technological trajectories as 
if one would assess the technological relatedness of a reachable pair of patents by looking only 
at the shortest path of citations it would exclude alternative sequences of technological im-
provements which connect the same pair of patents. These alternative sequences can be very 
informative as, for instance, they might pass through a different technological area or involve 
different companies. Once citation weights have been calculated, the original network is reduced 
to its main paths by an iterative process. The algorithm starts from source nodes (patents that 
are cited but do not cite anyone) and identifies the main paths of citations by following at each 
junction the citation that carries the highest weight, until a sink node (a patent that cites some-
one but is not cited) is reached. The procedure is explained with the help of a fictitious network 
shown in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11: A dummy citation network 
 
The dummy network is made of 22 patents. The SPNP weight for every citation is shown above 
each line. Citations are represented by arrows, whose head indicates the direction of improve-
ment (technology disclosed in cited patents is improved by citing ones). Consider, for instance, 
the citation between patents 5 and 9. It has a weight of 16. This is given by the multiplication of 
the number of patents reaching patent 5, plus 5 itself (i.e. patents 1 and 5), and the number of 
patents reached by patent 9, plus 9 itself (i.e. patents 9, 13, 15, 17, 14, 16, 18 and 19). To identify 
the NMPs we start from the set of source nodes (patents 1, 2, 3 and 4) and follow at each step the 
citation carrying the highest weight, till one of the end nodes is reached (patents 17, 18, 19, 21 
and 22). By repeating this procedure for each start point we identify the NMPs, which, in the ex-
ample above, is made of two components whose nodes are coloured in black (main one) and 
grey (second one). It is important to notice that the two components of the NMPs are not sepa-
rated if we look at the original network, but the white nodes that connect them have a negligible 
importance from the point of view of the paths of engineering improvements. This distinction let 
different systems of engineering problems to emerge. Patents within components are mutually 
related by paths of important improvements that address engineering problems connected to 
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each other’s. If the component is very large, the relationship can be loose. Nevertheless, it exists. 
In contrast, solutions disclosed in patents that are located in different components are not relat-
ed.  Therefore, a dynamic analysis of the NMPs allows detecting changes in the composition and 
ranking of the systems of engineering problems and tracing the stability of problem-solving ap-
proaches. The dynamic approach consists of cumulating networks at different points in time (e.g. 
from time t until t+1, then from t until t+2, and so on). This allows assessing how the entrance of 
newly granted patents in the system affects the presence of old ones in the network of main 
paths and the size ranking of its components. When newly granted patents largely connect to the 
main component of the NMPs the ranking of the systems of problems is preserved. When the 
relative majority connects to any other component, there is a change in ranking. A new system of 
engineering problems now attracts the bulk of innovative efforts. Newly granted patents also 
reveal which approach to problem solving has been followed. To understand how this is the case 
let us use once again the dummy network illustrated in Figure 11. Suppose that a set of 10 new 
patents would enter in the network at time t+1. For simplicity let us imagine that the 10 patents 
will connect (directly or indirectly) just to one endpoint10. Then, three cases might be observed.  
 CASE 1: If the new entrant patents connect to patent 18 or 19 then the main component is 
still attracting the majority of innovative effort and all patents that were previously on the 
main paths within the largest component will still be found there. In this case, both the ap-
proaches to problem solving and the stability of the ranking of problems are preserved. 
 CASE 2: New entrant patents connect to either patent 21 or patent 22. If that happens, the 
sequence of patents 3-7-44-20 becomes the root of the new largest component. In this case, 
the largest component is still the main attractor of innovative effort but now solutions to re-
lated engineering problems are seek through different approaches, as revealed by the fact 
that new patents connect to a previously less exploited prior-art.  
 CASE 3: Let us now imagine that the new entrant patents will connect at time t+1 to patent 
17. In this case, what was formerly the second largest component becomes the main one and 
the ranking of the system of engineering problems is subverted. 
3.3.2 Measuring the ranking of the system of engineering problems and the stability of 
problem-solving approaches 
Obviously, in real-world networks the attachment of newly granted patents follows patterns that 
are more complex. Some of them might connect to the largest component and some to the sec-
ond or any of the others. Yet, these patterns can always be reduced to two dimensions. From the 
point of view of the stability of the ranking of the system of engineering problems, what matters 
is whether the relative majority connects to a component different from the previously largest 
one. From the point of view of stability of approaches to problems solving, the extent to which 
new patents connect to previously unexploited prior-art, which could be either related to the 
main system of problems or not, indicates how much the search of solutions follows alternative 
approaches. Therefore, we only need to keep track of two measures, the attractiveness of the 
largest component of the NMPs, and the persistence of patents within and between the largest 
                                                             
10 In reality, they could connect to any other patent as well, but this empirically happens with a probability inversely 
proportional to the time lag between the citing and the cited paten, for time lags longer than about 4.5 years, as shown 
by Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002). 
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components of the NMPs over time. The ranking of a given system of engineering problems j (i.e. 
of a component of the NMPs) at time t, is measured by the attractiveness of the component of the 
NMPs that represents it. 
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑗 =  
𝑃𝑡𝑗
∑ 𝑃𝑡𝑘𝑘
 (3.1) 
Where the numerator Ptj is the number of important patents granted at time t that connect to 
component j. The denominator is simply the sum of all the important patents granted at time t, 
which connect to any of the component k of the NMPs.  
 The stability of approaches to problem-solving is measured by the following index, which 
quantifies persistence of patents within the components of the NMPs over time. The patent per-
sistence index (PPI) for component j from period t to period t+1 is equal to: 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑗𝑡→𝑡+1 =  
𝑁𝑗
𝑡 ∩ 𝑁𝑗
𝑡+1
𝑁𝑗
𝑡  (3.2) 
Where the denominator 𝑁𝑗
𝑡  is equal to the number of patents in component j at time t and the 
numerator is equal to the intersection between the set of patents in component j at time t and 
the set in the same component at time t+1. Obviously, it is possible to use the same approach to 
quantify movements of patents across components. In this case, the numerator measures the 
intertemporal intersection between components. By cumulating NMPs from period to period, we 
are able to assess the stability of search strategies across the space of possible solutions to engi-
neering problems. If newly granted patents in period t+1 build on the same prior-art that was 
improved along paths defined in period t, then citations from the former will connect, directly or 
indirectly, to the latter. In this case, paths that were central in t remains central in t+1. This indi-
cates stability in the approach to problem solving and in the corresponding technological trajec-
tory. In contrast, when newly granted patents represent solutions found through searching al-
ternative approaches, citations will point to a previously unexplored prior-art. This will disrupt 
the main paths, revealing a change in the approach to problem solving. 
3.3.3 Measuring centrality on the paths of engineering improvements 
We ultimately want to analyse catching-up strategies at the firm level. This requires defining a 
measure of the capability gap and identifies the strategies applied to reduce or close it. We de-
fine technical capabilities as the ability of affecting the direction of technological change. This 
ability is revealed by patent centrality on the NMPs. Companies whose patents are located in 
central junctions of the NMPs are able to influence the perception of which engineering prob-
lems are important and which approach to problem-solving is promising. Therefore, the effec-
tiveness of technical catching-up strategies can be measured in terms of companies’ ability to 
move to the centre of the system of engineering problems, i.e. to have patents centrally located 
in the NMPs. As we explained in Section 3.3.1, the SPNP index provides this information. Howev-
er, the index suffers from a problem that hinders its comparability over time, which we need to 
solve before using it as a measure of company centrality on the paths of technical improvements. 
Two effects play a role here. First, let us remind the reader that the SPNP index is calculated at 
the node level. It counts the number of times that a given node shows up on the possible paths 
that connect any node to anyone else. Hence, if we sort the network topologically such that any 
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node is preceded by all nodes pointing to it, we immediately realize that nodes that stand in the 
middle will tend to get higher SPNP values. This is simply because, by construction, they have 
better chances to be found on several paths. The second effect comes from the empirical evi-
dence on the growing size of patent citations networks. One has to consider that a growing num-
ber of newly granted patents per year implies a growing number of citations added to the net-
work every year (unless the average number of backward citations per patent dramatically 
falls). Consequently, the number of possible paths between nodes increases (exponentially) with 
the size of the network. This implies that the probability of a node to lay on many connecting 
paths increases when the network grows and a giant component exists. These conditions are all 
fulfilled by our empirical network. Therefore, if we compare the centrality of a given company in 
the network of main path over time by using the average of the SPNP count of its patents, it is 
very likely to observe that the company becomes more and more central. This could be a “real” 
phenomenon or it might be purely because the SPNP count increases because of network 
growth. The SPNP therefore needs to be normalized. Dividing the SPNP count of every node by 
the total number of paths computed at every period of observation does not solve the problem 
because the probability of laying on many paths grows less quickly than the number of paths 
itself, hence creating another bias. To correct for these biases and allow us to compare SPNP 
weights over time, we need to rescale the SPNP weight measure. We call the new measure Path 
Centrality Index (PathC). The index for node i is calculated as follows. 
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑖 =  
𝑆𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑖
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝑆𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1
 
(3.3) 
PathC is the SPNP weight of node i divided by the average SPNP weight assigned to the subset Nt 
of patents granted in the same year t of patent i. Because of the very large number of patents per 
grant year (minimum Nt is around 5000), the average SPNP for any given grant year is a good 
approximation of the true expected SPNP value for a randomly chosen patent granted in the giv-
en year, assuming it would cite other patents randomly. Accordingly, PathCi quantifies how good 
patent i has performed in terms of connectivity. It does so by comparing its performance with 
the connectivity achieved by other patents which entered in the network at the same time, 
therefore facing the same probability of getting high (or low) SPNP weights. Note that this does 
not mean that patent i’s performance will only be affected by patents granted in the same year, 
as the numerator of the fraction still depends on how important is patent i in terms of connectiv-
ity with respect to the whole network. This method is analogous to the fixed-effect approach 
proposed by Hall et al. (2001) to clean the number of forward citations received by a patent by 
any possible effect of network structure. As explained by the authors this simple method allows 
purging the data from systematic effects caused by change in the propensity to cite and in the 
number of citing patents. However, it also does wipe off any “real” technology-based effect. In 
particular, it does not allow us to compare absolute levels of centrality for the same agent (be it a 
patent or a firm) over time. Yet, it effectively serves our purpose of identifying the most central 
patents and companies within several periods. Indeed, the same approach can be used to com-
pare within-period firms’ centrality on the main paths. This is done in two steps. Fist we calcu-
late the average PathC index obtained by the subset NjT of patents belonging to company j at pe-
riod T: 
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𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑗𝑇 =  
1
𝑁𝑗𝑇
∑
𝑆𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑖
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ 𝑆𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝑇
𝑖=1
𝑁𝑗𝑇
𝑖=1
 (3.4) 
Being based on the average of patents’ centrality, his aggregating method is biased against large 
firms. The reason is straightforward. Large firms sample more patents from the population. 
Therefore, the larger they are, the more the centrality of their average patent will approximate 
the average SPNP for each grant year. Therefore, the aggregate PathC will approach to one for 
NjT approaching NT, shadowing firm’s real centrality. Hence, to use the PathC as a measure of 
companies’ centrality we need to correct for this bias by removing the firm’s size effect . We do 
that by bootstrapping firms’ average PathC. For each firm, we randomly sample NjT patents out 
of the population of patents granted in the given period under observation and then calculate 
the average PathC of the random sample. We repeat this process for 1000 iterations. This re-
turns a distribution of expected PathC for each firm, given its size and the topography of the 
network in each period under observation. This distribution provides the p-value for the empiri-
cally observed PathC. We can then assess whether the company is significantly more (or less) 
central than expected by its size and the structure of the system of technologies. We then asses 
the strength of firms’ centralities (or the lack of it) by computing z-scores of the empirical PathC 
compared to the expected one. 
𝑧 − 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑗𝑇 =  
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑗𝑇
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 − 𝜇𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑗𝑇
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝜎𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑗𝑇
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
 (3.5) 
The z scores of the PathC index can be interpreted as a measure of technological influence of a 
particular company. A large z-PathC for a given firm means that, in the given period, the firm 
was significantly more influential than expected in terms of shaping the direction of the paths of 
technical improvements.  
3.3.4 Measuring path-following, path-changing, ranking-following and ranking-
changing propensity  
We argued that the direction of technological change can be explained by two dimensions, the 
ranking of engineering problems and the stability of approaches to problem-solving. Therefore, 
players’ contribution to shaping the direction of technological change can be described accord-
ing to these two dimensions. 
 Depending on the extent to which innovative effort is directed to previously attractive en-
gineering problems or to newly attractive ones, economic agents can be ranking- followers or 
ranking-changers. This is measured by the observed odds that patents granted to a given agent 
connect to a system of engineering problems (i.e. the component of the NMPs) that is not the 
highest ranked one.  The rank-changing index (RCI) for agent j at period T, is calculated as fol-
lows. 
𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑗𝑇 =  
𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑇
𝑘=2 − 𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑇
𝑘=2
𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑇
 (3.6) 
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Where PCjt is the number of patents granted to agent j in period T,  𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑇
𝑘=1 is the count of patents 
that connected to the first component of the NMPs for company j, in period T, and 𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑇
𝑘=2 is the 
same for the second component. In other words, the RCI is simply the difference between the 
share of firm j’s patents that connect to the first and second largest components of the NMP in 
period T. Therefore, a large RCI indicates that the given agent is generating more inventive out-
put in the second largest system of technologies than in the first, contributing to change the 
ranking of the system of engineering problems. Using shares allows taking into account how 
spread firm’s inventive activities are across all the components of the NMP. Yet, similarly to the 
PathC index, we first need to correct for a bias against large firms that is intrinsic to the way we 
defined the RCI. Just by random chance, large firms can be expected to have a more broadly di-
versified set of inventive activities. This is because the more patents they randomly sample out 
of the population the more the set of inventive output is likely to be spread across components. 
Therefore, the larger PCjT, the smaller the shares of output in the first and second component 
and, consequently, the smaller the RCI. Once again, we rely on bootstrapping techniques to clean 
for this size-induced effect. For each firm j in each period T, we randomly sample PCjT items from 
the population of patents under the null hypothesis that each component has the same chance to 
be selected at each draw. We repeat this process for 1000 iterations and each time compute the 
RCI. We then compute p-values and adjusted z-scores (i.e. cantered on the mean of the random 
sample) for the empirically observed RCI. This exercise allows comparing the observed RCI with 
the one expected assuming that firms have no specific interest in any area of the system of engi-
neering problems. Therefore, the z-score reveals how much a firm truly focus on the second 
component of the NMPs compared to the first one, given its size. Thus, it can be used to identify 
significant ranking changers and followers.  
 With respect to the approach to problem-solving agents (be they patents or firms) can be 
path-followers or path-changers. To quantify the extent to which an agent is following or chang-
ing the approach to problem solving we need to look at which prior-art she is building upon. We 
measure this by means of the path-following index (PFI). The PFI for patent i at time t is meas-
ured as follow. 
 𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑗
𝑗 ∈𝑆𝑖𝑡
 (3.7) 
Where PathCj is the average Path Centrality Index of the cited patent j. 𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the size of the set Sit 
of patents cited by patent i. Therefore, the PFI is the average path-connectivity of i’s cited pa-
tents. If patent i connects on average to patents that are more central than their peers (i.e. with 
PathC>1), i’s PFI will be larger than one. Oppositely, a PFI smaller than one reveals that patent i 
connected to patents on average less central than their peers, namely to a relatively unexploited 
prior art. In particular, their low PathC indicates that they build on a short path of improvements 
and that their technical solutions had been largely unexploited, at the time the new patent con-
nects to them. This is similar to the concept of exploration defined as introducing solutions that 
are new-to-the-world (March, 1991). The strength of path-following or path-changing behaviour 
at the patent level, can be measured by computing a p-value statistic. To do that, for each five-
year period t, we estimate the cumulative distribution function of PFIi and then we derive the 
PFI thresholds corresponding to the bottom five-percent of the distribution (for significant path-
changers) and the top five percent (for significant path-followers). 
 Now we have a measure that quantifies the extent to which new patents connect to poorly 
or well-connected ones. Yet, citing poorly connected patents does not necessarily improve their 
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connectivity on the trajectory significantly. For that to happen, the citing patent must effectively 
set a new path to which many additional patents will connect in the future. This will eventually 
pull the previously poorly connected patents to the main paths. The potential power-of-pull index 
(POP)  for patent i is computed as follows.  
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖 =  
𝑅𝑖
𝑓𝑤𝑑
1
𝑛𝑡
∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑓𝑤𝑑𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
 (3.8) 
Where 𝑅𝑖
𝑓𝑤𝑑
 is the number of patents younger than patent i that reach him. This equals the 
number of patents that cite directly or indirectly patent i. The POP index measures how many 
forward (direct and indirect) connections a patent receives more than the average of his grant 
year cohort nt, within the window of time under observation. We stress that this is a potential 
power of pull as the effective ability to pull unexploited prior art to the main paths depends on 
the long-term success of the new path. The POP only measures promising early success within a 
five-year period, as the number of direct and indirect forward connections is measured within 
the window of time under observation. However, patents with significantly larger POP receive 
more forward connections than their average peer does within the five-year period. This means 
that solutions disclosed in those patents are quickly attracts further inventive efforts, perhaps 
because long awaited. The p-value statistics for the POP can be calculated in the same vein as for 
the PFI, by first estimating its cumulative distribution and then extracting the threshold corre-
sponding to the top five-percent. Analysing which patents have statistically larger POP and PCI 
allows identifying path-changing patents, as the citing patent is effectively changing the trajecto-
ries of problem-solving activity by pulling old patents that were previously unexploited into the 
NMPs. The same can be done at the firm level by calculating the average POP and PCI for each 
firms’ set of patents. However, the aggregation of PFI and POP at the firm level faces the same 
size-induced bias discussed for PathC and RCI. Once again, this is solved by bootstrapping PFI 
and POP to remove the size effect, using the same procedure discussed above. Therefore, the t-
statistics that we eventually use at the firm level are the following. 
𝑧 − 𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑇 =  
𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑇
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 − 𝜇𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑇
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝜎𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑇
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
 (3.9) 
𝑧 − 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑇 =  
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑇
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 − 𝜇𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑇
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝜎𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑇
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
 (3.10) 
Where 𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑇
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙and 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗𝑇
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙are the empirically observed averages of the values of PFI 
and POP for the set of patents belonging to firm j in period T. The larger the patent count for firm 
j in period T, the more the distribution of PFI and POP calculated for the random sample tends to 
approach normality.  Therefore, firms with z-PFI≥2 and POP≥2, are significantly more path-
followers than expected by their size and the topology of the network in the period under obser-
vation. Similarly, levels of z-PFI≤-2 and POP≥2 disclose significant path-changing firms. 
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3.4 Data 
We conduct our analysis using data from the second version of the NBER Patent Citation Data 
File (Hall et al., 2001). This dataset contains a detailed classification of patents granted by the US 
Patent Office (USPTO) between 1975 and 2006, and includes information on patent citations. 
Records are classified by US patent class (nclass), International Patent Classification (IPC) codes, 
application year, grant year and the country where the assignee company is registered. Semi-
conductor technologies belong to the macro-category “electronics” of the US classification sys-
tem. They are classified into five different subclasses. They are the followings:  
 257: Active solid-state devices (e.g. transistors, solid-state diodes) 
 438: Semiconductor device manufacturing: process 
 326: Electronic digital logic circuitry 
 505: Superconductor technology: apparatus, material, process 
 716: Design of semiconductor devices 
The most interesting distinction is the one between classes 257 and 438. The former includes 
inventions related to particular semiconductor devices (transistors, solid-state diodes, integrat-
ed circuits, etc.) so it can be generally understood as the container of product innovations. Manu-
facturing process innovations are generally classified in class 438. These two classes together 
include about 86% of patents in our dataset in the period 1976-2006. Class 438 account for 
about 46% of semiconductor patents, whereas about 40% of them belong to class 257. Class 326 
takes account of inventions associated to electronic circuits performing logic operations, which 
are those features that allow programmability of integrated circuits. It accounts for 7% of pa-
tents. Class 716 encompasses semiconductors design related inventions. 4.8% of patents are 
classified in this class. Finally, Class 505 comprises inventions related to the materials exhibiting 
superconductivity (of which semiconductors are made) and processes related to treating these 
materials. Only 1.6% of semiconductor patents belong to class 505. To construct the initial da-
taset of semiconductor patents we extracted from the complete NBER patent citations data file 
all patents belonging to one of the technological sub-classes listed above. Then we retrieved all 
citations for which both the citing and the cited patent belong to one of the five semiconductor-
related classes. This returns 118361 patents and 779083 citations, covering the time span be-
tween 1976 (intended as the grant year of the patent) and 2006. This is what we refer to as the 
initial dataset of semiconductor patents. 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics of the Network of Main Paths 
As explained in Section 3.3.1, the initial dataset of semiconductor patents is further refined to 
single out only influent patents from the point of view of technology development. This is done 
by applying the Network of Main Paths approach. One has to imagine this procedure as opening 
a Russian nested doll (Matryoshka), in which at every layer we reduce the network further. As in 
a Matryoshka every reduced network is fully contained in the one before.  
Table 2 compares network sizes over cumulated periods. For the sake of our dynamic analysis 
we decided to split the time span into 6 cohorts whose cutting year are 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 
2000 and 2006. Following what we discussed in Section 3.3.1, in 
Table 2, as in most of the rest of this work, we use cumulated time cohorts. That means 
that each time cohort builds on and includes the one before. We start from the initial dataset of 
118361 patents and we remove the isolated ones (those who do not cite and are not cited by any 
other patent). The result, for the complete period 1976-2006, is a network of 114097 nodes. 
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This network contains several weak components11, which are by definition disconnected with 
each other. We extract the main component of the whole network and feed it into the main path 
algorithm. The NMPs itself has several components. To analyse changes in the ranking of the sys-
tem of engineering problems, in the rest of the paper we focus on the two largest components of 
the NMPs. The main component of the NMPs for the period 1976-2006 is made of 3544 patents 
and 3562 citations. These are the most influential patents from the point of view of the paths of 
technical improvements in the semiconductor technology domain.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of networks' sizes 
  1976-
1980 
1976-
1985 
1976-
1990 
1976-
1995 
1976-
2000 
1976-
2006 
Whole network - number of patents 2079  5631 12533  26853  54086 114097 
Whole network - number of citations 2712 13310 40255 102957 272843 779076 
Main component -number of patents 1703  5385 12348  26686  53874 113756 
Main component -number of citations 2469 13164 40145 102864 272728 778890 
Network of Main Paths - number of patents 1445  3490  6042  10107  15387  23428 
Network of Main Paths - number of citations 1403  3291  5697   9489  14588  22077 
Network of Main Paths - Main Component - number of patents  694  1540  2678   2043   4557   3544 
Network of Main Paths - Main Component - number of 
citations 
 756  1597  2734   2064   4617   3562 
 
The NMPs is made of several components. Table 3 reports the number of patents belonging to 
each of the first five NMPs’ components as a percentage of the total number of patents in the 
NMPs. If we look at the relative size of the main component one can immediately notice a drop 
from period 1976-1990 to 1976-1995. Until the end of the 1980s, the main component com-
prised at least 44% of the total patents in the NMPs. This percentage decreases significantly 
from the early 1990s onwards. Moreover, the same drop in size is observed at the aggregate lev-
el for the five largest components. In the first period of our sample, the first five components ac-
counted for about 64% of the patents in NMPs. This percentage reduces by almost a half in the 
last period. This is a first interesting finding that suggests how the ranking of engineering prob-
lems increasingly changed from the beginning of the 1990s. We will analyse this in more details 
in the next section. 
Table 3: Relative size of the largest NMPs' component 
  First Second Third Fourth Fifth SUM 
1976-1980 48.03% 8.79% 3.32% 2.01% 1.73% 63.88% 
1976-1985 44.13% 2.89% 2.24% 1.60% 1.38% 52.24% 
1976-1990 44.32% 5.58% 1.26% 1.22% 1.16% 53.54% 
1976-1995 20.21% 8.71% 6.57% 6.33% 2.95% 44.77% 
1976-2000 29.62% 10.26% 2.00% 1.90% 1.37% 45.14% 
1976-2006 15.13% 11.79% 3.55% 2.01% 1.96% 34.44% 
                                                             
11 In a directed network a weak component is defined as the subset of patents for which there exists a path from any 
node to anyone else once we symmetrize the dyadic relationship between nodes (i.e. we consider every link as bidi-
rectional). 
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3.5 Findings 
The indicators described in the previous section can now be used to analyse the direction of 
technological change, agents’ contribution and the effectiveness of catching-up strategies. We 
present our findings in the next three sub-sections.  
 
 
Figure 12: Attractiveness of the two largest components of the NMPs 
3.5.1 Direction of technological change 
Figure 12 shows the evolution of the attractiveness index for the two largest components of the 
NMPs. The figure clearly shows that the largest component of the network of main paths dra-
matically loses attractiveness over time. In contrast, since 1996, the second largest component 
begins attracting more patents and overtakes the main one from 2001 onwards. This finding re-
veals a progressively strong change in the ranking of the system of engineering problems. It is 
interesting to report that the abstracts of the patents belonging to the second largest component 
of the NMPs in the 2000s, reveal a focus on displays and energy-saving technological solutions. 
This suggests that the second largest component of the NMPs is composed of technological areas 
more related to flat screens and portable devices rather than to desktop computers and laptops. 
This corresponds to a case in which a change in the technological trajectory, caused by a change 
in the functions of products that attract inventive efforts, disrupts the ranking of engineering 
problems.  This is because the technical requirements of new portable devices pose different 
technological problems than designing and manufacturing PCs and laptops. 
 The ranking of the system of engineering problems therefore clearly changed over time. 
The graphical illustration of the main component of the NMPs and the visual analysis of its 
changing composition are reported in the Appendix A.3.1.  
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Table 4: Patent persistence within the main component of the network of main paths 
 1976-1985 1976-1990 1976-1995 1976-2000 1976-2006 
1976-1980 55.04% 62.97% 23.05% 62.39% 60.23% 
1976-1985  63.12% 25.58% 66.04% 63.38% 
1976-1990   26.14% 58.96% 53.06% 
1976-1995    50.71% 35.93% 
1976-2000     48.63% 
 
Using the patent persistence index (PPI) discussed in Section 3.3.2, we can analyse stability in 
the approaches to engineering problem solving.  Table 4 reports the PPI within the main compo-
nent of the NMPs, decomposed by cohorts. In other words, the table shows the percentage of pa-
tents granted within the period reported on the rows, which are found in the main component of 
the NMPs computed for the period indicated in the column label. One can immediately notice 
that there has been a major disruption in the composition of the NMP in the first half of the 
1990s. This means that patents granted in the period 1991-1995 were drawing on a previously 
not well-exploited prior-art. This reveals a change in the approach to problem solving. This hap-
pened despite the ranking of problems was stable in that period, as shown in Figure 12. Never-
theless, the disruption in the approach to problem solving has been lately offset by a subsequent 
counter-discontinuity that occurred in the second half of the 1990s. Indeed, patents granted in 
the period 1996-2000 reverted to exploit the old and paths of technical improvements estab-
lished up to the end of the 1980s.  In fact, about 63% of patents from the 1976-1980 cohort of 
the main component of NMPs are found in the main component in the period 1976-1990. Many 
of them are excluded from the main component in the period 1976-1995 (only 23% of them per-
sisted in the main component) but reappear in the period 1976-1995, when the PPI returned to 
its 1976-1990 level. A very similar trend is observable for patents that belong to the main com-
ponent in the period 1976-1985. Their level of persistence in the main component of the NMPs 
computed for periods 1976-1990 and 1976-1995 is almost identical to the PPI of patents be-
longing to the main component of the NMPs in period 1976-1980. Similarly, we observe that on-
ly 26% of patents from the main component  computed in period 1976-1990 are part of the 
main component of NMPs76-95, whereas many more (about 59%) shows up in the last two pe-
riods. These findings clearly show that an important but temporary discontinuity in the ap-
proach to problem solving occurred in the first half of the 1990s.  
 So far, we have only looked at stability of problem solving approach in the main component 
of the NMPs. However, we know from the previous analysis that over time the main component 
has lost importance in favour of the second component. Therefore, to investigate stability of 
problem-solving approaches in the two main components, we analyse patent persistence within 
and across components with the help of Figure 13. Nodes on the first row represent the second 
component over time and those in the second row represent the main one. Node size is propor-
tional to the relative size of each component in terms of number of patents (as reported it in Ta-
ble 3). Links within and across components report PPI values.  
 Figure 13 reveals some interesting insights. Fist, the PPI within the second component is 
extremely low if existent at all. This means that the second component of the NMPs cannot be 
meaningfully interpreted as an established system of engineering problems alternative to the 
mainstream one. Yet it has an interesting role whose nature changes over time. In the first two 
periods, the second component hosts areas of research on semiconductor technologies that late-
ly converge into the main paths of technical improvement that constitute the main component. 
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This means that, up to the end of the 1980s, the main paths of technical improvements partly 
built on prior art that was previously explored but still underdeveloped, whose usefulness was 
initially overlooked. In the two periods 1991-1995 and 2000-2006, the role of the second com-
ponent changes. From source of novelty becomes a host for approaches to problem solving that 
gets temporarily disconnected from the main component. Indeed, in the period 1976-1995 it 
receives almost one fourth of the prior art contained in the main component in period 1976-
1990. This set of prior art almost entirely converge back into the main component in the follow-
ing period. Something similar happens between the last two periods, when almost eighteen per-
cent of the patents found in the main component persist to the second one.  
 
 
Figure 13: Patent persistence within and between components 
 
We can derive two conclusions out of the analysis of stability of problem solving approaches. 
First, a major but temporary discontinuity in the paths of technical improvements occurred in 
the mid-1990s. Second, disagreement on which paths of technical improvements deserved more 
attention also arose in the first half of the 2000s. In both instances, the result was an increase in 
the breadth of search across useful prior-art, which resulted in the movement of a large set of 
patents from the main to the second component of the NMPs. The fact that those patents were 
still found in the NMPs, albeit in the second component, show that the prior-art that they repre-
sent was still perceived of some use by some players, although its importance decreased in rela-
tive terms. These conclusions highlight the heterogeneity of players’ strategies and believes, 
which make technological change a complex dynamic. We analyse players’ role and the effec-
tiveness of their inventive strategies in the next section. This will also reveal who created those 
discontinuities. However, before to move to the firm-level, we can identify path-changers and 
path-followers at the patent level. We do that with the help of Figure 14, which reports patent 
position in the PFI-POP space. We focus on the last three five-year periods, 1991-1995, 1996-
2000 and 2001-2006 as the previous analysis has shown that interesting changes in the direc-
tion of technical change have occurred in the semiconductors from the 1990s onwards. Panels in 
the first column, report the scatter plots of patents in the PFI-POP log-log space. They include all 
semiconductor patents granted in the given five-year period. The second column includes only 
patents located in the first two components of the NMPs granted in the same window of time. 
The third one includes only patents located in the first two components granted in the first two 
years of the five-year period. This is used as a robustness check. Even though the POP index is 
normalized by the average for each grant year, patents granted in the last three years might not 
have sufficient time to receive any forward connection and therefore the few that receive some 
might have a very high POP. This would add noise and might bias the results toward the young-
est patents. Therefore, the plots reported in the third column are useful to assess whether our 
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results are strongly affected by patents granted in the last years of the five-year period. Clearly, 
they are not. In each panel, dashed lines mark the threshold for statistical significance. Patents 
located above the horizontal line and to the left of the first vertical one have a POP significantly 
higher than their peers in the five-year period and a significantly smaller PFI. Therefore, they are 
significant path-changers. Patents located above the POP threshold and to the right of the second 
vertical dashed line are significant path-followers. Panels in the second column show that nearly 
all the significant path-followers and most of the significant path-changers are located in the first 
two components of the NMPs, confirming the effectiveness of the NMP approach in identifying 
influential patents. Figure 14, also shows that significant path-changing patents are rare, much 
rarer than significant path-followers. This is not surprising as it is comparatively much more dif-
ficult to explore new paths and be successful (i.e. attracts more connections than expected), then 
successfully exploiting previously well-defined paths. There are many potential path-changers, 
but most of them do not have sufficient power of pull to effectively change the main paths of im-
provements. Also worthwhile noticing how, despite the previous analysis has shown that the 
engineering trajectories temporally changed in the first half of the 1990s, there are only two sig-
nificant path-changing patents in this period. Whether they are alone responsible for the whole 
shift in the main paths of the network depends on how many patents they reached through indi-
rect citations and of how many outgoing paths are generated by them. However, it is important 
to highlight how a shift in trajectories at the macro-level could also be the result of the accumu-
lation of many small shocks. Namely of a large number of poorly successful patents that connects 
to the same small set of poorly connected patents. 
 Table 5, reports the list of path-changing patents. Reading these patent documents is very 
revealing about the effectiveness of our method to identify solutions that significantly change 
the approach to problem solving. Indeed, all of these patents describe alternative methods of 
solving existing problems, legitimizing the definition of path-changers. Two path-changing pa-
tents have been granted between 1991 and 1995. Both of them are located in the main compo-
nent of the NMP. The one with lowest PFI is a Xerox 1992 patent on thin-film transistors, a tech-
nology that increases image stability and contrast in modern LCD displays. The patent describes 
an invention that uses a polycrystalline diamond film, which naturally exhibits light insulating 
properties. This allowed removing light shielding layers from thin film transistors, reducing de-
vice complexity as well as manufacturing time and costs. The second one describes a semicon-
ductor device with several die stacked one on another within a single package. This ingenious 
solution allows larger computational power by eluding the problem of increasing density of in-
tegrated circuits (i.e. larger number of transistors per square centimetre of die area). The pa-
tent’s assignee is single inventor, Mr. Peter J. C. Normington. This patent has been very success-
ful in establishing a new path and has been cited 156 times. 
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Figure 14: Identifying significant path-changer and path-follower patents 
 
For the second half of the 1990s, three patents can be identified as significant path-changers. 
The first one is a Bell Communications Research (BCR) patent that describes a solution to a high 
growth temperature problem related to complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) 
processing. Previous solutions to temperature limitations had been proposed before the BCR 
patent, as aknowledge in its text. However, while effectively addressing temperature problems, 
previous approaches also caused an insufficient electrical conductivity of the heterostructure of 
SiO2 /Si substrates that made it insufficient for effective integrated circuit application, as ex-
plained in the BCR patent document. The BCR invention uses a different approach to address the 
high temperature limitations while providing the desired electrical sheet conductivity. The sec-
ond path-changing patent in the 1996-2000 period is a Mitsubishi patent that describes a device 
having a multilayered metal interconnection structure with improved flatness. This solution, is 
also addressing the problem of generating higher speed and computational power by providing 
multiple layers of electrode interconnections. This solution set a path that will be eventually tak-
en by organizations from latecomer countries, such as Taiwan Industrial Technology Research 
Institute (ITRI), foundries like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), United 
Microelectronic Corporation (UMC) and Singapore-based Chartered Semiconductors, and Kore-
an firms Samsung and LG Semiconductors. All of these firms have patents that cite Mitsubishi’s 
technical solution. Successful US firms, such as Texas Instruments, Advanced Micro Devices 
(AMD) and Micron Technologies, also cites Mitsubishi’s patent. In particular, Micron and AMD 
will eventually dominate the main two components of the NMPs in the period 2001-2006 in 
terms of centrality. This proves how much influence this new path has had in the process of 
technological change in the industry. The third path-changing patent in the second half of the 
1990s has been granted to Bosch, for disclosing an invention that allows producing a hybrid 
semiconductor structure while tackling a main disadvantage of previously known methods in 
terms of reliability. 
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Table 5: List of path-changing patents 
period patent gyear PFI POP #fwdcit 
NMP  
comp. title assignee 
1991-1995 5099296 1992 0.0007 4.571 15 1 Thin film transistor Xerox 
1991-1995 5281852 1994 0.0027 4.016 156 1 Semiconductor device 
including stacked die 
Peter J. C. 
Normington 
1996-2000 5519235 1996 0.0001 3.286 45 1 Polycrystalline ferroelectric 
capacitor heterostructure 
employing hybrid electrodes 
Bell 
Communications 
Research 
1996-2000 5763954 1998 0 12.07 46 2 Semiconductor device having 
multilayered metal 
interconnection structure and 
manufacturing method 
thereof 
Mitsubishi 
1996-2000 5866951 1999 0.0003 3.7776 18 2 Hybrid circuit with an 
electrically conductive 
adhesive 
Bosch 
2001-2006 6291319 2001 0 12.64 59 1 Method for fabricating a 
semiconductor structure 
having a stable crystalline 
interface with silicon 
Motorola 
 
Finally, in the period 2001-2006, only one significant path-changing patent has been identified 
by our method. It is a process innovation developed by Motorola. The invention relates to a 
method for fabricating a semiconductor structure including a crystalline alkaline earth metal 
silicon nitrogen based interface. As explained in the patent document, this provides a more sta-
ble silicon surface, which is essential for subsequent epitaxial growth of single crystal thin films 
on silicon for numerous device applications. It is interesting to note that all of the path-changing 
patents identified by our method, except for one, belong to large incumbent corporations. This 
somehow constitute an argument in favour of the late Schumpeter’s hypothesis that large firms 
are more conductive for radical innovations.  
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Table 6: Top path-follower patents 
period patent and 
assignee 
gyear PFI POP #fwdcit PathC NMP 
comp 
title 
1991-1995 5061647 
Motorola 
1991 30.64 5.5745 49 228.1 2 Forming a conductive layer over a 
substrate having a gate 
dielectric,… 
1991-1995 5015598 
Philips 
1991 32.64 8.9875 69 222.8 2 Metal-insulator-semiconductor 
1991-1995 5168072 
Texas Inst. 
1992 38.41 6.9655 162 199.4 1 Method of fabricating an high-
performance insulated-gate field-
effect transistor 
1991-1995 5079180 
Texas Inst.  
1992 10.32 13.495 91 194.4 1 Method of fabricating a raised 
source/drain transistor 
1991-1995 5015595AMD 1991 22.57 10.011 51 132.1 2 Method of making a high 
performance MOS device having 
both P- and N-LDD regions using 
single photoresist mask 
1996-2000 5534447 UMC 1996 97.10 12.623 38 515.1 1 Process for fabricating MOS LDD 
transistor with pocket implant 
1996-2000 5538913 UMC 1996 150.0 16.170 76 495.6 1 Process for fabricating MOS 
transistors having full-overlap 
lightly-doped drain structure 
1996-2000 5670401 
Vanguard 
1997 181.5 6.692 19 546.5 1 Method for fabricating a deep 
submicron mosfet device using an 
in-situ polymer spacer to decrease 
device channel length 
1996-2000 5801083 
Chartered 
1998 94.13 10.282 149 540.4 1 Use of polymer spacers for the 
fabrication of shallow trench 
isolation regions with rounded top 
corners 
1996-2000 5489543UMC 1996 27.48 33.333 54 449.4 1 Method of forming a MOS device 
having a localized anti-
punchthrough region 
2001-2006 6190977 TI-
Acer 
2001 15.04 8.160 26 344.1 2 Method for forming MOSFET with 
an elevated source/drain 
2001-2006 6524920 AMD 2003 42.98 12.616 30 326.2 2 Low temperature process for a 
transistor with elevated source 
and drain 
2001-2006 6703648 AMD 2004 53.18 20.805 55 364.3 2 Strained silicon PMOS having 
silicon germanium source/drain 
extensions and method for its 
fabrication 
2001-2006 6979855 
Micron 
2005 32.28 5.1814 13 490.1 1 High-quality praseodymium gate 
dielectrics 
2001-2006 6921702 
Micron 
2005 38.02 14.063 67 316.9 1 Atomic layer deposited 
nanolaminates of HfO2/ZrO2 films 
as gate dielectrics 
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It is also insightful to identify significant path-follower patents. Since there are many of them, in 
Figure 14 we only report information for the most central ones (i.e. the top-5 of the PathC rank-
ing). Two major insights emerge from the table. First, some of the path-following patents listed 
in the table address similar research areas, as proved by the frequent appearance of the terms 
‘source/drain’ in the titles and the reference to MOS/MOSFET/PMOS/CMOS devices. These re-
lated patents are found in the first component of the NMPs in 1976-1995, and in 1976-2000 but 
move to the second in 1976-2006. They are part of the same long path of improvements that re-
lates to a key transistor technology, metal–oxide–semiconductor (MOS). The metal–oxide–
semiconductor field-effect transistor (MOSFET) provides switching function in microprocessors 
and memories to implement logic gates and data storage. They are the most widely used type of 
transistor in integrated circuits. This explains why they attracted such a constant inventive ef-
fort over time (MOS technology actually dates back to the 1960s). Particular attention has been 
devoted to the fabrication method, to make them cheaper and facilitate integration. For instance, 
the technique called complementary-metal–oxide–semiconductor (CMOS) consists in coupling 
two complementary MOSFETS into one high/low switch. This technique increased modularity, 
by allowing separating IC design from manufacturing (Adams et al., 2013). One major problem, 
as explained in patents 5670401 (Vanguard) and 6190977 (TI-ACER), is that the constant effort 
to miniaturize devices implies the need to solve a bunch of related problems. As stated in the TI-
ACER patent, “as the MOS transistors become narrower and thinner accompanying with shorter 
channels, the problems like the junction punchthrough, the leakage, and the contact resistance 
cause the reduction in the yield and the reliability of the semiconductor manufacturing processes”. 
The preparation of an extremely shallow source/drain junction is one way to solve some of 
these problems, which has attracted the inventive effort behind the solutions disclosed in the 
three patents located in the second component of the NMPs in period 2001-2006. These findings 
show how the approach to solve key problems, which arise from a long-lasting trajectory of min-
iaturization efforts, has been following a well-established path over the last four decades. This 
path is traced by solutions that largely shared the same approach to problem solving. The table 
also provides an interesting insight into the dynamics of catching-up. The ranking of path-
follower patents for the period 1996-2000 is dominated by latecomer firms, whose inventions 
address some of the MOSFETS related problems listed in the quote above. The diffusion of CMOS 
and MOSFETS opened entry opportunities in IC manufacturing for latecomers, as discussed in 
Adam et al. (2013) and Langlois and Steinmuller (1999). This implied that latecomer innovative 
effort focused on fabrication-related problems. These problems became major bottlenecks for 
further IC performance improvements, due to increased chip miniaturization. This ultimately 
explains the centrality of latecomer’s solutions in the NMPs. Three of these firms are from Tai-
wan. United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) is the second largest Taiwanese semiconductor 
companies, and second largest foundries in the world by revenues (according to IC Insights), be-
hind Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Vanguard is the third Taiwanese 
IC foundry service provider. It started in 1994 as a DRAM subcontractor of TSMC. It then evolved 
into a pure-play foundry company. TSMC and the Industrial Technology Research Institute 
(ITRI) are its largest investors. The last patent to appear in the top five path-follower ranking 
belongs to Chartered Semiconductors. Chartered Semiconductors was a Singaporean company 
which, prior to its acquisition by GlobalFoundries in 2010 (a joint venture between AMD and 
Abu Dhabi’s Advanced Technology Investment Company), was the world's third largest dedicat-
ed independent semiconductor foundry, after TSMC and UMC. Another Taiwanese firm hold a 
key path-following patent in period 2001-2006. This is ACER. The company started as Texas In-
strument-Acer, a joint venture between the US incumbent Texas Instruments and the Taiwanese 
 48 Engineering Trajectories, Ranking of Design Problems and Catching-up 
new entrant ACER. The joint venture was founded in 1976. Twenty-one years later, in 1997, 
Acer acquired the notebook division of TI and became one of the world leaders in notebook 
manufacturing. 
 We have analysed the direction of technological change in the Semiconductor industry 
along two dimensions, the ranking of engineering problems and the stability of problem-solving 
approach. This allowed identifying a discontinuity in the engineering trajectories of technical 
improvements in the first half of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, and a change in 
the ranking of problems in the early 2000s. We have also identified path-changing and path-
following patents, which greatly shed light on the nature of these dynamics. We can now move to 
the organizational level and investigate which firms shaped the direction of technological change 
and which one followed the course of the events. We only focus on the last three periods, given 
that the analysis presented in Section 3.5.1, identified them as interesting cases of change in the 
direction of technological progress in the Semiconductors. 
3.5.2 Players’ inventive strategies 
We have analysed the direction of technological change in the Semiconductor industry along two 
dimensions, the ranking of engineering problems and the stability of problem-solving approach. 
This allowed identifying a discontinuity in the engineering trajectories of technical improve-
ments in the first half of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, and a change in the rank-
ing of problems in the early 2000s. We have also identified path-changing and path-following 
patents, which greatly shed light on the nature of these dynamics. We can now move to the or-
ganizational level and investigate which firms shaped the direction of technological change and 
which one followed the course of the events. We only focus on the last three periods, given that 
the analysis presented in Section 3.5.1, identified them as interesting cases of change in the di-
rection of technological progress in the Semiconductors. 
 Figure 15 shows firm position on the PFI-POP space. The value of the indices reported on 
the axes are the z-scores computed on the basis of randomized samples of equal firm size, as ex-
plained in Section 3.3.4. This allows removing any possible effect related to large disparities in 
the number of patents hold across firms. Marker colour is proportional to log-transformed pa-
tent count. Dashed lines indicates the thresholds of statistical significance, which lay two stand-
ard deviations above the mean (i.e. z =2, p-value ≅ 0.05). For visual purposes, we only plot firms 
with a number of patents significantly greater than the geometric mean of firm patent count (i.e. 
two standard deviations of the log-transformed data).  This allows focusing only on firms that 
dedicate a significant amount of inventive effort in Semiconductors. We report firm labels for 
firms located in areas of the space that fulfil statistical significance requirements. A number of 
key insights emerge from Figure 15. 
 From a methodological point of view, the comparison of observed PFI and POP with their 
random counterpart effectively removed scale effects. Large and small firms are scattered in the 
space without any particularly remarkable order. Size does not seem to affect neither PFI, nor 
POP. Consequently, firms’ centrality (measured by PathC) is also independent from their size.  
We investigate if there is a relationship between the number of patents owned by a firm and the 
three indicators, PFI, POP and PathC in the Appendix A.3.2. The statistical analysis confirms that 
POP is independent from PFI and PFI, POP and PathC are independent form patent count. This is 
in itself an interesting insight. It shows that large players are as likely as small ones to have influ-
ential and high quality patents, and have same likelihood to be path-changers/followers. Moreo-
ver, being a path-follower does not necessarily ensures receiving more forward connections than 
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randomly expected, compared to being a path-changer. This reveals that, at the firm level, there is 
no preferential attachment of new patents to established paths. In turns, this means that, in princi-
ple, being a path-follower does not automatically make players more central. 
 
Figure 15: Identifying path-changing and path-following firms  
(marker color proportional to log transformed patent count) 
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In each of the three periods, the PFI-POP space is relatively more crowded in the area whose 
centrepiece has a PFI of -1 and POP of -2. This means that many semiconductor-focused firms 
seem to have a slight tendency toward being path-followers but in general have patents of a rela-
tively poor influence (i.e. the average POP is smaller than expected by firm size). However, the 
strength of this tendency is not sufficient to pass the thresholds of statistical significance, show-
ing that this pattern could possibly be just a random phenomenon. A few firms stand out of the 
crowd. Nevertheless, several of those that can be distinguished for unequivocally strong path-
changing or path-following strategies, lack the strength to pull new paths into the network, or 
hold old ones in, alone. This is revealed by lower levels of POP than expected by firm size. Yet, a 
few insightful tendencies can be observed.  
 Firms that pass the requirements of statistical significance for both PFI and POP, are path-
followers in the 1990s and mostly path-changers in the first half of the 2000s. This reveals that 
the temporary change in the engineering trajectories that happened in the first half of the 1990s, 
as discussed in Section 3.5.1, was not caused by a particular set of firms. Rather it was caused by 
idiosyncratic inventive outputs that explored new approaches. No firms were specifically trying 
to change the main trajectories in that period. In contrast, changes that happened in the early 
2000s, where driven by specific strategies of a few firms that focused their inventive efforts to 
new paths and new problems.   
 Firms from latecomer countries (Taiwan, S.Korea and Singapore), have a strong preference 
to connect to established paths. This is especially clear for the world largest foundries, TSMC 
(Taiwan), UMC (Taiwan), and Chartered (Singapore, now called Global Foundries). They are al-
ways found in the right part of the space. They have PFI significantly larger than expected and in 
some cases even a POP above the threshold for statistical significance (TSMC in the 1990s, UMC 
and Chartered in 1996-2000). The group is joined by Vanguard, another Taiwanese foundry and 
Acer Display, at the end of the 1990s. Winbond, the largest brand name integrated circuit suppli-
er in Taiwan, is also close to be a significant path-follower in the period 1996-2000. Korean 
firms, LG (in the 1990s), Hyundai Electronics and Samsung (both in 1991-1995 and 2001-2006), 
also have PFI much above the expected level, but the power-of-pull of their patents is not as 
strong as for the Taiwanese companies and Chartered. American microprocessor company Ad-
vanced Micro Devices (AMD), Intel’s closest competitor, is also part of the path-following group, 
in each of the three periods. This contrasts with Intel’s strategy, whose patents have a compara-
ble power-of-pull but are much less focused on following the main paths of improvements than 
AMD’s ones. 
 In the first half of the 2000s, a group of significant path-changers emerged. Some of them 
are relatively small players. Yet, some are noteworthy. Xilinx Semiconductors is famous for in-
venting the field programmable gate array (FPGA) and being one of the first semiconductor 
company to adopt the fabless business model. LSI Logic is another fabless focused that had an 
historical role in the industry. LSI helped create and nurture development of the application-
specific integrated circuit (ASIC) industry.   The company now focuses on designing semiconduc-
tors for storage, networking in data-centers, mobile networks and client computing. Both Xilinx 
and LSI Logic had a strong preference for being path-changers in the second half of the 1990s. 
However, only in the early 2000s they got a sufficient power-of-pull to become significant path-
changers. The presence of these two important fabless, that are known to be central players in 
the industry, suggests that our method is indeed able to identify path-changers. Fairchild, Intel’s 
mother, is also part of the path-changing group. Fairchild main line of business is now focused 
on high-performance power ICs and power discrete devices. The combination of path-changing 
companies working on power, mobile networks and networking, in the 2000s, reflect the shift-
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ing target of applied research on semiconductor devices from desktop PCs to laptops, tablets, 
smartphones and cloud computing.  
 There is also a crowd of potential path-changers in the first half of the 2000s, which have 
very strong preference to connect to unexploited paths, but lack sufficient power-of-pull. Among 
them, some consistently show a path-changing strategy in more than one period. These are 
mostly Japanese incumbents such as Fujitsu, Hitachi, Canon, Rohm Semiconductor and Sumito-
mo.  
 As we broadly discussed in Section 3.2, the stability of approaches to problem solving, here 
represented by the tendency to be path-followers, is just one of the two crucial dimension of the 
direction of technological change. The ranking of engineering problems is also insightful about 
the characteristics of technical progress. We have seen in Section 3.5.1, that a change in the rank-
ing has occurred in the 2000s. The RCI, allows identifying which players reported more in-
ventive output in the second component of the NMP than in the first, compared to what could be 
expected by random chance. Figure 16 reports the RCI ranking for firms in the last three periods. 
We only show firms whose RCI is statistically significant at the 95%. Besides being path-
followers, firms from latecomer countries were ranking followers. This is the case for UMC, 
TSMC, Chartered, Samsung and Vanguard. In the 1990s, large American and Japanese incum-
bents were those with relatively more inventive output in in the second component of the NMP, 
effectively trying to revert the ranking of the systems of engineering problems. This pattern 
changed in the 2000s. None of the latecomers is found in the list of significant ranking followers 
in the last period. In contrast, TSMC, together with the Korean Electronics and Telecommunica-
tions Research Institute (ETRI), Hann Star Display and LG LCD, were part of the group of rank-
ing-changers. The latter two are specialized on display technologies. The same holds for another 
ranking changer, Semiconductor Energy Laboratories (SEL). SEL’s president and majority 
shareholder, Shunpei Yamazaki, used to be the most prolific inventor according to the number of 
USPTO patents hold, until 2008. The presence of these firms confirms what emerged from the 
analysis of path-changers, namely that the second component of the NMPs in the first half of the 
1990s, is characterized by the emergence of a new set of engineering problems. It is worth not-
ing that the most ranking-changing player in the second half of the 1990s was Tessera Technol-
ogies. This US company is focused on miniaturization technologies that then aggressively license 
out to big players. Indeed Tessera is known as one of the largest patent trolls in the industry 
(Business Insider, 2012). 
3.5.3 Effectiveness of players’ strategies 
Having analysed players strategies we can now assess their effectiveness in terms of earning 
centrality on the paths of technological improvements. Figure 17 reports the rankings of the z-
scores of PathC at the firm level. We only show firms whose z-score is statistically significant (i.e. 
z≥2).  As we discussed in the previous section, our findings show that there is no relationship 
between PFI and POP. Therefore, in principle, it is possible to achieve high centrality even with a 
path-changing strategy, as long as the path-changing patents attract a considerable number of 
forward connections. However, in practice, it seems that path-following strategies are much 
more likely to earn centrality on the main paths. Indeed, only two of the most central firms listed 
in Figure 17, have a PFI lower than zero. These are Micron (PFI=-0.77) and Applied Materials 
(PFI=-0.6) in the last period. The cautious path-and ranking-following strategy of Taiwanese and 
Singaporean foundries has been very successful in terms of gaining centrality in the network, 
also due to their high quality patents (large POP). Since the early 1990s, TSMC and UMC have 
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been very central, and they maintained a position in the top ranking in the two subsequent peri-
ods. Chartered, Vanguard, Winbond and Taiwan Industrial Technology Research Institute also 
have been very central in one or two periods. This confirms the remarkable ability shown by 
these firms to quickly catch-up in terms of technological capabilities. Korean firms Samsung and 
LG also followed similarly cautious strategies, but they have been somewhat less successful in 
terms of centrality.  
 
 
 
Figure 16: Ranking-changing and ranking-following firms 
 
Figure 17: Most central players 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this work, we developed a theoretical and methodological framework to analyse two key di-
mensions of the direction of technological change, the ranking of engineering problems and the 
stability of approaches to problem solving. We applied this framework to the semiconductor in-
dustry, giving particular attention to the analysis of catching up strategies followed by latecomer 
firms. We showed that, a major change in the approach to problem solving has occurred in the 
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first half of the 1990s. Two patents were identified as significant path-changers. They focused on 
designing semiconductor structures made of polycrystalline diamond thin-films, and on vertical 
stacking dies on a single chip to increase computational power without increasing horizontal 
density of elements on microchips. We also identified a change in engineering trajectories, cou-
pled with a change in the ranking of problems, which occurred in the first half of the 2000s. This 
was caused by advances in the miniaturization of semiconductor devices allowed by the diffu-
sion of MOSFET technologies. This technology is the result of a long and well-established path of 
improvements, which could be referred to as a sort of backbone of the system of semiconductor 
technologies. However, the market success of new applications for semiconductor devices (like 
smart portable devices and LCD televisions), changed the connections among engineering prob-
lems, and created new challenges that attracted the relative majority of inventive efforts from 
the beginning of the 2000s. 
 Our findings show that, in the 1990s and first half of the 2000s, firms from latecomer coun-
tries (Taiwan, Korea and Singapore), especially Taiwanese and Singaporean foundries, were sig-
nificantly more path and ranking followers than expected by their size and time of entry. How-
ever, some of them, notably those engaged in LCD technology, were significant ranking changers 
in the early 2000s. This path and ranking following strategy has been instrumental in granting 
these firms centrality on the main engineering trajectories. Indeed, patents granted to Taiwan-
ese, Singaporean and, to a smaller extent, Korean firms, were of a relatively high quality, attract-
ing significantly more forward connections than expected by their size and time of entry. This 
shows how these firms were able to quickly develop the necessary technical capabilities to con-
tribute high-quality inventive solutions that further strengthened the main trajectories of engi-
neering improvements. Moreover, the fact that some latecomers are ranking changers in 2000s 
suggests that the path-following strategy adopted in the decade before, which ensured them 
strong centrality on main paths of improvements, strengthen their technological capabilities. It 
provided experience and knowledge about the direction of technological change in the industry, 
which allowed them being actively changer of the ranking of engineering problems in the early 
2000s.  These findings are in line with the anecdotal evidence on catching-up strategies in the 
semiconductor industry, as shown by Mathews and Cho (1999), Chang et al. (1994) and Cho et 
al. (1998). 
 It is important to highlight that our definition of firm’s strategies with respect to the paths 
of technical improvements loses one category compared to Lee and Lim’s (2001) threefold clas-
sification of catching-up strategies. The authors classified latecomer firms into path-following, 
path-creating and path-skipper. The empirical identification of path-skipping strategies requires 
defining and tracing the whole life cycle of a given technology. In particular, in our current 
framework, we do not make any statement about the future success or failure of path-changers 
and the new trajectories of improvements that they contributed. However, this framework can 
be suitably modified for identifying technology domains and trace their life cycle. This is done in 
the next chapter. In the third chapter, we will instead analyse how changes in the main trajecto-
ries of engineering improvements affect firms’ survival and how diversification can provide an 
evolutionary advantage over competitors in uncertain technological environments. Finally, con-
structing an index able to reveal statistically significant path and ranking changer has to be con-
sidered as a first step of a potentially very rich research agenda. It becomes possible, for in-
stance, to study whether a common profile for significantly more explorative firms can be de-
scribed. Our analysis has already showed that, at least for the semiconductor industry, size, 
measured by patent count, is not a good predictor of path and ranking-changing behaviour. Al-
ternative explanations might point to particular market or technological conditions that push 
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these firms to be more risk-takers. Another hypothesis could be that path and ranking-changers 
have a more diversified research workforce that allows them to pursuit several paths. Our indi-
ces make it possible to perform an econometric analysis with the goal of revealing predictors of 
firms’ path and ranking changing behaviour and, consequently contributing to unveil the future 
direction of technological change. 
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4 LIFE CYCLE OF TECHNOLOGY 
DOMAINS AND COMPARATIVE 
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE  
Catching-up, leapfrogging and falling behind in terms of productivity in high-tech industries cru-
cially depends on firms’ ability to keep pace with technological change. In fast changing indus-
tries, today’s comparative technological advantage does not guarantee tomorrow’s success. 
Firms’ innovation prospects depend on their learning paths as the set of central engineering 
problems and the approaches followed to seek their solutions change with time. This highlights 
the importance of studying the relationship between life cycle of technology domains and com-
parative advantage patterns of new and incumbent innovators. We understand domains as areas 
of applied research that share common engineering problems and follow similar approaches to 
problem-solving. We theoretically define the life-cycle of technology domains and its relation 
with product and industry life-cycles. We empirically identify technology domains and trace 
their life-cycle by mean of patent citation analysis. The methodology is based on the analysis of 
the age of the different domains and of the characteristics of their technological trajectories. We 
then investigate comparative technological advantage patterns of new and incumbent innova-
tors. Our findings prove that new innovators have a comparative advantage in emerging and 
young domains. We also show that, up to the end of the 1990s, firms from latecomer countries 
specialized mainly in areas at the later stages of their life cycles.  
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4.1 Introduction 
In this paper, we analyse the relationship between the life cycle of technology domains and the 
revealed technological capabilities of incumbent and new innovators. The striking example of 
sustained fast economic growth and enormous structural transformation that several countries 
like the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore) and some of the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have provided in the last half-century, have been 
explained by a variety of points of view. A widely accepted explanation points to the role played 
by technology and knowledge upgrading as engines of economic growth and sources of interna-
tional competitiveness (Kim and Nelson, 2000). The development of internal technological skills 
and the access to foreign technology is the key factor behind the process of catching-up (Fager-
berg and Godinho, 2005; Hobday, 2000; Perez and Soete 1988; Verspagen, 1991; Abramovitz, 
1994). Technology is in continuous evolution and the direction and speed of technical change, by 
creating and replacing capabilities at different paces, determine the availability of entry and 
catch-up opportunities (Lee, 2013; Lee and Lim, 2001 and Dosi, 1982) and changes in industry 
structure (Breschi et al. 2000; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997; Schmookler, 1962). The life cycle of 
technology domains is therefore a determining factor of the evolution of products and industries 
and of the fate of catching-up endeavours.  
 Although technology, product and industry lifecycles are conceptually and dynamically in-
tertwined, confusing the three levels of analysis generates conflicting predictions on the special-
ization patterns of new entrants. Industry life cycle theory (Klepper, 1997, 1996; Afuah and Ut-
terback, 1997; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1993; Suarez and Utterback 1993; Utterback and Ab-
ernathy, 1975) predicts higher entrance to occur in the earlier stages of the life cycle. This is 
when there are plenty of technological opportunities and a dominant design has yet to emerge. 
Consequently, the entry barriers are weaker due to the lack of cumulative technical and market 
knowledge advantage. Innovation management literature has also extensively analysed speciali-
zation of new entrants with respect to industry and product life cycles. However, the latter is 
even more specific than industry life cycle theory in predicting the type of technologies that are 
instrumental for successful entrance. Christensen disruptive technologies are the favourite com-
petitive battlefield of new innovators (Christensen et al., 1998; Christensen, 1997). There are 
two main conceptual puzzles in these branches of literature. First, these theories focus exclu-
sively on entrance from advance countries. Second, the theoretical framework does not clearly 
distinguish at which level between industries, products and technologies the mechanisms be-
hind the life cycle operates. The literature provides two alternative theoretical approaches that 
focus on global competition: international product life cycle theory and catching-up. The inter-
national economics literature on product life cycle (PLC), sparked by the seminal contribution of 
Vernon, predicts that latecomers are more likely to specialize in obsolete technologies that are 
progressively abounded by leader countries and whose production moves to developing coun-
tries to exploit their comparative advantage based on cheap labour (Vernon, 1966). Recent find-
ings in this strand of literature follows Vernon’s framework (Bergek et al., 2013; Karniouchina et 
al., 2013). Vernon’s theory has raised some criticisms, which focused mostly on the fact that to-
day’s production is characterized by fragmented value chains, and modular technologies and can 
therefore happen in more places simultaneously. Catching-up and technology regimes literature 
emphasizes how innovative entrance depends on changes happening at the technology level, as 
the introduction of new technologies or radical change in existing ones create higher technologi-
cal opportunities which, ceteris paribus, tend to favour the entry of new innovators (Lee, 2013; 
Lee and Lim, 2001; Breschi et al. 2000) 
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 A unifying framework that provides a systemic perspective relating industries, products 
and technologies is provided by Murmann and Frenken (2006). Industries can be seen as collec-
tion of vertically and horizontally related products which themselves are made of several com-
ponents whose design and manufacturing require distinct technologies. Industry life cycle there-
fore depends on the life cycle of the underlying set of products. There is a wide agreement in the 
literature that a key factor that shapes product life cycle is the emergence of a dominant design 
after a phase of fluidity that involves searching several possible design paths (Afuah and Utter-
back, 1997; Suarez and Utterback, 1993; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Utterback and Aber-
nathy, 1995). Yet products do not necessarily offer the best resolution to study search across the 
design space and the emergence of orthodoxy in the design approach. Products are systems of 
components and sub-components whose development follows own technological trajectories. 
Therefore, the life cycle of technology domains clearly affects product and industry life cycles. A 
micro-founded analysis of entrance and catching-up must necessarily focus on studying change 
at the technology level, as it is at this layer that learning happens. The goal of this paper is to im-
prove our understanding of the relationship between technology domain life cycle and speciali-
zation patterns of new innovators, in particular in the context of technological catching-up. Fol-
lowing Dosi’s definition of technological trajectories, we conceptualize technology evolution as 
the process of solving engineering problems (Dosi, 1982). This involves searching for solutions 
following different approaches. We argue that the emergence of an accepted approach to prob-
lem solving and the stability of the set of problems is the technology domain level analogy to the 
rise of a dominant design at the product-level. We define technology domains as areas of re-
search that define a set of common technological problems that are tackled applying similar 
mindsets and toolboxes.  
 Despite the variety of theoretical contributions to the literature of technology life cycle and 
dominant-design, few attempts have been made to empirically trace the evolution of technology. 
Perhaps this explains the contradictory predictions found in the literature on the specialization 
patterns of new entrants, specifically with respect to the direction of technology evolution. The 
few notable contribution to the study of life cycles at the technology level are the work of Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg (2002) and Lee (2013). Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) analysed the average time 
lag between cited and citing patents. They found that, on average, the number of citations to a 
given patent rapidly increases up to 3-4 years after it has been granted. It then relentlessly de-
creases. Lee (2013) argues that the citation leg trend is a good proxy of the technology life cycle 
as it reveal for how long the piece of technical information represented by a given patent keeps 
being a useful source of knowledge for improvement of technology. We argue that to link the 
technology and the industry level it is necessary to analyse the life cycle of the system of tech-
nologies within an industry, rather than focusing on single sub-classes. Furthermore, looking 
only at the citation lag provides a measure of the speed of change but do not provide a picture of 
the scope and direction of change. In this paper we contribute a method to identify domains 
within a technology class and analyse their life cycle. We can trace the stage of their evolution by 
looking at changes in the attractiveness of the engineering problems pertaining the given do-
main and the stability of the approaches followed to tackle them. Our method is based on a dy-
namic analysis of complex patent citation networks. We focus on the semiconductor industry as 
a case study as it provides a particularly suitable ground for testing such relationship. Industry 
leadership has changed over time, because of different waves of successful latecomer entrance. 
The industry is characterized by a persistently evolving knowledge base, increasing global com-
petition and short business cycles (Brown and Linden, 2009). Furthermore, given the focus of 
this paper, it is particularly interesting to notice that the technology life cycle of semiconductors 
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is considerably shorter than other industries, as shown by Lee (2013). This has been proposed 
by Lee as a key explanation of the success of catching-up efforts due to the speed of knowledge 
replacement. Therefore, it is crucial to understand in which semiconductor technology domains 
new entrants specialize, determine the stage of their life cycle and assess whether latecomers 
specialization patterns progressively upgrade to emerging domains. In particular, we answer the 
following research questions: (i) In which life-cycle stages new innovators have a comparative 
technological advantage over incumbents? (ii) Are there significant differences in the revealed 
technological advantage of new innovators from different countries? 
 We identify domains and trace their evolution by analysing patent citation networks. Patent 
are understood as proofs that an innovative solution to a selected engineering problem has been 
found. Citations highlight the approach followed to tackle the problem by identifying the prior-
art the design process has built upon. We use data from the second version of the NBER patent 
citation database (Hall et al., 2001) which covers the window of time between 1976 and 2006. 
To reduce noise in the data coming from the highly skewed distribution of patents’ technical and 
economic value (Gambardella et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2005; Reitzig, 2003), first we identify the 
set of the most influential patents from the point of view of the development of the main techno-
logical trajectories within the semiconductor technology class. For this purpose we use the main 
path approach originally developed by Hummon and Doreian (1989) and subsequently refined 
and applied in recent work by Verspagen (2007), Fontana et al., (2009), Martinelli (2008; 2009), 
Bekkers and Martinelli (2010). Within this set of patents, we identify several interrelated tech-
nology domains using a community detection method proposed by Newman (2004). Then we 
develop a methodology to describe the life cycle stages of these domains according to the attrac-
tiveness of their engineering problems and the stability of the approaches followed to seek the 
solution. The basic intuition is that the centrality of the problems pertaining a given domain de-
creases over time, while the stability of the approaches to problem-solving increases.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we present a short overview on the technolo-
gy and industrial dynamics of the global semiconductor industry (Section 4.2), to make the read-
er familiar with the background of this study. Then we introduce the theoretical framework that 
we followed to define technology life cycle (Section 4.3) and the necessary methodological steps 
to identify technology domains and infer the stage of their life cycles (Section 4.4). Finally, we 
present the results that answer the two research questions (Section 4.5). 
4.2 Technology and Industrial Dynamics of the Global Semiconductor Industry 
We focus our study on the semiconductor industry. Semiconductors are the best example of a 
high-tech industry in which catching-up, and possibly leapfrogging, by former laggard countries 
like Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore, prominently occurred. Technological change played a crucial 
role in determining the availability of entry opportunity. From the beginning of the 1980s on-
wards, the increased modularity of semiconductor design and manufacturing technology frag-
mented the value chain fostering specialization and jeopardizing production. New firms could 
now enter the industry at different stages of the production process. As argued by Adams et al. 
(2013), “the increased adoption of Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) production 
processes weakened the interdependence of product design and manufacturing. [...] With the crea-
tion of standardized interfaces between components and Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools 
a modular system developed. [...] The interdependence between product design and manufacturing 
was weakened in many product segments in semiconductors and specialist firms were able to enter 
the industry at both the design and the manufacturing stages” (Adams et al., 2013, p.287). Fur-
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thermore, on the product side the development of Application Specific Integrated Circuits 
(ASICs) and of systems on a chip (SoC), which squeezed all components of an electronic system 
into a single chip, allowed application customization. This fragmented the market and created 
entry and survival opportunities for small firms (Fontana and Malerba, 2010; Ernst, 2005; Lin-
den and Somaya, 2003). Further miniaturization was also made possible by technological ad-
vancements in industrial lasers and lithography, which allowed exploring new innovative solu-
tions. This shows how changes in technology strongly affect industrial dynamics and provides a 
first argument in favour of analysing the life cycles of semiconductor technology domains. A sec-
ond one is provided by the short product life cycle that characterizes the industry (Brown and 
Linden, 2009). Periods of sustained revenues growth are constantly followed by periods of de-
cline. This is also explained in a report by Integrated Circuit Engineering Corporation (ICE, 
1996): 
 “[In the] long term, the sustained profitability of the semiconductor manufacturers depends on 
each company's ability to maintain high enough profit margins on the devices it produces to allow 
sufficient capital outlays for future generations of devices. From year to year, the health of the sem-
iconductor industry as a whole is indicated by its characteristic "boom" and "bust" periods, known 
as the silicon cycle. Since 1978, there have been four growth cycles in which sales grew an average 
of 30 percent per year. Following each growth cycle, the industry experiences a one to two year pe-
riod when sales growth averaged slightly under 4 percent.” (ICE, 1996) 
 The cyclicality of the semiconductor industry at the business level provides a strong reason 
for studying its life cycle at the technological level as the introduction of new products depends 
on improving existing technologies and generating new ones. In this respect Lee (2013), by 
computing the citation lag between cited and citing patents, showed that semiconductor tech-
nologies have the second shortest life cycle length among those considered, with an average cy-
cle time of 6.07 years before the underlying technical knowledge becomes outdated.  
 From the technological point of view there are a number of indicators that show as the sem-
iconductor industry as a whole moved from an emerging phase in the second-half of the 1970s 
to maturity in the beginning of the 2000s. The empirical regularities of industry and product life 
cycles have been sketched by the work of Klepper (1996; 1997). The author summarizes them as 
follows: “While distinguishing stages is somewhat arbitrary, the essence of the PLC is that initially 
the market grows rapidly, many firms enter, and product innovation is fundamental, and then as 
the industry evolves output growth slows, entry declines, the number of producers undergoes a 
shakeout, product innovation becomes less significant, and process innovation rises.” (Klepper, 
1997, p.149). The shift in importance from product to process innovation is also at the hearth of 
models of industry evolution that followed the seminal contribution by Utterback and Abernathy 
(1975). The symptoms of a long-run maturity of the semiconductor industry are evident from 
Figure 18. Panel A reports the trend of the relative number of technologically influent patents 
granted by the USPTO from 1976 until 2006 in each of the five US sub-classes of the Semicon-
ductor technology class (i.e. 438–process, 257-product, 326-materials, 505-programmability, 
716-design)12. Product and process innovations were equally important in the end of the 1970s, 
                                                             
12 It is important to note that the percentage of patents by technological class shown in Panel A of Figure 18 is not 
calculated based on all patents granted by the USPTO and classified in one of the semiconductor subclasses. Rather, 
we refer to the percentage by class with respect to a subset of technologically influent patents identified through the 
Main Path Approach, which we introduce in Section 4.4.1. The same holds for Panel B, where by new innovators we 
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when microprocessors had been recently introduced (Intel commercialized its first micropro-
cessor in 1971), then process innovation strongly took over. Another sign of maturity, in line 
with life cycle theory is provided by the trend in technological concentration shown in Panel B. 
Industry maturity is usually associated with a decreasing number of new entrants (new innova-
tors in our case) and an increasing concentration index. Panel B shows somehow contradictory 
evidence of that. The trend of innovative entrance appears to be quite cyclical, with two peaks 
reached in the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s. The number of incumbents, on the other 
hand, increases constantly (although at a decreasing pace) up to the end of the 1990s. This clear-
ly points to the fact that some of the new innovators managed to successfully establish them-
selves in the industry. Consequently, the number of incumbents increased over time. Yet, in the 
first half of the 2000s, both the number of new innovators and incumbents decreases strongly. 
Consequently, the concentration index (we use the well-known Herfindal-Hirshman Index –HHI) 
explodes in the beginning of the 2000s. This reveals that the share of technologically influential 
patents had increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few firms. Therefore, at the technological 
level, the semiconductor industry is undergoing what is commonly defined as a shakeout in the 
2000s, in line with the hypothesis of industry maturity. This is explained by life cycle theory as 
the result of the emergence of a dominant product design. There is anecdotic knowledge that 
semiconductor devices, such as microprocessors and memories, have indeed achieved great 
standardization and a dominant design focusing on miniaturizing their components has 
emerged (Epicoco, 2013). However, due to the multiproduct nature of the industry and the im-
portance of customized application-specific semiconductors (ASICs), the theoretical concept of a 
dominant design, as defined in the literature, lacks meaning when broadly applied at the indus-
try level. Yet, in Chapter 3, we have shown how a mainstream approach to design and a domi-
nant system of engineering problems have guided innovative effort in the industry up to the end 
of the 1990s, as shown by the stability of the main technological trajectories13 and the ranking of 
problems. Then, a new set of technical problems, mainly related to screen and MOSFET technol-
ogies arose, pushing designers to explore different approaches.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
refer to firms that hold at least one patent in the subset of technologically influent ones for the first time and by in-
cumbent innovators we mean firms that had at least one patent in that subset in the period(s) before. 
13 In the previous chapter, we show how the main approaches to engineering problem solving, i.e. the technological 
trajectories, actually got temporarily perturbed in the mid-1990s, when new players from S.Korea, Taiwan and Singa-
pore became prominent innovators.  
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Figure 18: Industry technology dynamics 
 
Given the record of successful catching-up efforts in the industry, it is interesting to brake the 
trend of new innovators of Figure 18 B at the country level.  Figure 19 shows the share of new 
innovators by geographical origin. As we can see, innovative entrance is in accordance with the 
historical knowledge of the evolution of the global semiconductor industry, as described by 
Langlois and Steinmueller (1999).  The share of US new innovators decreased over time up to 
the end of the 1990s, in favour of a larger entrance in the technological area by firms from Tai-
wan, Korea and Singapore, which account for about 20 per cent of all new innovators in the 
1990s. In contrast, the share of new innovators from Japan is rather constant across our sample. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that, despite European firms becoming quite marginal players in 
the global semiconductor industry, they seem to be able to still play a significant role at the 
technological level, at least in terms of innovative entrance.  
 The brief overview of the industry trends reported in this section has shown how semicon-
ductor firms are exposed to strong and shortening business cycles and how the industry seems 
to have entered in a phase of maturity in which only a few players are able to be successful in 
terms of generating influent technological innovations. These two effects reinforce the im-
portance to clearly define life cycles at the level of technology domains and analyse specializa-
tion patterns of incumbent and new innovators. In the next section, we elaborate on the theoret-
ical framework that guides us in this analysis. 
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Figure 19: New entrant innovators by country of origin 
4.3 Theoretical framework 
The answers to the questions “how technology change?” and “how are products and industries 
affected?” have been seek in a variety of ways. As we have discussed in the introduction of the 
paper, the prevailing belief is that the emergence of dominant product designs is the selection 
mechanism that stop the search process and, consequently, reduce the number of players in the 
competition arena. This allows focusing innovative efforts to process innovation, which, by mak-
ing the product cheaper, spark diffusion. Eventually the fossilization of product design con-
strains the generation of novelty and lead to the emergence of decreasing returns to adoption. 
This eventually increases the probability that the dominant design is re-thought or abounded in 
search of the new product to introduce. 
 This is an accurate representation of the life cycle of a single product and there is evidence 
that the pattern of market entry and exit in the industry is consistent with the predictions of the 
product life cycle theory (Klepper, 1996; 1997). Yet its application to industries with a large het-
erogeneity of products, some of which are highly customized and based on highly modular tech-
nologies, is limited by conceptual difficulties. Semiconductor devices are made by several inde-
pendent components. Some of them contribute to different products and therefore the underly-
ing technical problems and the way solutions are seek affect the life cycle of several products. 
Second, in high-tech industries long-run market survival depends on technical capabilities (Lee 
and Lim, 2001). Therefore innovative entry (and exit), defined as the ability to tap in the right 
technological trajectory, is more informative of a firm’s long-run success than market entry, 
which could be due to a transitory cost-advantage, in particular for catching-up firms.  In an in-
dustry characterized by a multi-technology space, the ability of persistently come-up with inven-
tions that proves to be on the right direction with respect to the future technological develop-
ments depends on direction of technological change, depends on the life cycle of technology do-
mains. We therefore claim that, for industries like Semiconductors, life cycles should be studied 
at the technology level.  
 We define a technology domain as an area of engineering research bounded by a set of 
common design problems and by similar approaches to problem solving. We adapt Murmann 
and Frenken’s (2006) nested hierarchy approach to theoretically link the technology domain 
level to the product level. This theoretical exercise does not have to be seen as an attempt to 
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formally build a correspondence table between products and technologies. The goal of this work 
is to illustrate the systemic nature of technology and the relationship between industry, product 
and technology domains’ life cycle. This is used to stress how the most insightful unit of analysis 
is the technology level. Our theoretical framework is illustrated in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: Nested hierarchy of life cycles 
 
An industry is made by a collection of products. There is general agreement in the recent eco-
nomic (Murmann and Frenken, 2006), engineering (de Weck et al., 2011) and complex system 
(Arthur, 2009) literature in describing products as systems of nested hierarchies made by layers 
of components and parts. The degree of modularity of the system determines whether compo-
nents can be designed and produced in isolation from each other’s. Technology domains can 
span them both vertically and horizontally or they can be confined to a given component or 
product. This ultimately depends on the generality of the underlying engineering problem. For 
instance, miniaturization or reduction of energy-consumption, are very general and ubiquitous 
problems. The former carries a variety of related sub-problems like velocity saturation or deg-
radation due to overheat, as the technology scaling reaches channel lengths less than a micron. 
These problems are not isolated and related to a single product or component. In contrast, they 
affect the whole system. Change at the domain level propagates in the system along multiple 
paths, generating positive feedbacks or creating cascades of design problems, as shown by Giffin 
et al. (2008). Therefore, the search for solutions to key design challenges ultimately affects the 
life cycle of components and products. Consequently, incumbents’ and new entrants’ innovation 
prospects depend on their technical capabilities and their knowledge upgrading paths measured 
at the domain level. Mapping the hierarchical structure of the system goes beyond the scope of 
this work. For our purposes, we only need to perform the following tasks: 
1- Identify technology domains; 
2- Assess their life cycle stage; 
3- Investigate whether incumbents’ and new innovators’ revealed technological advantage 
significantly differs along the life cycle of technology domains. 
The technical aspects of the methodology used to address each of the three tasks are explained 
in details in the next section. Here we highlight the theoretical motivation behind them. A popu-
lar approach concerning the problem of identifying technology domains rely on raw information 
contained in patent database and on patent classification codes such as the US patent codes or 
the International Patent Classification (IPC). We believe that the well-known skewed nature of 
the distribution of patent economic and technical value (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2007; Tra-
jtenberg, 1990) makes it mandatory to clean the data by first identifying influent patents. This is 
done by applying the Main Path Approach (MPA) that identifies patents that lay on the main 
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paths of technical improvements, as measured by citation flows. Moreover, we claim that using 
patent classes to identify domains is not a suitable option given the purpose of this study. Classi-
fications are a very useful source of information but by definition are done ex-post and are sub-
ject to a certain degree of subjectivity. For instance, an emerging domain would not be immedi-
ately recognized as such. It will require a new classification, which will imply a considerable lag 
in our ability to recognize emerging technologies. For this reason, we rely on a bottom-up net-
work-based classification that makes use of network community-detection techniques. Domains 
are identified by clustering patents based on their similarity. The latter is measured by direct 
and indirect citations. Citations are a proof that the prior-art disclosed in the cited patent has 
been improved by the cited one. As such, they reveal the similarity of the underlying technical 
problem and the use of the same problem-solving approach. This perfectly fits with our theoreti-
cal definition of domains. Selecting only the most technologically influent patents besides clean-
ing the data also allows distinguishing innovators from inventors. By the former, we mean play-
ers that are able to generate novelty that is later recognized as useful from the point of view of 
technical progress. The latter are players whose inventive output does not attract sufficient at-
tention to determine the course of technology evolution. In this sense, we use the term innova-
tion in a Schumpeterian way, implying that inventions became innovations only when they are 
recognized as useful and, therefore, start diffusing. We further distinguish between incumbent 
and new innovators. Note that the use of the terms “new innovators” or “incumbent innovators” 
rather than new entrants or simply incumbents is purposely made. Industrial organization theo-
ry would distinguish between firms that have started producing for the first time (new entrants) 
or have been doing it for a while (incumbents). Since we look at the technological dimension ra-
ther than the manufacturing one, we characterize firms by their ability to generate technological 
inventions that lately attracted a significant sequence of engineering improvements.  
 Once we have theoretically defined what technology domains are, and why we identify 
them using a bottom-up citation-based approach, we can formalize the theoretical concept of 
domain life cycle. We argue that the evolution of a technology domain can be described by two 
variables: the importance of the underlying technical problem and the persistence of the variety 
of approaches to problem solving.  
 An archetypal description of the evolution of a technology domain is presented in Figure 21. 
Let us suppose that the origin of a given technology domain is a breakthrough innovation. These 
innovations bring a completely new set of engineering problems that are very loosely related 
with previous solutions. The problem-solving approach is therefore disconnected with past ex-
perience. This implies that a variety of search strategies is applied to seek the solution. Break-
throughs are obviously rare and are usually identified as such only ex-post. Our approach identi-
fies potential breakthroughs ex-ante as clusters of related problems with no or loose connec-
tions with the past that attract a lot of innovative effort by some of the players. In other words, 
finding solutions to these problems is considered as an important task. If the underlying prob-
lems are recognized as important and a solution is possible, at some point the variety of search 
strategies starts to decrease. Problem solving begins to be path-dependent and the persistence 
of a common approach increases. The underlying problems are still considered as important but 
they attract slightly less innovative efforts than before. The domain moved toward its early de-
velopment phase. As time goes by the domain enters its maturity phase, a bulk of existing 
knowledge accumulates, the search of alternative approaches greatly reduces and the problems 
themselves become to be perceived as less important. This can be due to at least three reasons. 
First valid solutions have already been found (i.e. technological progress have moved further). 
Second, technological development at the product level has taken a different trajectory and oth-
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er engineering problems are perceived as bottlenecks of progress. Third, the problems start to 
be perceived as unsolvable. In any of the three cases if a general agreement on the reduced im-
portance of the problem emerges the domains move to its decline or exhausting stage. Innova-
tive efforts drop dramatically and the remaining gleams of inventive activity, if at all, follow 
clearly predefined problem-solving approaches. This destiny is not ineluctable. Some players 
might think that searching for better solutions is still worthy, perhaps because of a different vi-
sion of the future development of the technological trajectory or because of the attempt to im-
prove older generations of a given product or technology. This is likely to be the case for players 
engaged in technological catching-up endeavours. When this happens, there is a renewed inter-
est in the set of technical problems and a revamp in the search of alternative approaches. The 
domain enters into a renewing phase. This type of life cycle is portrayed in Figure 46 in the Ap-
pendix A.4.1. If the renewal phase is successful and the new approaches are promising a new life 
cycle might start, otherwise the domain might face decline anyhow. 
 When we described the archetypal life cycle of a given technology domain we assumed it 
started with a breakthrough.  Besides a successful renewal of an old domain, another exception 
to the breakthrough kick off exists. A life cycle might be initiated by the emergence of disruptive 
technology domains. Christensen (1997) defined disruptive technologies as those that initially 
perform worse than the current best practices and address a different market but eventually 
outperform current technologies even in their own market. We use the word disruptive to de-
scribe domains whose engineering problems initially do not attract much innovative effort be-
cause they are not generally recognized as important. Furthermore, in these domains, the search 
of solutions follows unconventional paths. However, if promising approaches to problem solving 
arise, the importance of the problem and the value of the new design approaches might be rec-
ognized by many players. These domains would then start attracting more inventive effort. 
Eventually, this would spark the life cycle. This is shown in Figure 47 in the Appendix A.4.1. 
 
Figure 21: Archetypal life-cycle of a given technology domain starting with a breakthrough 
 
The exploration of different approaches to a problem, has a clear theoretical relationship with 
the concept of technological trajectories. A technological trajectory is defined by Dosi (1982) as 
the direction of problem-solving activities within a technological paradigm.  Yet, although con-
ceptually related there is an important difference concerning the level of analysis and the way 
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they affect technological progress. Trajectories are typically defined at the product level. They 
are the results of design choices on which features of the product to improve, in particular when 
these features are affected by trade-offs (e.g. computational power vs. energy consumption). 
Technological trajectory affect and are affected by the life cycle of technology domains. On the 
one hand, choices along the trajectory obviously imply that some engineering problems will be 
perceived as more important than others and consequently attract more innovative efforts. De-
pending on the novelty of the problem, the urge to find appropriate solutions will either spark a 
variety of search strategies or follow predefined and more conservative approaches. On the oth-
er hand, the solution of problems that affect several components and/or products, pushes inno-
vative efforts toward some products features rather than others or might even allow braking the 
trade-off. 
 There is also a clear relationship between the life cycle of technology domains and catching-
up strategies followed by latecomers. Lee and Lim (2001) defined three types of catching-up: 
path-following, stage-skipping and path-creating. When the latecomer firm just follows the same 
path taken by the forerunner (with a narrowing delay), the catching-up process is said to be 
path-following. When, instead, the latecomer firm learn so quickly to be able to skip one or more 
generations of the technology, catching-up follows a stage-skipping pattern. Finally, the authors 
define path-creating catch-up. This is defined as the situation in which the process of learning 
and assimilation of older generations of a given technology, by a latecomer firm, results into sig-
nificant technical improvements that take a different direction compared to the current path fol-
lowed by leaders. The authors argue that stage-skipping and path-creation are better described 
as leapfrogging rather than catching-up as they involve doing something different from what 
previously done by the leaders. There is a strong analogy between the life cycle stage of a given 
technology domain and the type of catching-up followed by latecomers. Successful path-
following catching-up would correspond to initially specializing in exhausted areas and then sys-
tematically move backward along the life cycle, specializing in mature, early-growth and emerg-
ing areas at each subsequent time. If any of the steps would be skipped along the catching-up 
process than we could describe it as a stage-skipping type, or leapfrogging.  Taking Lee and Lim’s 
definition literally, path-creating would correspond to an early specialization in breakthrough or 
disruptive areas, as it reveals that the latecomer is exploring its own path. However, we claim 
that specialization in renewing areas also falls into the path-creating category of catching-up 
given the explorative nature of the learning endeavour. 
4.4 Methodology and Preliminary Data Analysis 
To empirically test the validity of our theoretical framework, identify semiconductor technology 
domains’ and analyse players’ revealed technological advantage over the life cycle, we need to 
perform a number of practical tasks. Table 7 reports these tasks together with the methodology 
used to address them. The table is intended to serve as a roadmap to navigate the next sub-
sections, where we systematically explain the methodology used to tackle each task. 
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Table 7: Methodological roadmap to analyse the life cycle of technology domains and 
specialization patterns of new and incumbent innovators 
Task Methodology used 
Define a method to identify technologically influent patents Network of Main Paths Approach 
Define a method to cluster patents around relatedness of 
problems and approaches to problem-solving (i.e. identify 
technology domains) 
Community detection 
Measure importance of the underlying problem and 
persistence of the problem-solving approach 
Communities’ patent composition analysis 
Define boundaries of the importance and persistence to 
categorize life cycle stages of technology domains, from 
breakthrough to declining 
Analysis of the distribution of patent types 
Analyse which actors (i.e. new or incumbent innovators) are 
more active in which stages.  
Analysis of the Revealed Technological Advantage Index 
4.4.1 Identification of technologically influent patents 
Patent technical and economic value is highly skewed (Silverberg and Verspagen, 2007; Trajten-
berg, 1990). Only a few patents stand out of the crowd in terms of their importance for the 
course of technical change and their economic value. Therefore, there are two reasons to reduce 
population of patents to a sample of the important ones. First marginal patents and their cita-
tions create noise that can make it difficult to identify important signals from the data. Second, 
the reduced network size is computationally convenient for subsequent data analysis. The Net-
work of Main Paths (NMPs) is a methodology developed to identify the routes through which 
knowledge diffuses in large citation networks made of patents or publications (Martinelli, 2009; 
Fontana et al., 2009; Verspagen, 2007). When applied to patent citation networks this method-
ology allows analysing the evolution of the main sequences of technological improvements in a 
given industry or technological area. The first building block of this approach relates to the 
meaning of patent citations. If patent B cites patent A then the former improves upon the latter. 
In other words, A represents the state-of-the-art concerning the particular technology described 
in patent B at the moment in which patent application B was filed. Therefore citations can be 
interpreted as a measure of technological relatedness14 and provide insights on the direction of 
technological change. In particular, the citation relationship proves that the citing patent focused 
on the same engineering problem than the cited one. Furthermore, it also highlights the use of a 
similar approach to problem solving as otherwise the relationship between the technical claims 
of citing and cited patents would not be justified. In this case, the latter would not be considered 
as the relevant prior-art for the former. Obviously, a patent can cite and be cited by many other 
patents. Hence, if we want to follow the main trajectories of technology evolution among a set of 
                                                             
14 From this perspective, the well-known fact that many, if not most, of the citation are added by the patent examiner 
rather than the applicant plays in our favor. Indeed patent applications are examined by expert in the field of the 
technology described by the patent. Therefore, citations added by examiners can be seen as an even more objective 
measure of technological relatedness among patents. Obviously examiner-added citations are instead much more of a 
problem if one wants to use them as a measure of spillover between patent assignees. This is not the case for this 
work.  
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patents, we first need to decide which direction to take at every junction. This is what the algo-
rithm to define the NMPs does. First, we calculate the weight of every citation using the search 
path node pair (SPNP) algorithm, developed by Batagelj (2003) based on the original measure 
introduced by Hummon and Doreian (1989).  The SPNP returns the number of times that each 
citation link lies on all possible paths connecting any node to anyone else15. This is easily calcu-
lated by multiplying the number of patents that reach (through direct and indirect citations) the 
cited patent by the number of patents that are reached (directly or indirectly) by the citing pa-
tent. Therefore, a high SPNP weight indicates that the given citation and the two patents in-
volved are located in a highly connected and connecting area of the network. This means that the 
given citation has a strong technological influence, as many paths of technological improvement 
pass through it. The NMPs is then identified by following the paths emanating from start nodes 
(nodes that are cited but not cited), taking at each junction the direction of the citation which 
carries the highest weight, till an end point (a node who cites but is not cited) is reached. This 
process can be repeated several time by cumulating windows of time, (e.g. from time t till t+1, 
then from t till t+2, and so on). By computing the NMPs for each period we can observe how the 
entrance of young patents at each point in time affects the presence of old ones in the network of 
main paths (i.e. the persistence of old technological trajectories). When newly granted patents 
connect to previously well-connected patents, technical improvements follow the same paths of 
citations of the previous period(s). In this case, the technological trajectories are said to be sta-
ble and cumulative. We interpret this case as an instance of stability of problem-solving ap-
proaches. To the contrary, if the new patents connect to paths that were previously underex-
ploited the patent composition of the NMPs changes and the technological trajectories are af-
fected by a discontinuity. We interpret the latter as a case of search of alternative problem-
solving approaches. In a nutshell a given NMPs at each point in time is populated by three types 
of patents: those recently granted (i.e. young patents), older patents that appeared in previous 
snapshots of the NMPs (i.e. old persistent patents) and older ones that show-up for the first time 
(i.e. old new patents). The distribution of patents across the three types is instrumental in identi-
fying the life cycle of technology domains, as we will explain in Section 4.3.  
 We apply the NMPs methodology to the whole citation network of semiconductor tech-
nology-related patents granted by the USPTO between 1976 and 2006. First, we extract all US 
patents belonging to the following five US technology sub-classes: 438–process, 257-product, 
326-materials, 505-programmability, 716-design. Then we create the citation network and ex-
tract the largest connected component. The latter is used to feed the NMPs algorithm that ex-
tract the most important paths of citations based on the SPNC weights and identify the patents 
laying on them. The largest component of the resulted reduced network is composed by the set 
of patents that we claim being the most influential from the perspective of technical progress.  
Table 8 reports the network size at each layer of data reduction. Figures showing the main com-
ponent of the NMPs for the six periods are reported in the Appendix A.4.2. The technology do-
mains are highlighted in different colours (these areas have been identified through the commu-
nity detection procedure explained in Section 4.2).  
                                                             
15 Readers familiar with recent developments in graph theory will recognize the similarity with the measure of ran-
dom-walk betweenness centrality (RWBC) introduced by Newmann (2005). Indeed SPNP and RWBC are essentially 
the same measure. The former had been defined by Hummon and Doreian (1989). 
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Table 8 shows that the main component of the NMPs for the periods 1976-1995 and 1976-2006 
decreased in size compared to the periods before them. Both were analysed in the previous 
chapter. The drop in the period 1976-1995 has been explained by the action of new innovators 
from latecomer countries that happened in the mid-1990s. Their learning strategy consisted in 
searching for alternative-approaches to the existing sets of engineering problems. However the 
disruption that they caused to the main paths was temporary.  Some patents from the main 
component of the NMPs in 1976-1995 moved to the second component in the next period. Yet 
they were brought back into the largest component in 1976-2000, revealing successful attempts 
to make a synthesis of different problem-solving approaches. In the context of this paper, it is 
more interesting to focus on the drop in the size of the main component of the NMPs that oc-
curred in the last period (1976-2006). This second drop was also discuss in the previous chap-
ter. In this case, the reason was a change in the ranking of engineering problems. At the begin-
ning of the 2000s, newly granted patents connected more to the second largest component of 
the NMPs than to the first. This means that a change in the ranking of engineering problems’ im-
portance occurred in this period. Priority of innovative effort shifted from those related to do-
mains pertaining to the largest component to those found in the second one. The analysis of pa-
tents titles and abstracts revealed that technology domains found in in the second component 
focused on engineering problems related to LCD displays, in particular for e-readers and flat tel-
evisions. This suggests that the second largest component of the NMPs is composed of domains 
more related to entertainment and portable devices than to desktop computers and laptops. 
What we observe in this period could therefore be a case of overlap between the life cycle of 
products and technology domains. Given the importance of engineering problems related to the 
second component of the NMPs in the last period under observation, we include it in the analysis 
performed in the rest of the paper. 
 
Table 8: Basic network statistics 
  76-80 76-85 76-90 76-95 76-00 76-06 
Whole network - number of patents 2079  5631 12533  26853  54086 114097 
Whole network - number of citations 2712 13310 40255 102957 272843 779076 
Main component -number of patents 1703  5385 12348  26686  53874 113756 
Main component -number of citations 2469 13164 40145 102864 272728 778890 
Network of Main Paths - number of patents 1445  3490  6042  10107  15387  23428 
Network of Main Paths - number of citations 1403  3291  5697   9489  14588  22077 
Network of Main Paths -Main Component –  
number of patents 
 694  1540  2678   2043   4557   3544 
Network of Main Paths - Main Component –  
number of citations 
 756  1597  2734   2064   4617   3562 
4.4.2 Grouping technologically influent patents into technology domains 
What we have analysed so far is just the size of the NMPs. We need to identify technology do-
mains in this network. Given our definition of technology domains as areas of research charac-
terized by commonality of problems and approaches, the best way of identify them is by com-
munity detection. It became a common practice to analyse large networks’ community structure 
in order to split them into partitions. Partitional and agglomerative hierarchical clustering 
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methods have been defined to identify such structure. We use a method proposed by Newman 
(2004) based on the concept of modularity. Modularity is defined as the fraction of links (cita-
tions in our case) in the network that falls within a community. The algorithm maximizes modu-
larity. This allows identifying communities as areas of the networks whose nodes are more re-
lated to each other’s than with nodes outside the community. Technical details about the New-
man’s community detection algorithm can be found in the Appendix A.4.3, where we also vali-
date the quality of the algorithm’s results. We chose to use the Newman algorithm because, con-
trary to other popular community detection algorithm like, for instance, the Newman and Girvan 
one (2003), the former provides a benchmark to evaluate the quality of the partition and does 
not require to arbitrarily choose the number of communities to be identified. Indeed the modu-
larity maximization procedure and the comparison with equivalent random networks returns 
the best partition of the network analysed, without assuming a pre-existing community struc-
ture.  
Some basic statistics about semiconductor technology domains identified by Newman’s algo-
rithm are reported in 
Table 9. The high values of modularity (always higher than 0.85) reveal a strong underlying 
community structure within the largest component (and the second one in the last period) of the 
NMPs. This provides empirical support for the existence of several, relatively separated, areas of 
research within the semiconductor industry. The algorithm identifies a number of domains vary-
ing between 14 and 15 over the periods observed. The size of the largest area changes quite a 
lot. So does the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation.  
 
Table 9: Basic statistics for the technology domains identified by Newman’s algorithm 
  76-80 
 
76-85 76-90 76-95 76-00 76-06  
(1st Comp.) 
76-06  
(2nd Comp.) 
Number of patents 694 1540 2678 2043 4557 3544 2762 
Modularity 0.8567 0.8789 0.9013 0.9066 0.9161 0.9021 0.8967 
Number of domains 14 15 14 14 15 15 14 
Size of the main domain 128 328 368 272 637 701 489 
% of patents in main domain 18,44% 21,30% 13,74% 13,31% 13,98% 19,78% 17,70% 
Size of smallest domain 15 29 52 65 62 73 53 
% of patents in smallest domain 2,16% 1,88% 1,94% 3,18% 1,36% 2,06% 1,92% 
Average cluster size 49,57 102,66 191,29 145,93 303,80 236,27 197,29 
St.dev. 34,16 80,38 80,41 69,76 143,03 149,51 118,04 
Coefficient of variation (St.dev/Av) 0,69 0,78 0,42 0,48 0,47 0,63 0,60 
 
The large size differences among technology domains hint to the importance of analysing their 
life cycle. In the next subsection, we explain how we identify the life cycle stages of technology 
domains that we have just identified. 
4.4.3 Characterizing technology domains according to their life cycle stage 
Our method to identify the life cycle of technology domains is based on the existence of three 
types of patents that are found in the NMPs at each point in time: young, persistent old and new 
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old. Young patents are those granted in the last period of observation. Persistent old patents are 
those that have already been part of the largest component of the NMPs at least once in the peri-
ods before the one observed. In our analysis, we focus on six periods: 1976-1980, 1976-1985, 
1976-1990, 1976-1995, 1976-2000 and 1976-2006. Let us take, for instance, the last period 
1976-2006. For this period, the three patent categories can be described as follows. Young pa-
tents are those granted after the end of the previous period (i.e. from 2000 till 2006) which con-
nects to the main component of the NMPs. Persistent old patents are those who showed up in 
the main component of the NMPs at least once in one of the previous five periods. New old pa-
tents are those granted before 2001 which had never been part of the main component of the 
NMPs before. The distinction between persistent old patents and new old patents allow us to 
distinguish domains where there is no search of alternative approaches, from those who are ex-
ploring a new path. Furthermore it also help us to differentiate between areas which are young 
but nevertheless building on previously explored technological paths and young areas which are 
not related to any technological solution that have been developed in the past. Figure 22 shows 
the relationship between the type of old patents and the age of the technological areas. Each cir-
cle stands for one of the technology domains identified over the six periods. Its position on the 
horizontal axis reflects the age of the area. The vertical axis coordinate is given by the percent-
age of old new and old persistent patents found in the domain (each domain counts for two cir-
cles in Figure 22). Dashed lines are lines of best fit obtained by linear regression using a second 
degree polynomial as mathematical model. 
 The figure shows that young domains are more likely to build on previously unexploited 
technological solutions (new old patents) than known ones (persistent old patents). Therefore, 
search across possible problem-solving approaches is higher. To the contrary, the more a do-
main grows old, the more likely it will follow a stable and previously defined approach to prob-
lem solving. The two curves closely resemble the patterns sketched in Figure 22. This confirms 
our theoretical predictions based on the cumulative nature of technological change. Figure 22 
also clearly shows that patent composition within a technological area changes drastically with 
age.  Our classification method follows the intuition that it is possible to categorize domains’ life 
cycle stages based on the relative number of young, persistent old and new old patents, they are 
composed of. This allows defining all the stages of the life cycle of technological areas, from 
emerging to declining.  
 
 
Figure 22: The relationship between persistent old patent, new old patents 
and the age of semiconductor technology domains 
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Based on the theoretical framework discussed in Section 4.3 and the empirical findings shown in 
Figure 22, we propose the following theoretical correspondence between each life cycle stage 
and the patent composition that reflects it. 
Breakthrough  
Breakthroughs break the usual pattern of knowledge cumulativeness that normally characteriz-
es technical change. Their relationship with previous solutions is very little if existent. We argue 
that domains in their breakthrough stage are characterized by a large number of young patents 
and a few new old and persistent old patents if at all. 
Disruptive emerging areas 
We argue that disruptive technological areas are characterized by the presence of several young 
patents that builds largely on previously disconnected patents and very little on persistent old 
ones. This reflect the high search across possible approaches to problem solving which charac-
terize emerging areas but also the peculiar focus on previously unexploited existing solutions 
which make the domain disruptive in nature. The other marking trait of disruptive domains is 
that the underlying set of problems initially does not receive much attention. The latter two 
characteristics distinguish disruptive domains from breakthroughs. 
Early development 
If successful, disruptive or breakthrough domains are developed further and move to a stage of 
early growth. During this stage, the attractiveness of the area of research is high and the techno-
logical trajectory starts to consolidate. Therefore, the number of young patents is high, the pres-
ence of persistent old patents increases and the one of new old patents decreases.  
Maturity 
Maturity is similar to the early development stage with the only difference that the domain now 
attracts much less innovative efforts (i.e. fewer young patents connect to it) and technological 
change becomes increasingly cumulative. This means that the number of persistent old patents 
keeps growing, to the detriment of the exploration of alternative approaches.  
Renewing  
After the maturity stage the evolution of a given technology domain is at a crossroad. The devel-
opment of the given technology could be either stopped or get new vigour. In the former case, 
the domain begins exhausting. In the latter, it enters into a renewing stage. In this case, alterna-
tive paths are explored to avoid obsolescence. This might begin a new life cycle or just extend 
the life of a technology domain for a short while without avoiding its imminent decline. The re-
newing stage is characterized by a few young patents that build extensively on new old ones and 
on some persistent old patents. 
Exhausting  
Exhausting (or declining) areas are characterized by very few, if any, young patents, a large 
number of persistent old patents and almost no new old ones. 
 At this point, we have a theoretical definition of the life-cycle stages of technology domains 
and the preliminary characterization of them according to the relative number of young, old per-
sistent and old new patents that is found in each domain. To make our methodology operational 
we need a practical way to formally distinguishing one stage from the other. Consider a triangu-
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lar shaped space in which the horizontal axis measures the relative number of old persistent pa-
tents in a given domain and the vertical axis reports the relative number of young patents. The 
structure of the space is such that domains can only locate in the lower triangle that is defined 
by the axis and the diagonal connecting the maximum values of the two axis (i.e. 100). This is 
because the relative number of patents per each category is constrained between 0 and 100. 
Therefore, by construction the orthogonal distance of each domain from the diagonal measure 
the relative number of old new patents. We call such space the life-cycle space of technology do-
mains as the entire life of a given domain can be described by movements along this space. The 
space is reproduced in Figure 24. However, before to discuss the figure, let us first explain step-
by-step the process behind its creation. We first need to draw borders on such space that will 
help us identifying the areas corresponding to each life-cycle stage. To accomplish this task we 
need to formally quantify the relative number of young, persistent old and new old patents that 
a domain must have for its life cycle to be in a given stage. Quantify how much is a lot is a task 
that is best done by comparison. Therefore, we first take all domains identified by Newman’s 
algorithm over the periods 1976-198516, 1976-1990, 1976-1995, 1976-2000 and 1976-2006, we 
look at the percentage of young, persistent old patents and new old ones in each area and then 
we plot the distribution of these percentages. This is shown in Figure 23, where each of the do-
mains is split into three observations indicating the percentage of young, new old and persistent 
old patents it is composed of. On the horizontal axis, we have the values for the percentages of 
each category of patents that are part of one of the technology domains, whereas on the vertical 
axis we have the cumulative percentage of the distribution, meaning the percentage of observa-
tions with a value smaller than the value on the horizontal axis. We drew two horizontal dashed 
lines to clearly separate the top 20 percent from the mid-60 percent and the bottom 20 percent 
of the distribution. This allows us to identify the border values for the first quintile and the last 
quintile. For instance, if we look at the distribution of the relative number of young patents 
among all technology domains we see that 20 per cent of the domains have less than 1.14 per 
cent of young patents, 60 per cent have between 1.14 per cent and 49.35 per cent of them and 20 
per cent have more than 49.35 per cent of young patents. For instance, this means that a given 
domain can be said to have many young patents if more than 49.35 per cent of its patents are 
young. In this case, the remaining 50.65 per cent is distributed between new old patents and 
persistent old ones. The same exercise can be applied to new old patents and persistent old 
ones. In the former case 20 per cent of the domains have less than 11.11 per cent of new old pa-
tents, 60 per cent have between 11.11 per cent and 45.57 per cent of them and 20 per cent have 
more than 45.57 per cent of young patents. Finally, if we look at the distribution of the relative 
number of persistent old patents we see that 20 per cent of the domains have less than 11.97 per 
cent of them, 60 per cent have between 11.97 per cent and 86.67 per cent and 20 per cent have 
more than 86.67 per cent. It is important to notice that there are no domains purely composed 
by young or new old patents. Nevertheless, a few are entirely made of persistent old patents. 
From a NMPs methodological point of view we can argue that a domain purely made by young 
patents or by new old ones would be disconnected from the main component of the NMPs by 
construction and therefore not observed. To the contrary, albeit rarely, domains entirely com-
                                                             
16 We cannot use the first period, 1976-1980 because, being the initial period, by construction all the areas are entire-
ly composed by young patents. 
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posed by persistent old patents can be found in the main component of the NMPs. They indicate 
technological ancestors upon which newer solutions build. 
 
 
Figure 23: Empirical cumulative distribution of the percentage of young, new old and persistent old patents 
for all the domains in the periods 1976-1985, 1976-1990, 1976-1995, 1976-2000 and 1976-2006 
 
Now that we have more precise quantities of young, new old patents and persistent old ones, we 
can use them to elaborate a more precise definition of the life cycle stages of technological do-
mains. Table 10 reports the thresholds that define the amount of each type of patents to be 
found in a given domain for it to be classified in one of the life cycle stage reported in the left 
column. We call this thresholds quantile borders. For instance, for a domain to be classified as a 
breakthrough it needs to have at least 49.35 per cent of young patents, less than 45.57 per cent 
of new old ones and less than 11.97 per cent of persistent old patents.  
 However, the quantile borders alone are not sufficient to determine life cycle stages. The 
main reason is that, being thresholds, quantile borders suffer from the drawback that areas that 
lay very close to the border might actually be more similar to the areas located on the other side 
of the border than to the other areas located on the same side. This problem is similar to the one 
of defining homogeneous groups of people living in areas whose borders have been set on paper, 
without considering the common characteristics of people living close to the border. In other 
words, we would like to have borders that respect the geography of the life-cycle space. There-
fore, the initial quantile borders are used to calculate centroids, which serve as basins of attrac-
tion. To sum up, first we calculate the quantile borders for the distribution of the percentage of 
young, new old and persistent old patents for all the domains in the periods 1976-1985, 1976-
1990, 1976-1995, 1976-2000 and 1976-2006 (Table 10). Then we use them to preliminary iden-
tify regions of the life-cycle space that are coherent with the theoretical description of the life 
cycle stages of technology domains and the empirical distributions of young, persistent old and 
new old patents. Afterwards we calculate the centroid for each of the preliminary defined areas 
of the life-cycle space. Finally, we compute the distance to each of the centroids for each tech-
nology domain identified through Newman’s algorithm. The life cycle stage of each technology 
domain is then identified by assigning each domain to the closest centroid. This procedure is 
shown in Figure 24.  
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Table 10: Patent distribution quantile borders by patent type and life cycle stage 
 Quantile classification  
 
 Many Q1 (i.e. top 20%)  
 Mid Q2, Q3, Q4 (i.e. mid 60%)  
 Few Q5 (i.e. bottom 20%)  
    
Quantile borders for the technological area life cycle stages 
 
 Young patents New old patents Persistent old patents 
Breakthrough 
emerging areas 
Many = Q1 (>49.35%) Few-mid = Q2-Q5 (<45.57%) Few = Q5 (<11.97%) 
Disruptive  
emerging areas 
Few-mid  
= Q2-Q4 (<49.35%) 
Many = Q1 (>45.57%) Few = Q5 (<11.97%%) 
Early growth areas Many = Q1 (>49.35%) Few-mid  
= Q2-Q5 (<45.57%) 
Mid Q2-Q4  
= (11.97%≤ …<86.67%) 
Mature areas Few-mid  
= Q2-Q4 (<49.35%) 
Few-mid  
= Q2-Q5 (<45.57%) 
Mid Q2-Q4  
= (11.97%≤ …<86.67%) 
Renewing areas Few-mid  
= Q2-Q4 (<49.35%) 
Many = Q1 (>45.57%) Mid Q2-Q4  
= (11.97%≤ …<86.67%) 
Exhausting areas Few = Q5 (<1.14%) Few = Q5 (<11.11%) Many = Q1 (>86.67%) 
 
Each node stands for one of the technology domains identified in Section 4.2. The size of the 
node is proportional to the size of the given domain measured by the number of patents. The 
location of a domain on the life-cycle space is informative of its patent-composition and there-
fore of its life-cycle stage. In Figure 24 red lines highlight quantile borders reported in Table 10 
and centroids are marked with a red ‘x’. Domains that share the same colour fall within the basin 
of attraction of the same centroid. This means that they are closer to that centroid than to any 
other one and therefore are in the life-cycle stage indicated by the centroid. Note that by con-
necting centroids of subsequent life cycle stages and tracking the evolution of the relative num-
ber of young, old persistent and old new patents, curves similar to those reported in Figure 21 
emerge. This highlights the strong connection between the theoretical description of the life-
cycle of technology domains and the methodology used to trace it. 
 Now we have a classification of the life cycle stage of each technology domain. To test its 
logical consistency we trace movements from each life cycle stage to the other ones. Of course, 
for our classification to be coherent, we should observe movements consistent with time. This 
means that, for instance, patents that are classified into a technology domain in its early devel-
opment stage in period T should be mainly part of a domain classified as mature in the next pe-
riod. Some might still be found in an early-development stage. This would indicate that the life 
cycle of that domain is relatively slow. Some others might jump over stages and be found in re-
newing or exhausting domains. This would indicate that the life cycle of that domain moved fast-
er in the period observed. The crucial aspect is that they should not be found in large numbers in 
an earlier stage, otherwise the time consistency of our methodology would be broken. A small 
number of patents could actually move back to an earlier stage but this can only happen when 
some patents from one domain serve as foundation for a younger one in the next period. This 
possibility is intrinsic to the evolution of communities as defined by Newman’s algorithm and 
the network of main path approach. However, this cannot happen in large numbers because oth-
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erwise the new domain would not be younger than the original one and would then be classified 
in the same life cycle stage than the latter, or in one of the followings.  
 
 
Figure 24: The life-cycle space 
 
Table 11 shows how many patents from domains which, in period T, were in one of the life cycle 
stages listed on the rows moved, in the next period, to any of the domains whose life cycle stage 
in T+1 is indicated in the columns. 
 
Table 11: Movements from one life cycle stage to the others over consecutive periods 
 
The table clearly proves that our methodology is logically consistent as most of the patents fol-
low the expected movement to “older” life cycle stages (to the right of the diagonal) and very few 
moves to “younger” domains whose life cycle stage is antecedent the one of origin (to the left of 
the diagonal). Having proved the consistency of our methodology, we can now introduce the an-
swers to the paper’s research questions. 
4.4.4 Measuring comparative technological advantage along the life-cycle 
In the introduction of our paper, we raised two research questions about the role played by in-
cumbent and new innovators along the life-cycle of technology domains.  In order to analyse ag-
gregate comparative technological advantage we propose an original index that returns a macro-
aggregation of micro-comparative technological advantage of individual firms. Our specializa-
tion index, which we call SPEC, builds on the well-known revealed technological advantage index 
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(RTA). The RTA is a specialization index defined by Soete (1987), which builds on the Ricardian 
concept of comparative advantage and, more precisely, on the revealed comparative advantage 
index as defined by Balassa (1965). The intuition behind the RTA is that even if a given entity 
(countries, firms, geographical regions) might have less patents than other entities in absolute 
terms, there might still be areas of technology in which it enjoys a comparative advantage. This 
means that such entity could be able to produce comparatively more patents in a given techno-
logical area than in the overall industry. Indeed, the index reveals the domains in which a given 
entity performs comparatively better. This reflects the entity’s comparative advantage in terms 
of research productivity in those domains. Neoclassical economic theory would suggest that 
agents (firms or countries) should specialize in those domains where they enjoy comparative 
advantage. Obviously, this is a static suggestion that does not take into account the possibility of 
knowledge upgrading. Our use of the SPEC index is intended to investigate in which life-cycle 
stages agents’ capabilities significantly differ, in particular between new and incumbent innova-
tors. However, it must not be understood as a suggestion that agents should necessarily special-
ize in those domains permanently. To the contrary, in Section 4.5.2, we seek evidence of 
knowledge upgrading by looking at how the revealed comparative advantage changed over time. 
The original version of the RTA index is calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑘 =  
𝑥𝑖𝑘/ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 / ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑖,𝑘𝑘
 (4.1) 
Where xik is entity’s (country or firm) i number of patents in domain k. The RTA index is equal to 
zero when entity i holds no patents in the given domain k. When the index is equal to 1 entity i’s 
patent share in area k is equal to its share in all areas. Values of the index greater than 1 indicate 
comparative advantage in the given domain. The original version of the index is not symmetric, 
meaning that it is bounded to zero for comparative disadvantage in the domain but unbounded 
for comparative advantage. This causes problems when the RTA is used in econometric models 
or when one wants to compare the shape of its distribution for different entities. Since in this 
work we intend to do the latter we therefore opt for the symmetric version of the RTA (SRTA), 
which is calculated as follows: 
𝑆𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑘 =  
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 1
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑘 + 1
 (4.2) 
In its symmetric version the index ranges from -1 (full negative specialization) to lim
𝑅𝑇𝐴→∞
1 (full 
positive specialization), with values greater than 0 indicating comparative advantage in the do-
main. 
 We use the symmetric RTA as a basis to construct an index that gives a micro-founded pic-
ture of specialization patterns at the aggregate level. We first need to estimate the probability 
density function (pdf) of the SRTA for each country. The pdf returns the probability to observe a 
given SRTA value if we choose a firm at random out of the sample of firms belonging to a given 
country. We use a kernel smoothing function to estimate the probability distribution that best 
fits the empirical (cumulative) distribution of the SRTA for the given entity. The kernel density 
function estimates the probability to observe a given SRTA for the whole range of the SRTA in-
dex (from -1 to 1). This improves our ability to compare entities of different size as the empirical 
distribution for small entities relies on fewer observations than for large entities. Once we esti-
mated the probability density function, we compute the SPEC index as follows: 
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(4.3) 
Our specialization index SPECik is the weighted sum of the probability ρ to observe SRTA values 
at the firm level reflecting comparative advantage in the given domain (i.e. SRTA>0). Indeed 
ρ(SRTAj)ik is the probability to observe a given SRTA value j greater than zero (i.e. positive spe-
cialization) among the whole sample of SRTA values calculated for the area k for all firms be-
longing to the given country i. This probability is multiplied by the strength of specialization, 
namely by the value of the SRTA j, which, ranging from 0 to 1, effectively serves as a weight for 
the sum. We limit the SRTA range to positive values because we are not interested in compara-
tive disadvantage. In other words, a large value of the SPEC index means that, if we extract a firm 
at random out of the sample of firms from the given country, that firm has a high probability to 
be strongly specialized in the area under consideration. It is important to note that our index 
focus on the right tail of the distribution of SRTA. This is an improvement over traditional ap-
proaches that calculates the SRTA at the firm level and then averaged it at the country level. This 
approach fails to realize that comparative advantages are rarer than comparative disadvantages. 
Therefore calculating the average SRTA over the whole distribution hides the interesting signal 
contained in the data. Indeed, typically, the average SRTA would be negative. Given that observ-
ing values of the SRTA greater than zero is much less common than the opposite, the interesting 
information that the data provides with respect to comparison across groups is not provided by 
the mean. Rather, what really matters is how large the difference between the right tails of the 
distribution for the two groups is. Comparing the SPEC index across groups provides this infor-
mation. Another popular choice in the literature is to calculate the SRTA for a given country as 
the aggregate of all of its firms. This approach is also unsatisfactory in the sense that the aggre-
gate picture might be heavily influenced by a few large firms, washing away the information 
about comparative advantages or disadvantages of small firms. The SPEC index does not suffer 
from this problem either.  
4.5 Findings 
In the two following subsections, we present the findings that answer the two research ques-
tions raised in the introduction of this paper: (i) In which life-cycle stages new innovators have a 
comparative technological advantage over incumbents? (ii) Are there significant differences in the 
comparative technological advantage of new innovators from different countries? Before introduc-
ing the answers to these questions, we first describe the distribution of new and incumbent in-
novators in the NMPs sample. Table 12 reports the number of firms by geographic origin and 
type (new or incumbent innovators) across the five periods under consideration. To answer our 
two research questions, we merge the first and second component of the NMPs in the last period 
together, as explained in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.  
  
  Life Cycle of Technology Domains and Comparative Technological Advantage 79 
Table 12: Number of firms by geographic origin and category 
All firms 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2006 (1st+2nd) Total 
US 61 92 62 75 80 370 
JP 24 32 28 47 29 160 
KR 0 2 5 7 5 19 
TW 0 1 6 17 15 39 
SG 0 0 1 4 3 8 
KR/TW/SG 0 3 12 28 23 66 
Total 85 127 102 150 132 596 
  
      New Innovators 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2006 (1st+2nd) Total 
US 35 50 20 40 48 193 
JP 13 18 10 25 8 74 
KR 
 
2 3 2 3 10 
TW 
 
1 5 11 7 24 
SG 
  
1 2 1 4 
KR/TW/SG 0 3 9 15 11 38 
Total 48 71 39 80 67 305 
  
      Incumbents 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2006 (1st+2nd) Total 
US 26 42 42 35 32 177 
JP 11 14 18 22 21 86 
KR 0 0 2 5 2 9 
TW 0 0 1 6 8 15 
SG 0 0 0 2 2 4 
KR/TW/SG 0 0 3 13 12 28 
Total 37 56 63 70 65 291 
4.5.1 New and incumbent innovators’ revealed technological advantage 
In order to have a reliable estimation for the distribution of SRTAs for new and incumbent inno-
vators we initially plot all five periods together. This returns 305 observations for the new inno-
vators and 291 for the incumbents. Figure 25 shows the kernel smoothed cumulative distribu-
tion functions for the two categories of firms. The vertical axis reports the probability to ob-
serve, across the whole sample, values of the SRTA smaller or equal than those reported on the 
horizontal axis. Therefore if one distribution is “smaller”17 than the other for positive values of 
the SRTA it means that the former shows a comparatively stronger specialization pattern in the 
                                                             
17 The correct terms would be first order stochastic dominance if one distribution were always below the other one 
and second order stochastic dominance if the two distributions cross at some point, meaning that one distribution is 
below the other only for values greater than a certain threshold. Stochastic dominance refers to the difference in 
probabilities to observe values of a given amount. If the distribution for one category is stochastically dominated (i.e. 
it falls below the other) for the whole or part of the range it means that the probability to observe large (small) values 
of the variable is higher (smaller) than for the other category. 
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given technology life cycle stage than the latter, as the probability to observe large SRTA values 
is higher. A first look at the figure reveals that the shape of the distributions changes across the 
different life cycle stages. However, in at least three cases, breakthrough, early growth and ma-
ture areas, the right tail of the distribution for both groups behaves quite similarly. The differ-
ence appears to be stronger in disruptive, renewing and exhausting areas. We test whether the 
behaviour of the two populations is statistically different by mean of the Anderson-Darling non-
parametric two-sample test. The table of result is reported in Appendix A.4.4. The test confirms 
that the distribution of SRTA for new and incumbent innovators is statistically different for all 
the life-cycle stages except for the exhausting one. New innovators seem to have a comparative 
advantage in disruptive areas (as predicted by Christensen), whereas incumbents seem to be 
comparatively stronger, for mild levels of the SRTA, in renewing and exhausting areas, in line 
with industry life-cycle theory. A clearer picture of these differences is shown in Figure 26, 
where we plot the SPEC index for new and incumbent innovators. 
 
Figure 25: Estimated cumulative distribution functions for new and incumbent innovators 
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Figure 26: Micro-founded specialization index for new and incumbent innovators 
 
Our micro-founded specialization index confirms what we inferred from the visual inspection of 
the cumulative distributions. New innovators have a greater probability than incumbents to 
have a comparative advantage in all life-cycle stages up to maturity. These differences are all sta-
tistically significant based on the Anderson-Darling test. However only for disruptive domains 
the comparative advantage is considerably strong.  For renewing and exhausting domains the 
opposite is true and the comparative advantage is hold by incumbents. Yet the difference is sig-
nificant only for the former. Therefore, if we only distinguish firms based on whether they are 
new or incumbent innovators, without considering their country of origin, the semiconductor 
industry follow a recommended specialization pattern which is consistent with industry life-
cycle theory, Christensen’s notion of disruptive technologies and Levinthal and March’s defini-
tion of incumbents’ myopia (Christensen, 1997; Levinthal and March, 1993) . Indeed our findings 
are consistent with the theoretical prediction that new innovators perform comparatively better 
in technology domains in the initial stages of their life-cycle because incumbents are more likely 
to face learning traps that make them reluctant to explore new approaches to problem-solving. 
Our findings show that this is in general true but the comparative advantage is particularly 
strong only for disruptive domains. This answers our first research question. To tackle the sec-
ond one we need to further distinguish firms based on their geographical origin. This is done in 
the next sub-section. 
4.5.2 Countries’ revealed technological advantage 
In Figure 27 we split new entrant innovators by geographical origin. Once again, in order to have 
enough observations for the estimation of the cumulative distribution function we plot all peri-
ods together (this constraint will be removed in the last part of the analysis). Furthermore, for 
the same reason, we need to group latecomer new innovators from Korea, Taiwan and Singa-
pore into a single geographical area. This approach allows revealing the comparative technologi-
cal advantages of new innovators from catching-up (i.e. Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), early en-
trant (i.e. Japan) and leader (i.e. US) countries. For the sake of further comparison, we also plot 
the distribution of SRTA for incumbent innovators. This distribution is the same shown in Figure 
25. 
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Figure 27: Estimated cumulative distribution functions for new innovators 
from the US, Japan, and the three Asian tigers 
 
US and Japanese new innovators follow the same pattern of comparative advantage. The kernel 
estimated cumulative distributions of the SRTA values for US’s and Japan’s new innovators are 
extremely close in all the life cycle stages with the exception of disruptive areas. To the contrary, 
there is a remarkable difference between the distributions of the three Asian tigers and those of 
US and Japan, especially at the extreme stages of the life cycle. In breakthrough, renewing and 
exhausting areas, the distribution of SRTA values for Korean, Taiwanese and Singaporean new 
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innovators is always stochastically dominated by the distribution for US and Japanese new inno-
vators. This means that Asian tiger’s new innovators are comparatively more specialized in 
those areas that US and Japanese ones. The opposite is true for disruptive areas, whereas there 
is not much difference for early growth and mature ones. It is also interesting to compare spe-
cialization patterns between new innovators, now split by geographical origin, and incumbents. 
In technology domains in the early stages of their life-cycle, US and Japanese new innovators’ 
specialization patterns closely follow incumbent innovators’ one. On the other hand, for domains 
in the late stages (mature, renewing and exhausting), incumbents’ distribution of SRTA values 
resembles more to the specialization patterns of new innovators from the three Asian tigers. 
This suggests that incumbent strategies are imitated more strongly by US and Japanese new in-
novators when it comes to specializing in emerging technologies, whereas they are followed 
more closely by Asian tigers’ firms when the decision is about specializing in relatively older 
technologies. 
 As done in the previous section, to give a more precise answer to our second research ques-
tion we look at the micro-founded specialization index for new innovators by geographical 
origin. This is reported in Figure 28. Once again, differences in the distributions plotted in Figure 
27, which implies differences across SPEC indices, have been tested for statistical significance 
using the Anderson-Darling test (Appendix A.4.4).  
 
 
Figure 28: Micro-founded specialization index for incumbents and new innovators by geographic origin 
 
Let us first consider breakthrough, renewing and exhausting domains. If we pick a firm at ran-
dom out of each of the samples of new innovators, there is a larger probability that the randomly 
selected firm has a strong comparative advantage in those areas if we sample it from the Asian 
tiger group rather than the US or Japanese ones. Yet differences across the related distributions 
are statistically significant only for renewing domains. They are close to be significant in break-
through and exhausting domains, when we compare Asian tigers’ new innovators against US 
ones for the former and against Japanese new innovators for the latter. They are not significant 
in when comparing Asian tiger’s and Japanese new innovators in breakthrough and Asian tiger’s 
and American new innovators in exhausting domains. When we look at disruptive areas, the pat-
tern reverses. Japanese and US new innovators enjoy a strong comparative advantage, whereas 
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Asian tiger’s ones have a clear disadvantage. Yet, the Anderson-Darling test reveals that the ad-
vantage over the Asian tigers is significant only for Japanese new innovators, albeit close to sig-
nificance for American ones. Differences are very mild for early growth and mature areas, alt-
hough statistically significant in the case of early development domains for Japan. The advantage 
enjoyed by Asian tiger’s new innovators over US and Japanese ones is consistent with the anec-
dotic knowledge of the development of the Semiconductor industry in these countries. As shown 
by Mathews and Cho (1999), Chang et al. (1994) and Cho et al. (1998), the strategy adopted by 
firms from Taiwan and Korea consisted in accessing relatively obsolete foreign technologies and 
reverse-engineer them to start their learning path. To the contrary, their comparative advantage 
in breakthrough domains, although not significant, deserves more attention. In particular, from 
the point of view of catching-up and knowledge upgrading, it is interesting to know when this 
advantage started to emerge.  
 Thus far, we provided a static analysis, due to the lack of a sufficient number of observa-
tions to have period-by-period reliable estimations for the new innovators. We can overcome 
this constraint by looking at all firms together, regardless of whether they are new or incumbent 
innovators. This way we are able to show a dynamic picture of micro-founded specialization pat-
terns at the country level. Figure 29 shows the trend of the SPEC index over time across geo-
graphic areas.  
 
 
Figure 29: The evolution of the micro-founded specialization index over time 
 
A dynamic look at specialization patterns reveals that the comparative strength of Asian tigers in 
breakthrough domains is recent and started in the 2000s. Up to the end of the 1990s, firms from 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, were comparatively more specialized in renewing and exhausting 
domains. Interestingly, an increase of the SPEC index for these firms can also be observed in the 
2000s for disruptive areas. What is also striking is that US and Japanese firms’ comparative 
technological advantage in breakthrough areas (and disruptive ones, for Japan only) is decreas-
ing in the 2000s in favour of areas at later stages of their life cycle (mature, renewing and ex-
hausting). More information on the technical nature of each of the technology domains identified 
in the 2001-2006 period is included in the Appendix A.4.5. 
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 These results shed light on the different strategies followed by the mayor players of the 
semiconductor industry. New entrants from emerging countries successfully catch-up with the 
leaders by initially specializing in renewing and exhausting technology domains. These areas of 
engineering research were left free by US and Japanese firms, which, up to the mid-1990s, were 
comparatively more specialized in disruptive and early growth areas. However, in the 2000s 
latecomer countries began to develop a distinct specialization in breakthrough areas and also an 
increasing focus on disruptive ones, though maintaining a comparative technological advantage 
in exhausting areas. A closer look at the data reveals that the large values of the SPEC index for 
Taiwan, Korea and Singapore in breakthrough and disruptive areas in the 2000s, is mainly due 
to their specialization in emerging areas belonging to the second component, rather than the 
first one. This highlights their ability to anticipate a possible radical change in the trajectory (in 
favour of semiconductor applications for devices such as e-readers, tablets, LCD monitors) and 
testify the effort they devoted to build capabilities in the new frontier thin-film transistor LCD 
technologies (Hung, 2006; Chang, 2005). The combination of these findings with what emerged 
from the analysis in Chapter 3, describe a clear picture of the learning strategies followed by 
latecomers in the Semiconductor industry. As shown in Chapter 3, up to the end of the 1990s, 
firms from Taiwan, Korean and Singapore were primarily focused on following well-established 
approaches to tackle central engineering problems in the semiconductors. However, the findings 
of the life-cycle analysis showed that, at the same time they were trying to renew these relatively 
older domains by mixing well-known approaches to problem solving with new ideas. These al-
lowed latecomer firms building strong technological capabilities that quickly shift their compar-
ative advantage to breakthrough areas in the early 2000s. This is confirmed by the ranking-
changing strategies followed by some of these firms in the first half of the 2000s, as emerged 
from Chapter 3.  Therefore, we can conclude that successful technological catching-up by firms 
from latecomer countries took a form that combined what Lee (2013) and Lee and Lim (2001) 
called path-creating and stage-skipping strategy. By focusing on renewing established engineer-
ing trajectories, they build sufficient technological capabilities to explore new ones. In contrast, 
for players from leading or early entrant countries (US and Japan), comparative advantage pat-
terns reflect Klepper’s industry life cycle theory. Entry focuses on emerging technologies, with a 
stronger advantage in disruptive domains, as predicted by Christensen (1997). For the sake of 
keeping the analysis concise, we did not show details on comparative advantage for individual 
firms. The interested reader can find a series of tables reporting SRTA indexes calculated for the 
mayor firms in the industry in the Appendix A.4.6.  
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
Catching-up and leapfrogging in high-tech industries strongly depends on the direction of tech-
nological change and on the emergence of new technology domains and decline of old ones. In 
fast changing technical and business landscapes today’s capabilities do not necessarily ensure 
long-run survival. This highlights the importance of studying the relationship between technolo-
gy life cycle and the dynamic of comparative advantage patterns of new and incumbent innova-
tors. Our study is one of the few empirical contributions, together with Lee (2013), to the discus-
sion of technology life cycles at the domain level. Patent citation networks offer a fertile ground 
for such analysis. We theoretically defined the life-cycle of technology domains and its relation 
with product and industry life-cycles. Furthermore, we built a methodology to identify technolo-
gy domains and trace their life-cycle by means of disentangling the complexity of large patent 
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citation networks. This provided new insights on the dynamics of comparative advantage in the 
semiconductor industry. 
 First, we confirmed the empirical validity of entry and comparative advantage predictions 
from the theories of industry life-cycle and disruptive technologies. Second, we showed that, un-
til the end of the 1990s, US and Japanese firms were comparatively better in emerging technolo-
gy domains, whereas firms from Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, tended to specialize in relatively 
older domains, mainly in their mature, renewing and exhausting stages. These comparative ad-
vantage patterns changed strongly in the beginning of the 2000s, when firms from the three 
Asian tigers, next to their advantage in declining domains they also started developing a com-
parative advantage in emerging ones. This proves that latecomer firms from these countries 
have engaged in a mix between path-creating and stage-skipping catching-up, as theorized by 
Lee and Lim (2001). These results are also in accordance with the empirical analysis of technol-
ogy cycle time and catching-up made by Lee (2013) in which the author shows that the success-
ful catching-up of Korea and Taiwan built on upgrading the specialization pattern from older to 
newer technologies, exploiting short-life cycles. Our findings are also in line with the description 
of how Korean and Taiwanese firms managed to build their technological capabilities, as dis-
cussed by Chang et al. (1994), Mathews and Cho (1999),  Cho et al. (1998), Chang and Tsai, 2002, 
Bell and Juma (2008) and Hobday (2000). These authors agree in highlighting the instrumental 
role played by Korean and Taiwanese firms’ early specialization in old foreign licensed  technol-
ogies to develop internal R&D capabilities lately used to upgrade their specialization. The Asian 
tigers’ relatively strong position in domains that were emerging in the early 2000s, testifies their 
ability to be forward-looking. 
 Yet, it is important to notice that in this work we did not assess the future impact of emerg-
ing domains. Our goal was to analyse whether new entrants’ comparative advantage in those 
domains significantly differs from incumbents’ one. It is needless to mention that emerging 
technologies are intrinsically risky and there is no guarantee that their development will be sus-
tained in the future. A detailed analysis of how emerging areas affect the future direction of the 
technological trajectories goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, a preliminary analysis, 
that was not reported here, revealed that some areas did generate sustained new trajectories 
whereas others failed to do so. Since this has crucial implication for catching-up, a full analysis of 
the knowledge interaction between technology domains and the transferability of capabilities 
between areas is an open question for future research. 
 Finally, we want to praise the strength of using interdisciplinary approaches to disentangle 
today’s technological and economic complexity. Several tools have been developed for this pur-
pose, mainly at the intersection of economics with mathematics, physics and network science. 
The application of economic thinking to a combination of these tools, the community detection 
technique and the network of main paths, proved to be extremely insightful to analyse an eco-
nomic question that occupied scholars at least since Vernon’s seminal work (1966), namely the 
one of the relationship between life cycles and comparative advantage. The correspondence of 
our findings with the extensive anecdotal knowledge of catching-up in the semiconductor indus-
try contributes to validate our methodology to trace the life-cycle of technology domains and 
make a case for its use to study the technology dynamics of other high-tech industries or apply it 
at a wider scale to the question of the co-evolution of technologies.  
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5 DO I FIT? INNOVATIVE SURVIVAL, 
TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
We study firms’ survival as core innovators (i.e. innovative survival) in the semiconductor indus-
try as a function of knowledge diversification and accumulation. The semiconductor industry is 
characterized by high level of technical modularity, which is reflected in poor knowledge prox-
imity across technology domains. We hypothesize that, in such context, diversification and 
knowledge accumulation provide better chances for innovative survival. Moreover, we argue 
that, when knowledge is hardly portable across domains, the spread of survival chances be-
tween diversified and specialized players should be larger when technological change is 
knowledge replacing. We contribute new measures of knowledge persistence, breadth, depth 
and modularity, which take into account the topological structure of the system of technology 
domains. We do that by combining the Network of Main Paths (NMPs) analytical tool with the 
genetic approach (GA) to patent citation networks defined by Martinelli and Nomaler (2014). 
Our findings show that diversification significantly improves core innovators’ odds of innovative 
survival on the main paths of citations but only for large levels of knowledge breadth. The effect 
is conditional to the level of knowledge persistence. In contrast, firm’s knowledge depth alone, 
as well as the size of its technical knowledge base and the business method adopted, does not 
affect innovative survival. However, there are positive complementarities between knowledge 
breadth and depth. Important policy and managerial implications of these findings are dis-
cussed. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Technology, innovation and capability upgrading are widely believed to be among the main 
drivers of economic growth (Kim and Nelson, 2000). Several studies have analysed the empirical 
relationship between innovation and performance. In some cases the simplest measure of per-
formance has been used, i.e. survival. A variety of factors has been proven to affect firm survival. 
A not-exhaustive list includes product innovation (Fontana and Nesta, 2009, Cefis and Marsili, 
2005), new technology development (Levitas et al., 2006) product differentiation (Cottrell and 
Nault, 2004), capabilities (Sapienza et al., 2006), pre-entry experience (Bayus and Agarwal, 
2007, Buenstorf, 2007) and industry life cycles (Agarwal and Gort, 2002). From an evolutionary 
perspective, survival is seen as the ability to adapt to change (or successfully introduce muta-
tions) and fit the new environment. The urge to adapt depends on the scale and direction of 
change. Audretsch, (1995) showed that a highly innovative environment exerts a disparate effect 
on the post-entry performance of new entrants. New firms that are able to adjust and offer a via-
ble product experience higher rates of growth and a greater likelihood of survival. Therefore, the 
survival of firms in the competitive environment is substantially affected by the evolution of the 
technology underlying their products and the related manufacturing process. (Suarez and Utter-
back, 1995). 
 The lesson that we can learn from the studies on firm survival is that the ability to innovate 
and to adjust to changes in the technological environment are key explanations of market sur-
vival. Consequently, understanding the determinants of innovative survival is of crucial im-
portance. We characterize innovative survival as firm’s persistent presence in the set of core in-
novators. By the latter, we mean those players that are capable of affecting the direction of tech-
nological change by consistently produce influent technological improvements. In other words, 
core innovators define the approaches followed to solve engineering problems. To identify influ-
ent technical improvements we select, out of all semiconductor-related patents, those that are 
centrally located on the paths of technical development of semiconductor technologies. This is 
done using a bibliometric approach called Network of Main Paths (NMPs). We estimate the 
probability of firms’ innovative survival as a function of their technical knowledge breadth, 
depth, experience and business type. We also assess how the scale of knowledge replacement 
along the main paths of technological improvement, affects innovative survival. We use patent 
data from the second version of the NBER patent citation database (Hall et al., 2001), which cov-
er the period between 1976 and 2006. Since US are a crucial market for semiconductors we as-
sume that any technologically or economically important invention in this field is patented at the 
USPTO.  
 Surprisingly, the number of studies that focus on innovative survival as dependent variable 
is considerably smaller than those focusing on firm market survival, even though the former has 
been hypothesized to explain the latter. As Lee and Lim (2001) pointed out, a durable and sus-
tainable market success crucially depends on the ability to upgrade firm’s technological capabili-
ties constantly. Malerba and Orsenigo (1999) showed that innovative turbulence is an important 
composite phenomenon, in which innovative entrants/exiters and lateral entrants/exiters play 
different roles. Most of the entrants are occasional innovators, while persistent innovators are 
only a few but have the largest patent shares. That is why they are referred to as core innova-
tors. Explaining innovative survival (sometimes also called innovation persistence) is not an 
easy task. Studies on the topic have found mixed evidence (Antonelli et al., 2012; Roper and 
Hewitt-Dundas, 2008; Raymond et al., 2006; Malerba et al., 1997). Most of them measured per-
sistence using self-reported innovation outcomes or indirect measures of innovation that are 
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more closely related to strategic decisions, like R&D investments, or affected by large noise, like 
patent counts. For instance, Antonelli et al. (2012), measured product and process innovation 
persistence using a self-reported binary variable from a survey of firms. They found that the 
higher level of persistence is found for R&D-based innovation activities. Roper and Hewitt-
Dundas (2008), using data from the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) found that 
product and process innovation exhibit strong persistence at the firm level, but they find that 
persistence is not significantly stronger among highly active innovator. On the other hand, Ray-
mond et al. (2006), also using the CIS, found no evidence of true persistence in firms’ ability to 
achieve technological product or process innovation. This seemingly contradictory evidence 
might be explained by hypothesizing that, if technical change is knowledge-replacing, the cumu-
lative advantage of incumbent core innovators is broken. Therefore, in this scenario, we expect 
no differences in the ability to innovate between new entrants and incumbents as they both start 
at the same level of knowledge. The need to further understand the determinants of innovative 
survival provides the motivation of this paper.  
 We focus on the global semiconductor industry as a case study. Several factors threat semi-
conductor firms’ ability to persistently generate influential technical solutions. Firms need to 
keep pace with an exponential rate of improvement (Koh and Magee, 2006) fuelled by high com-
petition and short product life cycle (Brown and Linden, 2009). Furthermore, in the last two 
decades, the industry has experienced an unprecedented level of technology modularization that 
spurred functional specialization along the value chain and entrance of specialized suppliers. 
This further increased competition. There are four main types of players in the industry, Inte-
grated Device Manufacturers (IDM), which design, manufacture and commercialize their own 
chips, fabless companies, which specialize in the design of semiconductor devices, foundries, 
which manufacture them on behalf of third parties and specialized suppliers of equipment and 
materials. The technology modularization has fostered the entrance of fabless, foundries and 
specialized suppliers by reducing the economies of scope due to the decreased interdependence 
of different technological components (Adams et al., 2013; Langlois and Steinmueller, 1999). 
Modularity has also increased the variety of possible applications for semiconductors. The diffu-
sion of Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) production processes reduced phys-
ical and cognitive interdependence between product design and manufacturing. This was caused 
by the standardization of interfaces between components. The introduction of systems-on-a-
chip (SoC) and Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) furthered increased the market 
segmentation and fostered product specialization (Adams et al., 2013; Brown and Linden, 2009). 
 However, this positive view on modularity and specialization is contrasted by more cau-
tious theories in the literature on production networks. Ernst (2005b) argues that: “competitive 
dynamics and cognitive complexity create modularity limits. […] interfirm collaboration requires 
more (not less) coordination through corporate management, if codification does not reduce com-
plexity—which it fails to do when technologies keep changing fast and unpredictably”. At the tech-
nological level, modularity means that technology is developed into separate and independent 
components. Therefore mastering the design of one component requires little knowledge about 
the internal functioning and the design process of the others. Even though this clearly fosters 
specialization, it also means that knowledge is highly domain-specific. Therefore, if a technologi-
cal shock affects a given component, innovative survival of firms specialized in that component 
requires being able to quickly jump to the new generation of the domain-specific technology. 
This is because what had been learned so far is not useful to innovate in other domains. In other 
words, there are no escape routes to related knowledge domains. When between-technology 
knowledge flows are limited, the ability to adopt a new generation of the domain-specific tech-
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nology, for innovators specialized in that domain, crucially depends on the intertemporal persis-
tence of domain-specific knowledge. If knowledge persists across time the urge of diversification 
is smaller because the knowledge required to master the new technology is did not change much 
compared to the old one. This is the case when technological change is cumulative. 
 This paper focuses on the relationship between modularity, knowledge persistence and in-
novative survival. The research question that we seek to answer is whether technical knowledge 
diversification (i.e. knowledge breadth) affects firms’ innovative survival, in particular in periods 
of large technological turbulence. We also argue that diversification is only one dimension of the 
knowledge space. Knowledge accumulation (i.e. knowledge depth) provides a complementary 
dimension. In other words, if we think about knowledge as a tree, the breadth dimension corre-
sponds to the number of branches the tree has. The depth dimension tells us how deep the roots 
feeding each of the branches are. The relationship between knowledge depth and survival is 
more ambivalent. Knowledge accumulation can provide a shield against technological turbu-
lence by allowing early detection of decline of a given technology domain due to the high level of 
experience. However, the opposite could be true if the former investments to accumulate that 
knowledge generate resistance to change and learning myopia (Levinthal and March, 1993). We 
contribute to the debate on innovative survival by defining a new method to identify core inno-
vators that goes beyond simple patent counts or self-reported outcomes. Furthermore, we de-
velop a set of indicators to measure knowledge modularity and persistence at the patent level, 
and firms’ knowledge breadth and depth. These measures are based on the genetic approach 
(GA) to patent citation networks developed by Martinelli and Nomaler (2014). The GA takes into 
account the topography of the system of technical knowledge. It is used here to map relationship 
across technology domains and the structure of firms’ knowledge base. To identify the set of 
technology domains within the Semiconductor Industry we use a network community detection 
technique developed by Newman (2004). The paper is structured as follow. Section 5.2 clarifies 
the theoretical framework and defines the hypotheses that guide our analysis. Section 5.3 pre-
sent the data used. The set of models that we estimate are introduced in Section 5.4. In Section 
5.5 we explain how we measured the model variables. Trends of knowledge modularity and per-
sistence in the semiconductor industry are discussed in Section 5.6. Finally, in Section 5.7 and 
5.8 we introduce and elaborate the preliminary empirical analysis and the findings from the re-
gressions.  
5.2 Theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
The theoretical framework that we apply in this paper is based on seven key concepts and their 
interaction: engineering trajectory, knowledge persistence, technology domains, technical 
knowledge modularity, firms’ knowledge breadth and depth and innovative survival. We first theo-
retically define each of these concepts and then discuss their interactions. By engineering trajec-
tory, we mean the main paths of technical improvements followed in an industry to tackle prod-
uct and process design challenges. It represents how innovators solved technical problems re-
lated to create and manufacture better performing products, i.e. semiconductor devices in our 
case. Engineering trajectories are, therefore the projection in the design space of technological 
trajectories defined by functional and technical trade-offs that emerge at the product level. As 
Dosi (1982) theorized, a technological trajectory is defined as “the ‘normal’ problem solving ac-
tivity determined by a [technological] paradigm. [It] can be represented by the movement of multi-
dimensional trade-offs among the technological variables which the paradigm defines as relevant”. 
The set of product features one wishes to improve and the engineering problems that need to be 
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addressed to achieve those improvements are deeply intertwined and affect each other in a 
complex fashion. The historical paths of technical approaches used to solve those design chal-
lenges are what we define as engineering trajectories. When current approaches to problem 
solving cumulatively build on previous ones, knowledge developed in the past is still useful in 
the present. In this case, we can state that there is a strong persistence in technical knowledge. 
Therefore, this instance of technical change can be described as knowledge reinforcing. In con-
trast, when innovators explore new approaches to solve engineering problems, which do not 
build on previously well-established paths, the trajectory of improvements experiences a discon-
tinuity. Previous knowledge becomes less useful to solve current problems. This pattern of tech-
nical change can be said to be knowledge-replacing. Ultimately, the presence or lack of changes 
in the approaches to problem solving depends on the strategic decisions of the players involved. 
However, some firm are more influent than others in shaping the direction of the engineering 
trajectories. We measure firms’ technical influence as the ability to have central patents on the 
paths of technical improvements. Patents’ monetary and technological value is notoriously high-
ly skewed (Gambardella et al., 2008; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2007; Hall et al., 2005; Reitzig, 
2003).  Some technologies attract much more innovative effort than others do and some are able 
to set the path of current and future engineering solutions to selected technological problems. 
Firms’ ability to persistently having influent patents is what we define as innovative survival.  
When we think about the design space of an industry, we intend that the set of products and re-
lated engineering challenges is heterogeneous. In particular, the set of applications of semicon-
ductor devices is highly diversified, including products as diverse as microprocessors, memories, 
light-emitting diodes (LED), liquid-crystal displays (LCD), personal computers, smartphones, 
tablets, and application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). Therefore, the set of engineering 
challenges and approaches to problem solving is very diverse. We define technology domains 
within an industry as areas of applied research that share a set of common technological prob-
lems that are tackled applying similar approaches. Technical modularity measures the extent to 
which knowledge is domain-specific. In a highly modular system, the technical knowledge that is 
needed to succeed as an inventor in a given domain is very unrelated to what is needed in other 
domains. The notion of a system of domains allows defining the concept of firms’ knowledge 
breadth and depth. The former refers to how diversified a firm’s technical knowledge is across 
domains. The latter indicates how much of the knowledge historically generated within a do-
main is known by the firm.  
 To discuss how the seven key concepts of our theoretical framework interact with each 
other, we need to define a broad picture of firm’s inventive process and its relationship with firm 
survival, both as core innovator and in the marketplace. This picture is illustrated in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30: Theoretical framework 
 
Large firm’s size allows for conspicuous investments in R&D, which, depending on the level of 
technological capabilities, can generate high or low quality technology outputs. These can be 
measured by the level of technical influence of its patents. We argue that the ability to generate 
such influent technologies depends not only on R&D investments but also on the unobservable 
technological capabilities. The number of technologically influent patents granted to a given firm 
can be used as a proxy of the size of its technical knowledge base. The larger the knowledge base 
the more diversification and knowledge accumulation opportunities can be enjoyed. Depending 
on how the disruptive or cumulative nature of the firm’s innovative output, technologically in-
fluent patents can either set a new engineering trajectory or reinforce the prevailing approach to 
problem solving. This creates a systemic shock or reinforces the known landscape of the techno-
logical environment. In turns, this can either create new opportunities for knowledge diversifi-
cation or strengthen knowledge accumulation. This is a bidirectional relationship as firms’ 
knowledge diversification and accumulation effort also changes or reinforces the existing tech-
nology landscape. Ultimately, innovators’ resilience to technology shocks or probability to suc-
cessfully introduce change, depend on diversification and the level of knowledge accumulation. 
Note that the shock is exogenous to firms that react to novelty but endogenous to the firm ex-
ploring the new trajectory. However, in the latter case success is not guaranteed. Therefore, di-
versification and knowledge accumulation can still be beneficial. The former, by sharing the in-
novator’s bets across several technology domains. The latter, by increasing the likelihood that 
the new trajectory will eventually be the winning one. Finally, depending on exogenous market 
response to technology introduction and development, innovative survival leads to financial 
capital accumulation, which injects additional resources into the system.  
 The ease of exploiting diversification opportunities depends on the level of relatedness be-
tween firms’ current products and technologies and those in which they wish to diversify (Teece 
et al., 1994; Breschi et al., 2003; Neffke and Henning, 2013). Depending on the structure of the 
product and technology spaces, diversification may not be trivial. One might wonder then what 
makes technical knowledge diversification beneficial. Diversification is usually intended in the 
literature as the process of adding new products to the firm’s portfolio or entering new sectors 
of the economy (Frenken and Boschma, 2007; Saviotti and Pyka, 2004). However, the commer-
cialization of new products or entry in new markets does not imply that the firm is diversifying. 
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This could also be achieved by shifting firm’s specialization. Moreover empirical evidence shows 
that novelty is often introduced by new ventures rather than incumbents especially at the be-
ginning of the technology life cycle, as argued by Utterback and Abernathy (1975) and Christen-
sen (1993) and empirically showed, for instance, by Klepper (2002 and 1997), Rosenbloom and 
Christensen (1994), and in Chapter 3 of this thesis. We argue that the peculiar advantage of 
technical knowledge diversification is the increase in the probability to persist fitting the envi-
ronment for a simple economic principle of risk sharing. This ultimately creates dynamic returns 
as survival allows for knowledge and physical capital accumulation that sustain the growth path. 
This argument moves the spotlight from market survival and macroeconomic shocks to innovative 
persistence and technology shocks. Following this reasoning, we formulate our first hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 1: Innovative survival is positively affected by knowledge diversification (i.e. 
large knowledge breadth).  
 Knowledge diversification measures how much firms can share risk across technology do-
mains. Moreover, it also indicates the extent to which firms can enjoy knowledge complementa-
rities across several technology domains and knowledge spillovers coming from advances in re-
lated domains. This is what Frenken et al. (2007) define as related-variety. From a theoretical 
point of view, complementarities and spillovers are possible only under two circumstances. First 
knowledge from different domains must be somehow related. This is not the case under modu-
larity. Second, that the firm has a sufficient level of absorptive capacity to effectively internalize 
knowledge coming from outside the boundaries of the current firm’s domain(s) of specialization. 
As explained by the pivotal work of Cohen and Levinthal (1990), the latter can only be achieved 
in presence of pre-existing internal learning efforts. In other words, firms need to have sufficient 
knowledge depth to enjoy knowledge spillovers from related domains. Large knowledge accu-
mulation can allow early detection of decline of a given technology domain and provide the nec-
essary absorptive capacity to eventually attempt to take alternative paths. On the other hand, 
former investments to build knowledge depth can generate resistance to change that is particu-
larly high if the investment is seen as a sunk cost, i.e. when high modularity makes knowledge 
less portable across technical domains. It is therefore difficult to a priory-define a hypothesis 
about the relationship between knowledge depth and innovative survival. They might be charac-
terized by a positive or negative relationship or the combined effects of the positive and negative 
aspects of knowledge depth might generate an inverted-U shape. We therefore formulate a gen-
eral hypothesis, without specifying whether the relationship is positive or negative and defining 
its functional form.  
 Hypothesis 2: Knowledge accumulation (i.e. large knowledge depth) affects innovative 
survival. 
 Technical knowledge breadth and depth can also be interpreted as measurable outcomes of 
exploration and exploitation strategies respectively. In his seminal work March (1991) defined 
the organizational trade-off which is intrinsic in the decision to allocate resources to the “explo-
ration of new possibilities or the exploitation of old certainties”. What attracted particular interest 
in the organization learning literature is the hypothesis that ambidexterity, i.e. the ability to 
combine both exploitation and exploration, is the key to sustained performance (Raisch et al., 
2009). A similar explanation focuses on dynamic capabilities, i.e. the ability to update and recon-
figure firms’ routines, knowledge and strategies as the main determinant of long-term survival. 
O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) proposed a synthesis of the two approaches that sees ambidexteri-
ty as a manifestation of dynamic capabilities. Following these theories we hypothesizes that 
technical knowledge breadth and depth have strong complementarities. Obviously, it is not easy 
to simultaneously pursuit both. The innovator’s attempt to master new domains is likely to re-
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duce, at least initially, its overall knowledge depth because a previously unknown area is ex-
plored.  Yet, successfully breaking the trade-off and being able to enlarge both breadth and 
depth allows risk-sharing and enjoying economies of learning. He and Wong (2004) showed that 
the interaction between explorative and exploitative innovation strategies is positively related 
to sales growth rate. Similarly, achieving complementarities between technical knowledge di-
versification and accumulation should increase the odds of innovative survival. This argument 
leads to our third hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 3: Innovative survival is positively affected by the ability to break the trade-off 
and achieve large values of both knowledge breadth and depth. 
 So far, we have discussed the effects of knowledge diversification and accumulation on in-
novative survival in isolation from technological change. Clearly, the probability of innovative 
survival crucially depends on how useful the current and past knowledge is to be successful in 
the future, as measured by knowledge persistence. As shown by Breschi et al. (1998) and 
Malerba and Orsenigo (2000) patterns of organization of innovative activities are determined by 
the nature and peculiarities of the underlying technology. Technological regimes are defined as a 
combination of some fundamental properties of technologies, namely opportunity conditions, 
appropriability conditions, degrees of cumulativeness of technological knowledge and character-
istics of the knowledge base. Lee and Lim (2001) stress that as far as catching-up by latecomers 
is concerned, cumulativeness plays a particularly important role as it increases the predictability 
of the technological trajectory. We add that this is true for all firms, regardless if they are incum-
bents or latecomers. More generally, we hypothesize that high knowledge persistence favors 
current core innovators’ ability to persist being influent. Obviously, the opposite is also true. 
 Hypothesis 4: Low knowledge persistence increases the hazard of innovative exit. 
 Furthermore, as argued by Malerba and Orsenigo (1993), the higher the degree of cumula-
tiveness of technical change the larger the set of technology paths that current core innovators 
can take. However, it is important to distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post paths. As we ar-
gued in the introduction, high levels of knowledge modularity make it difficult to create escape 
paths to other knowledge domains after a shock in the technological trajectory has occurred. 
Therefore, to improve survival chances it is necessary to diversify ex-ante. Hence, we postulate 
our last hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 5: Knowledge diversification provides a larger survival premium compared to 
specialization when technological change is knowledge-replacing (i.e. when knowledge persis-
tence is low).  
 To test these hypotheses empirically, we first need to perform a number of tasks. We need 
to identify influent patents, core innovators and technology domains within the Semiconductor 
industry. Furthermore, we need to measure knowledge persistence, modularity and firms’ 
knowledge breadth and depth. These tasks and the methodology used to tackle them are sum-
marized in Table 13. We will discuss them in details in the next section. 
 
Table 13: Methodology roadmap 
Task Methodology used 
Data preparation 
Identify influential patents and core innovators 
Identify technology domains 
 
Network of main paths (NMPs) 
Community detection on the NMPs 
Measurement of the model variables 
Measure technical knowledge modularity and persistence 
Measure firms’ technical knowledge breadth and depth 
 
Genetic approach to patent citation networks (GA) 
GA 
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5.3 Data preparation and description 
5.3.1 Identification of influential patents and core innovators 
We use data from the NBER-USPTO database containing metadata of granted utility patents and 
their citations from 1976 to 2006 (Hall et al., 2001). Our initial dataset is composed of all organi-
zations that have been granted at least one patent classified in one of the semiconductor US 
technological classes between 1976 and 200618. This dataset is made of 4170 unique assignees, 
114097 patents and 779076 citations for the entire period. This dataset is reduced to select only 
technologically influent patents and their assignees. We define technological influence as the 
ability to affect the direction of technological change. This is intended as the act of indicating 
which are the most promising approaches to address the key engineering challenges that affect a 
given industry. To identify technologically influent patents we make use of a methodology that 
analyses the network of main paths (NMPs). The NMPs’ approach has been originally proposed 
by Hummon and Doreian (1989), further developed by Verspagen (2007) and lately applied by 
Fontana et al (2009), Martinelli (2008 and 2009) and Bekkers and Martinelli, (2010) to several 
empirical cases studies of technology dynamics in different industries. The NMPs identifies the 
routes through which knowledge diffuses in large citation networks (made of patents or publica-
tions). When applied to patent citation networks this methodology allows analysing the evolu-
tion of the main sequences of engineering improvements within the technology domain(s) un-
derlying a given industry. The first building block of this approach relates to the meaning of pa-
tent citations. If patent B cites patent A then one of the claimed features of the invention de-
scribed in the former improves upon the latter. In other words, as described in the USPTO Man-
ual of Patent Examination Procedure, A represents the state-of-the-art concerning a claimed fea-
ture of the technology described in patent B, at the moment in which patent application B was 
filed (USPTO, 2014). Therefore, citations can be interpreted as a measure of technological relat-
edness and provide insights on the direction of technological change. Obviously, patents can cite 
and be cited by many patents. Hence, if we want to follow the main trajectories of technology 
evolution among a set of patents, we first need to decide which direction to take at every junc-
tion. This is what the NMPs algorithm does. First, we calculate the weight of every citation using 
the search path node pair (SPNP) algorithm, as developed by Batagelj (2003).  The SPNP returns 
the number of times that each citation link lies on all possible paths connecting any node to any-
one else. This is easily calculated by multiplying the number of patents that reach (through di-
rect and indirect citations) the cited patent by the number of patents that are reached (directly 
or indirectly) by the citing patent. Therefore, a high SPNP weight indicates that the given citation 
and the two patents involved are located in a highly connected and connecting area of the net-
work. This means that the given citation has a strong technological influence, as many paths of 
technological improvement pass through it. The NMPs is identified by following the paths ema-
nating from start nodes (nodes that are cited but not cited), taking at each junction the direction 
of the citation which carries the highest weight, till an end point (a node who cites but is not cit-
                                                             
18 The US patent classification distinguishes five classes related to semiconductor technologies: 257, ‘Active solid-state 
devices (e.g. transistors, solid-state diodes)’; 438, ‘Semiconductor device manufacturing: process’; 326, ‘Electronic 
digital logic circuitry’; 505, ‘Superconductor technology: apparatus, material, process’; 716, ‘Design of semiconductor 
devices’. 
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ed) is reached. By repeating this procedure for each start point, we identify the NMPs. The NMPs 
can be made of separate network components when some of the main paths do not intersect. 
Engineering solutions described in patent belonging to different components can therefore be 
interpreted as unrelated. It is important to notice that components of the NMPs are not neces-
sarily separated if we look at the original network, but the nodes that connect them have a negli-
gible importance from the point of view of technological trajectories. We interpret patents that 
show up in the NMPs sample as the technologically influent one because of their importance in 
setting the engineering trajectory followed by innovators in the industry in the window of time 
under observation. We identify the NMPs for six left-cumulated periods: 1976-1980, 1976-1985, 
1976-1990, 1976-1995, 1976-2000 and 1976-2006. Cumulating periods starting from the same 
initial grant year (i.e. 1976), allows assessing how newly granted patents affects the stability of 
the main paths of technical improvements. By doing so, we can identify influent patents granted 
in the last five years of each period. For each period, we only focus on the largest component of 
the NMPs and the second one when deemed important. This applies to periods 1991-1995 and 
2001-2006, when, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4, the second component accounted for a signifi-
cant share of the influent inventing activities. This is the sample of technologically influent pa-
tents that we use as the basis for identifying core innovators. From now on, we will refer to this 
sample as the NMPs sample. It is made of 673 unique assignees and 9555 unique patents granted 
in the six five-years periods mentioned above.  
 The set of 673 assignees of NMPs patents represents the group of innovators in the indus-
try. In other words, a given firm might be engaged in patenting in one of the semiconductor clas-
ses but none of its patents might be important enough from the perspective of technological evo-
lution in the industry to make it to the NMPs sample. In this case, the given firm is not consid-
ered an innovator (it might at best be considered an inventor). This builds on Schumpeter’s dis-
tinction between invention and innovation based on their recognized usefulness. Innovators can 
be further distinguished between core and marginal innovators. Core innovators are entities that 
appear in the NMP sample for more than one period (i.e. over a time horizon of at least 10 years) 
or entities that show up in just one period (i.e. 5 years, except for the last period which is made 
of 6 years) but hold a significant share of patents in at least one technological domain19. All the 
other entities are marginal innovators whose patents are important enough to make it to the 
NMPs sample but whose inventive outcome in the semiconductor technology domain lacks ei-
ther persistence or success. This is a similar to the definition of core innovators from Malerba 
and Orsenigo (1995) and Malerba et al. (1997). The conceptual relationship between inventors, 
marginal and core innovators and the NMPs sample is graphically summarized by Figure 31.  
                                                             
19 There are 142 unique core innovators between 1976 and 2006. Within this set, 129 show up in more than one peri-
od, although not necessarily in a row, whereas only 13 of them are only present once but have a significant share of 
patents in at least one technology domain. However, none of these 13 appears in the final subsample that we use for 
the econometric analysis. Therefore, the sample used for the regressions, which is limited to the window of time be-
tween 1980 and 2000, is only made by core innovators that show up in the NMP more than once.   
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Figure 31: The relationship between inventors and innovators 
 
We can also categorize innovators in terms of their time of entrance. We distinguish between 
new, incumbent and exit innovators. New innovators are organizations that show up in the 
NMPs sample for the first time. They might later prove to be core or marginal innovators. In-
cumbent innovators are organizations that appeared in the list of assignees of the NMPs sample 
at least once in the previous periods. Exit innovators are organizations that ceased to be part of 
the NMPs sample in the period under observation.  
 Table 14 provides detailed information on the number of technologically influent patents 
(i.e. the size of the NMPs sample), their share of the total number of semiconductor patents, the 
number of innovators and their sub-categories for each of the five periods under observation. 
Two major trends emerge from Table 14. First, the number of technologically central patents in 
the semiconductor industry decreases in the periods 1991-1995 and 2001-2006, compared to 
the previous periods. This is due to the decrease in the number of assignees, which in turn is 
caused by a fall in the number of marginal innovators in those two periods. The number of core 
innovators is relatively stable over time. More precisely in the first half of the 1990s and the 
2000s we observe a peak in of innovative exit and the effect on the total number of innovators is 
further exacerbated by the fall of innovative entrance. Therefore, in these two periods the indus-
try has undergone a phase of innovative shakeout. As we explained in Chapters 2 and 3, for the 
first period the cause was a significant shift in the main engineering trajectories caused by a few 
path-changing inventions that explored new designs for integrated circuits. For the second peri-
od, the reason was a change in the ranking of engineering problems induced by the emergence of 
new technological sub-domains related to LCD and MOSFET technologies. 
 The data that we have presented so far describes the entire NMPs sample. However, as we 
discussed in the theoretical framework, in this study we analyse persistence as core innovators. 
Marginal innovators are not central players in the industry. Therefore, they might exit for rea-
sons that go beyond their knowledge breadth and depth. For this reason, we excluded them from 
the sample used for the regression analyses. Furthermore, we have to avoid type II errors, i.e. 
exit misidentification. As in any high-tech industry, semiconductors business are often acquired 
or merged and companies frequently engage in joint ventures. For our purposes, we need to dis-
tinguish real innovative exit from exit by acquisition or merge. In the latter case the acquired or 
merged organization clearly remains technologically influent if is still found in the list of core 
innovators. Therefore, if the new entity is considered a core innovator we count it as survival. 
Else, we consider it as a real exit. There is one of the former cases and ten of the latter in the 
NMPs sample. Finally, some cases organizations temporarily exit from the list of core innovators 
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and join it back later. In this case, we still count this as a real exit because, even if momentarily, 
the given organization lost its technological centrality.  We found twelve of such cases in the 
NMPs sample. 
 
Table 14: Size of the NMPs sample and categories of innovators 
Time period 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2006 
Number of technologically influent patents (size of the 
NMPs sample) 
689 818 661 1067 901 
Share of total USPTO semiconductor patents 42.64% 32.45% 15.30% 17.63% 9.36% 
Number of assignees (i.e. innovators) 96 145 120 167 132 
Core innovators 64 89 87 89 77 
Marginal innovators 32 56 33 78 55 
New innovators (from previous period) 42 88 54 102 74 
Incumbent innovators 54 57 66 65 58 
Exit innovators (from previous period) 48 39 79 55 109 
 
Moreover, out of the six periods for which we computed the NMPs we can only use four for the 
empirical analysis. This is because we need to identify new innovators by discriminating prior 
experience, as the latter is one of the control variables that we include in the logit model de-
scribed in the next section. The period 1976-1980 is used to provide information on prior expe-
rience for the first period used, i.e. 1981-1985. Moreover, our data are right censored. We need 
to truncate the sample to 2000, in order to be able to observe survival to the next period. This is 
because we do not have information on which firms survive after 2006. To sum up, the panel 
dataset that we use for the econometric analysis is made by 133 unique core innovators fol-
lowed over four five-year periods: 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000. The 133 core 
innovators hold 2862 patents between 1980 and 2000. 
 We classified core innovators according to their business type. We mostly relied on data 
from ICinsights, a business consulting firm specialized in the semiconductor industry.20 When 
needed we complement it with additional information gathered from company websites or Wik-
ipedia web-pages. Assignees that represented subsidiaries belonging to the same company have 
been manually merged into a single entity. Table 15 provides more details on the functional and 
geographical composition of core innovators. The total number of core innovators per period 
per business type is highlighted in bold characters. We then break business types by country of 
origin (we report information only for the set of key countries in the industry: US, Japan, S.Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore21).  Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs) are large vertically integrat-
ed players that perform all the steps of the value chain (from design to commercialization) in-
house. To the contrary, fabless and foundries, specialized in design and manufacturing, respec-
tively, and often interact with each other. Suppliers provide IDMs, fabless and foundries with 
equipment and materials.  
  
                                                             
20 We thank Roberto Fontana for sharing the data. 
21 Note that, up to 2006 no single patent from Chinese firms managed to make it in the NMPs sample. 
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Table 15: Core innovators’ functional and geographic composition 
  1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2006 
Equipment suppliers 1 2 2 5 9 
JP 1 1 1 3 3 
US  1 1 2 5 
Fabless   4 4 5 5 
TW    1 1 
US  4 4 4 4 
Government or Industry Research Institutes 6 8 9 11 8 
JP 1 3 2 2 2 
KR  1 2 2 1 
TW  1 2 2 1 
US 3 3 2 4 3 
Integrated Device Manufacturers 39 53 50 46 37 
DE 1 1 1 2 2 
JP 10 14 14 16 12 
KR  1 3 3 4 
TW   1 3 4 
US 23 30 25 17 13 
Material suppliers 1 2 4 5 5 
DE    1 1 
JP  1 3 2 2 
US 1 1 1 2 2 
Pure-Play Foundries   3 4 4 
SG   1 1 1 
TW   2 3 3 
Universities 3 3 2 4 3 
US 3 3 2 4 3 
Users 14 17 13 9 6 
DE   1  1 
JP 1 2 2 2 1 
US 12 14 9 6 3 
 
Users are players external to the industry whose products incorporate semiconductor devices. 
Some users invest in R&D for specific needs related to semiconductor technologies. Further-
more, there are a number of universities, government and industry research centres that are 
particularly active in the R&D landscape of the industry, we will lately collectively refer to them 
in this paper as research providers. In terms of number of core innovators, it seems that innova-
tion was demand-pulled in the 1980s and become more and more technology-pushed toward 
the 2000s. Indeed the importance of downstream innovation (by users) is reducing, in favour of 
upstream-oriented innovation (by equipment and material suppliers) over time. 
 100 Do I fit? Innovative Survival, Technology Dynamics and the Evolution of Knowledge 
5.3.2 Identification of Semiconductor technology domains 
To measure knowledge breadth and depth of core innovators we first need to identify the set of 
semiconductor technology domains. Our definition of domains as areas of applied research that 
share a set of common technological problems which are tackled applying similar approaches, 
make it possible to exploit the characteristics of the patent system to empirically identify them. 
Patent claims describe the solution to given engineering problems, and the reference list high-
lights on which other patents the claimed invention has improved upon. The presence of cita-
tions between patents proves that similar mindsets and toolboxes have been applied to tackle 
the given problems, as discussed in the USPTO Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (USPTO, 
2014). Therefore, to empirically identify semiconductor technology domains we can partition 
the network of patents into communities using a method proposed by Newman (2004) based on 
modularity maximization. The method identifies areas of the network (called communities) 
whose nodes (patents in our case) are more related to each other than with nodes belonging to 
different communities. Patent relatedness is defined by the presence of citations. As such, a 
community identifies a region of the technological space whose patents are closely related by 
sequences of technical improvements. This distinguishes them from patents located in other re-
gions of the citation network. We can then interpret communities as technology domains within 
the meso-family of semiconductor technologies. To identify network communities Newman pro-
poses to maximize a measure of modularity (Q) defined as follows: 
𝑄 =  ∑(𝑒𝑘 − 𝑎𝑘
2)
𝑘
 (5.1) 
Where eii is the fraction of edges falling within community k and ai2 is equal to the squared sum 
of edges falling between communities, as 𝑎𝑘 =  ∑ 𝑒𝑘𝑗⩝𝑗≠𝑘 . As explained by Newman (2004), to 
assess the significance of the community structure the fraction of edges that fall within commu-
nities is compared to the expected value of the same quantity if edges would fall at random 
without regard for the community structure. If a particular partition returns no more within-
community edges than would be expected by random chance modularity Q would be equal to 
zero. The best partition is found by iteratively optimizing modularity. The optimization ap-
proach starts from the worse possible combination (each node is a community) and then begins 
an iterative aggregation process which stops when the increase of modularity becomes negative. 
The modularity maximization procedure and the comparison with equivalent random networks 
returns the best partition of the network analysed, without assuming a pre-existing community 
structure. Therefore, Q is not only a measure of the quality of the partition but can be effectively 
used to measure the interdependence between domains. Larger values of Q mean that the differ-
ent domains of the technological space are less interdependent as the identified partition of the 
network is more statistically significant (i.e. boundaries across domains are more strongly de-
fined). Note that, to apply the algorithm to the case of directed networks we first need to make 
the relationships across patent pairs symmetric. This is done by transforming citations into un-
directed edges. This reinforces the interpretation of citation as a measure of technological relat-
edness between pairs of patents.  
 We feed the community detection algorithm with the set of key semiconductor patents 
granted within each of the following periods 1976-1985, 1976-1990, 1976-1995, 1976-2000, 
1976-2006. By cumulating periods, we are able to assess variation on the modularity structure 
of all generations of semiconductor patents caused by the entrance of young patents. This cumu-
lative perspective takes into account the possibility that in some cases young patents might not 
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be directly related to each other but still be part of the same domain if they have a strong genetic 
proximity with the same ancestors. One possible criticism to this approach is that Newman’s 
modularity maximization does not consider the temporal structure of a citation network when 
evaluating the statistical significance of an existing link between a pair of nodes compared to the 
probability that the given link exists in a random network. As shown by Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(2007), patents have a relatively short forward citation life. Typically, the number of yearly cita-
tion to the average patent starts decreasing after 3-4 years from the grant date. The community 
detection algorithm does not consider this when evaluating the significance of the presence/lack 
of a citation between a pair of patents compared to a random network in which links among 
pairs of nodes fall completely at random. Whether this should be considered as a serious bias 
depends on the extent to which the algorithm tends to identify domains purely based on the age 
composition of the patents they are composed of. In the Appendix A.4.3, we showed that the age 
structure of the semiconductor domains identified with the Newman’s algorithm is highly scat-
tered. This proves that in our case the citation lag bias is not strong enough to undermine the 
validity of the domains identified by the community detection process. Table 16 reports basic 
statistics of the domains identified by Newman’s algorithm. 
 
Table 16: Basic statistics for the identified semiconductor technology domains 
  76-85 76-90 76-95 76-00 76-06 
Number of domains 15 14 29 15 29 
Size of largest domain 328 368 272 637 701 
% of patents in largest domain 21,30% 13,74% 9,31% 13,98% 11,12% 
Size of smallest domain 29 52 20 62 53 
% of patents in smallest domain 1,88% 1,94% 0,68% 1,36% 0,84% 
Average domain size 102,66 191,29 100,79 303,80 217,44 
Patent dispersion (1-HHI) 0,9591 0,9873 0.9837 0,9733 0.9868 
 
The patent dispersion across domains is measured by the Herfindal-Hirshman Index (HHI), 
normalized by the maximum possible value of dispersion attainable given the number of do-
mains (similarly to the knowledge breadth index explained in Section 5.2.1.4). Values closer to 1 
indicate maximum dispersion across domains, thus pointing to a perfectly equal distribution of 
patents across communities. The table reveals high patents dispersion. This shows that the 
community structure is not dominated by a few domains. This further proves the meaningful-
ness of the identified network partition.  
5.4 Model 
We estimate, using maximum likelihood, the following pooled data logit model, where the prob-
ability of survival for observation i belonging to core innovator j is: 
𝑃(𝑠)ij =  P(Sij = 1 |Xij , Xi, α) = 𝐹(Xij + Xi + α)  (5.2) 
𝑆𝑖𝑗  is a binary variable taking value of one if player j persist being a core innovator in the follow-
ing period. The matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is composed of the list of predictors of innovative survival for each 
observation i belonging to player j. These predictors are: knowledge breadth (KB), knowledge 
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depth (KD), count of NMPs patents (PC), number of periods of experience as core innovator and 
business model followed by the innovator. The latter is a factor variable that distinguishes be-
tween IDM, foundry, fabless, supplier, research provider and user. 𝑋𝑖 provides information that 
is player-invariant, in our case it is the level of knowledge persistence in the period in which ob-
servation i has been recorded. Finally, α serves as a baseline probability of survival, which is in-
cluded to capture the effect that core innovators have an intrinsic propensity to survive.  
 Since we are treating time variant data at the firm level as pooled cross-section, we esti-
mate robust error by clustering the variance-covariance matrix by core innovator. Note that core 
innovators that survived for more than one period entered in the pooled cross-sectional sample 
twice or more. Clustering the variance-covariance matrix by core innovator allows for arbitrary 
correlations across observations belonging to the same player, leaving the form of the correla-
tion free to vary from player to player. For the sake of comparison we also estimate a panel data 
version of the model described in (1) with innovator-specific random effects22. Random effects 
model are more efficient than their cluster pooled data counterpart because the firm-specific 
effect is estimated separately from the error term. However, random effect models assume that 
the within-firm correlation takes the same form for all innovators. We recognize that the as-
sumption behind random effects might not be fully legitimate in this context. Firms pursue dif-
ferent strategies that interact with the level of their capabilities. This might take different forms 
and, therefore, differently affect the probability of survival. Furthermore, it might also create 
correlation between the individual random effect component of the error term and the KB and 
KD regressors. Nevertheless, the rational of comparing the results with a random effect model 
here has the specific purpose of investigating whether the overall results holds and whether we 
are able to reduce the variance of the predicted probability of survival for fully specialized and 
poorly diversified players. In the panel data random effect version of model (1) the probability 
of survival for observation i belonging to core innovator j at time t is: 
𝑃(𝑠)ijt =  P(Sjt = 1 |Xijt , Xj , Xt  , μj) = 𝐹(Xijt + Xj + Xt + μj)  (5.3) 
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 are time dependent predictors for observation i belonging to player j (i.e. our KB, KD, 
PC and Experience variables), 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a time independent predictor that varies across players j (i.e. 
the business model variable), 𝑋𝑡  is a time dependent predictor that is constant across players 
(i.e. knowledge persistence) and 𝜇𝑗  is the core innovator specific effect which represents the 
combined effect of all omitted subject-specific unobserved variables that cause some subjects to 
be more (or less) more likely to survive than others.  
 To test the robustness of our findings to the estimation method used we also run probit and 
complementary log-log versions of the pooled and panel data models described in (1) and (3). 
All the main finding hold regardless of the method used to linearize the relationship between 
survival and the predictors. Therefore, we will only discuss findings for the logit model and re-
port results for the probit and complementary log-log versions in the appendices A.5.4 and A.5.5. 
                                                             
22 We opted for a random effect model instead of a fixed effect one as the latter severely reduces the sample size. The 
estimation of a fixed effect logit model relies on conditional maximum likelihood, therefore it necessarily drops 80 
right censored observations (i.e. those core innovators that never exit over the given window of time) because the 
dependent variable is a constant in this case. This reduces the sample size by 207 observations. The effect of such a 
large harvest is very problematic as the maximum likelihood maximization process does not converge for most of our 
models and the estimation becomes impossible. 
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Given the stability of findings, we opted to present the findings for the logit model instead of the 
probit or complementary log-log versions because of the ease to interpret coefficients as odds 
ratios provided by the former. Note that, since we include a variable measuring innovators’ pe-
riods of experience and a baseline survival probability α, the complementary log-log version of 
our model becomes conceptually similar to the discrete time representation of an underlying 
continuous time proportional hazard model. This is particularly convenient as it means that our 
results would be confirmed by a formally defined discrete-time survival analysis. 
5.5 Measurement of the key variables 
To study the effects of firms’ technical knowledge diversification and accumulation and the sta-
bility of the engineering trajectory on firms’ innovative survival, we need to define measures of 
firms’ knowledge breadth, depth and persistence of technical knowledge. We also need a meas-
ure of knowledge modularity to assess the difficulty of knowledge diversification. In the litera-
ture knowledge diversification has been measured by counting active fields of research, by com-
puting the concentration of a firm’s patents across technological classes or by calculating firms’ 
specialization indices across fields (e.g. Xu, 2014; D’Este, 2005; Brusoni et al., 2005; Brusoni and 
Geuna, 2003). Knowledge accumulation is usually measured by firms’ patent counts in each class 
(e.g. Xu, 2014) or by counting areas of fields in which firms are co-specialized in basic and ap-
plied research. (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2005). These approaches dissatisfy us for a number of rea-
sons. First, as we discussed in Section 5.3.2, relying on classification systems to define technolo-
gy domains does not consider that technology relatedness goes beyond class boundaries. Fur-
thermore, classifications react with a long lag to changes in the structure of the system of tech-
nologies23. Bottom-up techniques, such as community detection on citation networks, identify 
domains in real time, without assuming any prior knowledge of relatedness across domains. In 
this sense, they are not affected by any cognitive or time bias. This is particularly important to 
detect the level of knowledge diversification of surviving firms.  Moreover, measuring diversifi-
cation by looking at the distribution of item counts across domains does not provide any infor-
mation on how much of the domain-specific knowledge a firm actually mastered. Similarly, hav-
ing the same amount of patents in two or more classes does not necessarily imply that the firm’s 
technical knowledge is equally distributed across those classes. This is because the difficulty of 
generating patentable inventions might vary greatly across domains. Nor does it provide any 
information on how the inventions disclosed in the firm’s patents are related to the existing pri-
or art. Because of these reasons, we need measures of technical knowledge diversification, ac-
cumulation and persistence that respect the structural properties of the knowledge system and 
its topography. To define a suitable measure for each of these dimensions of technical 
knowledge we rely on the similarity between knowledge and genetic evolution. Technological 
knowledge largely builds on past achievements and firms innovative efforts draws on prior in-
ternally and externally developed technological solutions. As such, technological knowledge is 
                                                             
23 For instance, the USPTO introduced a cross-reference art collection for Nanotechnology in October 2004. According 
to the output of the USPTO reclassification efforts of old patents into the newly created art collection class, the first 
Nanotechnology patent has been granted in 1978. This means that it took twenty-six years for a social agreement on 
the existence of the Nanotechnology domain to emerge and lead to the creation of an ad-hoc technology class. This is 
because the patent system is a complex engineering system rich in technology and human complexity (de Weck et al., 
2011). 
 104 Do I fit? Innovative Survival, Technology Dynamics and the Evolution of Knowledge 
largely cumulative, although from time to time radical innovations are introduced. These cause a 
shift in the technological trajectory and, if successful, permanently change the direction of tech-
nological change. When this happens, in order to survive firms need to adapt their capabilities to 
the new technological environments (unless, of course, if they are those that introduced the rad-
ical innovations). An appropriate analogy with genetic evolution can be easily made. Populations 
also evolve slowly and in a cumulative fashion, as genetic traits are inherited from generation to 
generation. Shocks in the form of random mutations can break this persistency by introducing 
novel genetic traits, whose survival will ultimately be decided by natural selection. A second 
source of genetic variety takes the form of transmission from parents to offspring of genes that 
evolved as the result of adaptation to the environment (i.e. Lamarckian inheritance). This analo-
gy inspired the definition of a genetic approach (GA) to patent citation networks, which has been 
developed by Martinelli (2010) and Martinelli and Nomaler (2014). The approach provides an 
original way to measure technological knowledge, its persistence and evolution. Our main con-
tribution to the genetic approach lays in the definition of a method to map firm technological 
genome and its genetic heritage. In addition, we also define a set of metrics that allow applying 
this approach to measure firm’s technical knowledge breadth, depth and knowledge persistence 
at the industry level. The GA looks at patents as knowledge genes. Citations therefore represent 
channels through which knowledge is inherited from cited to citing patents. Therefore, a citation 
network can be interpreted as a map of genetic history, portraying knowledge that persists from 
parents (cited patents) to offspring (citing patents). In the following, we describe how we con-
struct our measures of firms’ knowledge breadth, depth, and knowledge persistence and modu-
larity at the patent level. 
5.5.1 Knowledge persistence 
Figure 3 represents a dummy citation network. Nodes stand for patents and arcs represent cita-
tions from the patent to the right to the one on the left (the arrow indicates the direction of im-
provement). The first step of the patent genetic decomposition requires sorting the network 
topologically, meaning that nodes are ordered such that for every directed citation ab from pa-
tent b to patent a, a comes before b in the ordering. Thus, network truncations can be identified. 
Truncations are analogous to generations in a genealogy family tree. In Figure 32 we have three 
truncations. The number of truncations corresponds to the largest possible path in the network. 
Nodes labels report a fictitious patent number and the name of the assignee. Nodes’ colour high-
lights fictitious technological domains.  
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            Truncation 1                      Truncation 2                                Truncation 3 
Figure 32: Fictitious citation network with shares of genetic heritage 
 
Let us assume that filled nodes represent patents belonging to domain A and white ones belong 
to domain B. The weight of the arcs represents the share of knowledge direct genetic heritage 
(we refer to it as the weight w), meaning the share of the knowledge included in the citing patent 
that is inherited from the cited one. The weight between patents i and j is computed as follows: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 =  
𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑏𝑤𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑗
 (5.4) 
Where citij is a dummy variable taking the value of one if j cites i and zero otherwise and bwdcitj 
is the number of backward citations made by patent j. For instance, patent 7 cites patent 4 only. 
Therefore 100% of the knowledge that patent 7 inherits from the set of patents belonging to the 
directly preceding truncation comes from patent 4. Patent 8, instead, builds on patents 4 and 5, 
meaning that these two patents contribute 50% each to the first layer of inherited knowledge of 
patent 8. However, the genetic decomposition of the citation network goes beyond direct cita-
tions and keeps into account the topology of the whole network (i.e. all the connection across all 
‘generations’). Indeed, as explained by Martinelli and Nomaler (2013), the genetic approach de-
composes the knowledge content of a given node in function of the nodes that precede it. There-
fore, we need to account for genetic heritage across all possible truncations. Following the same 
example, we can see that 100% of the knowledge inherited by patent 4 from the preceding trun-
cation comes from patent 1, whereas 50% of the knowledge of patent 5 comes from patent 2 and 
50% from patent 3. Consequently the contribution of patent 1 to patent 8’s knowledge is equal 
to 0.5 (=1*0.5), whereas patents 2 and 3 contributes 0.25 (=0.5*0.5) to patent 8’s knowledge. It 
follows that we can define an index of the total genetic heritage (from now on just heritage) from 
each patent to each other one. The heritage index between a pair of patents i and j is computed 
multiplying the weights of all the links connecting patents i and j. The heritage index can be easi-
ly normalized such that the sum of the weights of the backward citations originated from a given 
patent adds up to one. In this case, the index becomes the share of the total genetic heritage 
(normheritage) of the citing patent that is inherited from each of the other patents in the net-
work.  
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For the sake of clarity we report in Table 17 the heritage and the normheritage (in italics and as 
percentage) for each pair of patents in the dummy network of Figure 32. It is important to notice 
that, as argued by Martinelli and Nomaler (2014), the genetic decomposition does not underplay 
the role of novelty. One has to distinguish between knowledge that is inherited and knowledge 
that is generated. Citation weights represent shares of the former. The existence of the citation 
represents the latter, as citations identify prior art which is subsequently improved. Therefore, 
the very same existence of the citation proves the relevance of the novelty created by the cited 
patent.  
 We can now calculate the persistence index (PI) for patents belonging to the first two trun-
cations in the network of Figure 3. For this purpose let us define the set E of endpoint patens i 
such that: 
E = { i | bwdciti > 0 , fwdciti = 0 } (5.5) 
Where bwdciti and fwdciti are backward and forward citation made and received by endpoint 
patent i respectively. Endpoints are therefore those patents that end the sequence of citations in 
the network. We index them by e  i  E. The persistence index (PI) computes how much of the 
knowledge of a given patent i ∉ E is retained in the set of endpoints E. It can be computed as fol-
lows: 
𝑃𝐼𝑖 =  ∑ ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑒
𝑒
 (5.6) 
The PI for the patents of the fictitious network of Figure 32 are reported in the last raw of Table 
18.  
Table 17: Measuring knowledge genetic heritage across patents 
    Parents patent (i.e. cited)   
    1 2 3 4 5 6 Total heritage 
Offspring patents        
(i.e. citing) 
4 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
  100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 5 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
  0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 6 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
  0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 7 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 
  50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 8 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.00 2 
  25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
 9 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
    0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
   Persistence Index 2.50 0.75 6.75 1.50 0.50 5.00 17 
    14.7% 4.4% 39.7% 8.8% 2.9% 29.4% 
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In our example, the most prominent patent in terms of persistence is patent 3, which accounts 
for 37.5% of the knowledge retained in the last truncation of patents. The example we used so 
far represents a static picture of a citation network. By dynamically analysing different snap-
shots of subsequent networks, it is possible to measure how knowledge persistence changes 
over time. Suppose that we observe the citation network for three periods, T – T+C, T+C – T+2C 
and T+2C – T+3C. We can measure recent knowledge persistence from one period to the next by 
computing the persistence index including only patents granted within one period, take for in-
stance period T+C – T+2C, in the list of parents patents and only patents granted in the next pe-
riod, T+2C – T+3C, in the list of endpoints. The ratio of the total heritage of endpoints belonging 
to the third period received from parent patents granted in the second is a measure of recent 
knowledge persistence from period 2 to 3. Similarly, we can measure cumulative knowledge per-
sistence, for the third period, by including in the list of parent nodes all patents granted in the 
first and second period. Obviously, this version of the index tends to decrease over time as gen-
eration of patents goes by. 
 
Table 18: Measuring knowledge persistence 
    Parents patent (i.e. cited) 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 Total heritage 
Endpoints 
7 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2 
  50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 8 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.00 2 
  25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
 9 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 
    0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
   Persistence Index 1.50 0.25 5.25 1.50 0.50 5.00 14 
    10.7% 1.8% 37.5% 10.7% 3.6% 35.7% 
 
5.5.2 Firms’ knowledge breadth and depth 
To develop a measure of firms’ knowledge breadth and depth we first need to define an index of 
knowledge proximity that can be used to identify the position of a given firm in the multi-
domain technological space (i.e. the genetic composition of its technological knowledge base). 
Let us define the set of patents belonging to firm f as F and the set of patents belonging to tech-
nology k as K. We then define the set Z as the intersection of F and K: 
Z = F ∩ K = { i |i  F and i  K} (5.7) 
The proximity index between a given firm f and the set of technological domains k is then calcu-
lated as the total genetic heritage of firm f coming from domain k, as shown in the following 
equation. 
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𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓𝑘 =  ∑ ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝑍
 (5.8) 
Table 19 reports the firm-technology domain proximity for our fictitious network. Firm A has 
the largest knowledge base, as measured by its total heritage. Twenty percent of its technical 
knowledge is related to technology domain 1 and eighty percent to domain 2. 
 
Table 19: Measuring firm-technology domain proximity 
    Cited 
    Tech 1 Tech 2 Total heritage 
Citing 
Firm A 1.75 7 8.75 
  20.0% 80.0% 
 Firm B 3.5 0.75 4.25 
  82.4% 17.6% 
 Firm C 
 
2 2 
  0% 100% 
 Firm D 
 
2 2 
  0% 100% 
  
The knowledge breadth (KB) index for a firm f is calculated as the Herfindal-based dispersion 
index of a firm’s proximity to the different technological domains k normalized by the maximum 
Herfindal index attainable given the total number of technological domains (equal to K). The 
equation is as follows. 
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 (5.9) 
Where the denominator is equal to the highest possible value the numerator can attain. Proximi-
ty is calculated using normheritage. The KB index ranges from a zero to one. A value of zero indi-
cates that firm f is fully specialized, meaning that 100% of its knowledge is retained from a sin-
gle technological domain. To the contrary, a value of one means that firm f is fully diversified, i.e. 
its knowledge is equally spread across all existing domains.  
 The knowledge depth index (KD) measures how much of the knowledge persistence of the 
given domains in which firm f operates is retained by the firm. In other words, KD measures how 
knowledgeable the firm is in the domains in which it operates. The index is calculated as follows. 
 
(5.10) 
Where proximity is calculated using normheritage and F is equal to the number of firms and Kf is 
the number of domains in which proximityfk > 0. The denominator is equal to the largest numera-
tor attainable by firm f given the number of areas in which it operates. KD ranges from zero to 
  Do I fit? Innovative Survival, Technology Dynamics and the Evolution of Knowledge 109 
one. It takes the value of zero when firm f is a marginal player in each domain in which it oper-
ates. Values closer to one indicate that the firm monopolized the domains in which it operates, 
meaning that 100% of the persistent knowledge in those domains is retained by the firm. It is 
easy to verify that, in our example, the values of knowledge breadth and depth for our fictitious 
firms are as follows: KBA=0.64; KDA=0.23; KBB=0.58; KDB=0.22; KBC=0.0; KDC=0.01; KBD=0.0; 
KDD=0.01. 
 In summary, the knowledge breadth index measures the width of a given firm’s knowledge 
tree, i.e. how many roots the patent citation network of the given firm has, whereas the 
knowledge depth measures how long the roots are. Note that, from a strategic point of view, it 
exists a trade-off between increasing knowledge breadth and depth. Suppose that a successful 
specialized firm (i.e. one with high KD but narrow KB) decides to diversify into an existing tech-
nological domain. Most likely, the firm will face some initial difficulties in mastering the new 
technology. Consequently, at first it will be less knowledgeable than rival firms that were already 
present in that domain. Therefore, the firm’s attempt to increase its KB is likely to decrease its 
knowledge depth initially. Depending on the firm’s capabilities, it might ultimately be able to di-
versify successfully or it might need to reconsider its strategy and move back to a specialization 
position.  
 Based on the level of KB and KD we can classify core innovators in four categories, as shown 
in the taxonomy illustrated in Table 20. We classify core innovators according to the following 
four categories: Diversified Leaders (DL), Diversified Followers (DF), Specialized Leaders (SL) and 
Specialized Followers (SF). We use this classification to test the third hypothesis, discussed in 
Section 5.2. In order to compute the survival rate for the four categories we need to decide upon 
a threshold to use to distinguish high and low levels of knowledge depth and broad and narrow 
knowledge depth. The thresholds used are based on the distribution of knowledge breadth and 
depth. We discuss them in Section 5.7. 
 
Table 20: Knowledge taxonomy of core innovators 
  Knowledge Depth (KD) 
  Low High 
Knowledge 
Breadth (KB) 
Broad Diversified follower Diversified leader 
Narrow Specialized follower Specialized leader 
5.5.3 Measures of knowledge modularity 
In order to assess whether semiconductor technologies became more or less modular over time 
we make use of two indicators: Newman’s Q modularity and genetic modularity. The latter is our 
original contribution. Newman’s Q only accounts for the presence of inter-domain linkages but 
does not measure the strength of information flowing on them. Genetic modularity reveals the 
level of knowledge relatedness across domains. Using a genealogy analogy, modularity Q sets 
family borders within a population, genetic modularity measures genetic closeness across fami-
lies. 
 We define a measure of modularity that complements Newman’s Q and provides infor-
mation about the genetic relationships between different domains. Newman’s Q only takes into 
account direct citations (i.e. direct relatedness). However even though a pair of domains might 
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be connected by few citations, in principle, they could still be genetically interconnected if a lot 
of knowledge flows through those citations. We therefore construct an index of genetic modular-
ity. We first need to define a measure of external knowledge usage at the domain level (DEK). 
This is computed as follows. 



K
k
jk
jj
j
proximity
proximity
DEK
1
1  
(5.11) 
The domain external knowledge index (DEK) measures how much of the knowledge of domain j 
is inherited from all domains k other than j. Genetic modularity is then defined as follows. 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 − (
1
𝐾
 ∑ 𝐷𝐸𝐾𝑘
𝑘
) (5.12) 
Genetic modularity measures how much of the knowledge in the system comes from inter-
domains genetic relationships on average. Genetic modularity ranges from zero to one. Higher 
values indicate that technology domains are more genetically independent from each other. Val-
ues closer to zero reveal knowledge admixture across technology domains. 
5.5.4 Control variables 
In our model, we include two control variables for the technological size of the firm and its level 
of innovative experience. We measure the size of core innovators’ technical knowledge base as 
the count of technologically influent patents they have been granted. This simply equals the 
number of NMPs patents granted to each core innovator in each of the five periods. In the re-
maining of the paper, we refer to this variable with the acronym PC (patent count). Finally, the 
number of periods in which each core innovator has showed up in the NMPs sample is used as a 
proxy of the players’ innovative experience. 
5.6 Trends of knowledge modularity and persistence 
The goal of this section is to briefly describe the dynamics of technological change followed by 
the semiconductor industry over the period between the beginnings of the 1980s until mid-
2000s. We describe the trends followed by the industry according to our indices of knowledge 
modularity and persistence.  
 Table 21 reports the evolution of modularity Q and genetic modularity of the NMPs sample 
as well as the set of measures of knowledge persistence. Values of the genetic modularity are 
even higher. This shows that not only the different domains are connected by a few citations but 
also that very little knowledge flows pass through those citations. Trends for both indicators do 
not reveal large variations over time. Essentially semiconductor technology domains are genet-
ically independent from each other. This reinforces the importance of testing our hypothesis 
concerning knowledge diversification. Since technical knowledge is not easily portable across 
domains in the semiconductor industry, diversification needs to be already in place before the 
occurrence of possible shocks in knowledge persistence as reactive behaviour is hindered by the 
lack of bridges across domains. The last four rows of Table 21 show the trend in knowledge per-
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sistence from 1980 to 2000. Since persistence is calculated from one period to the next, obvious-
ly, the value for the last period is not available. We report two versions of the recent and cumula-
tive knowledge persistence indices. The first one is computed for the whole NMPs sample. As we 
have discussed in Section 5.3, the latter includes the main component of the NMPs for each of the 
five periods under observation and the second largest component for periods 1991-1995 and 
2001-2006. This is done to take into account that a larger than usual share of influential patents 
were found in the second component in these two periods. We also compute recent and cumu-
lated knowledge persistence on a sub-set of the NMPs sample that only includes the main com-
ponent. We refer to the latter as the indices of recent and cumulated knowledge persistence on 
the main trajectories. 
 When measured using the NMPs sample, both recent and cumulated knowledge persistence 
indicators show a cyclical trend for knowledge persistence, with peaks in 1990 and 2000 and 
lower values in 1985 and 1995. If we look at cumulated knowledge, we see that only 21.9% of 
the knowledge embodied in the endpoints of the network in the period 1986-1990 was inherited 
by patents granted before 1986. This means that 78% of the knowledge generated in this period 
is genuinely novel. Therefore, a lot of new knowledge needs to be learned to keep updated. This 
figure increased to 53.4 in period 1991-1995 (i.e. less than half of the knowledge is new) and 
then drop to 13.1% in period 1996-2000. Finally, it increases again to 25.1% in 2001-2006 but 
without reaching the level of 1991-1995. On average, over the four periods, knowledge persis-
tence is 28.35%. Therefore, more than 70% of the knowledge generated in each period is genu-
inely new, on average. We argue that this is a strong indicator of knowledge-replacing techno-
logical change, which creates a strong evolutionary pressure. The trends differ when we meas-
ure persistence on the main trajectories only. Recent knowledge persistence becomes monoton-
ically decreasing, whereas cumulated knowledge decreases up to 1995 and slightly increases 
from period 1996-2000 to 2001-2006. These differences show that the knowledge replacing na-
ture of technical change has been considerably stronger for those domains that are found on the 
main trajectories of improvements, i.e. those related to the largest areas of research in the industry. 
 
Table 21: Trends of knowledge modularity and persistence 
  1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2006 
Modularity Q 0.879 0.901 0.907 0.916 0.902 
Genetic Modularity 0.975 0.981 0.947 0.977 0.966 
Cumulated Knowledge Persistence (NMPs) 0.220 0.534 0.131 0.251 n.a. 
Recent Knowledge Persistence (NMPs) 0.150 0.338 0.091 0.153 n.a. 
Cumulated Knowledge Persistence (Main traj.) 0.220 0.184 0.131 0.144 n.a. 
Recent Knowledge Persistence (Main traj.) 0.150 0.110 0.091 0.084 n.a. 
5.7 Econometric issues 
Before presenting the findings from the logit model estimation, we discuss a few econometric 
issues that affect the regressions. We also inspect our predictors of innovative survival for pos-
sible collinearity. 
 Figure 33 shows the distribution of four out of the five firm level variables (information 
about the fifth one, business type, can be found in Table 15, Section 3). Vertical bars represent 
the number of observations included in each bin, whereas dotted lines show the Kernel 
smoothed probability density function, estimated with the Epanechnikov method. The distribu-
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tion of knowledge breadth, reported in the upper left panel, is clearly bimodal with two peaks, 
one at 0 and one at 0.77. This indicates that there are two distinct populations of core innovators 
in terms of knowledge diversification. One is made by fully specialized players and the other is 
composed of diversified innovators. However, even considering diversified players alone does 
not return a normal distribution as the right tail is fatter than a normal one. The existence of two 
distinct populations of core innovators with respect to their level of diversification can potential-
ly make it difficult to assess how knowledge breadth affects the probability of innovative surviv-
al. In particular, the large density of observation in the left tail of the distribution followed by a 
particularly low density for intermediate levels of KB in the range 0<KB≤0.4, is a source of con-
cern for the efficiency and reliability of the estimated effect of KB. This makes the use of a con-
tinuous variable of KB particularly unreliable because the estimation of the effects of KB on sur-
vival is very inefficient for that range (i.e. the standard deviation of the parameter is very high). 
For this reason, we build a categorical variable based on ten equally spaced bins of KB. This ap-
proach assumes that the effect of the relationship between the independent and the dependent 
variable is flat within intervals. However, using ten bins greatly mitigate the influence of this as-
sumption. Furthermore, it allows avoiding any prior assumption on the functional form of the 
relationship by letting the data speak for it. It does not completely solve the problem of unequal 
density of observations but allow ignoring it by refraining to make any conclusion regarding the 
effect within the range 0<KB≤0.4 and by erasing its influence on the estimation of the effect for 
the other bins. As a comparison with a continuous version of KB, we also test the effect of diver-
sification by using a restricted cubic spline function. This approach allows maintaining a smooth 
relationship between KB and survival and maximizes power (by using fewer degrees of freedom 
than the categorical variable approaches). The spline function transforms the predictor (KB) to 
achieve linearity while still estimating a non-linear relationship in a smooth way.  
 The measure of knowledge depth does not present any particular econometric issue. The 
distribution of KD is log-normal, with a geometric mean of 0.00052 = e(-7.56). This show how 
difficult is to cumulate knowledge. On average, core innovators in the semiconductor industry 
know 0.052% of the total technical knowledge produced in the sub-domain(s) in which they are 
active. The largest value of KD in our sample is 0.085. This has been achieved by Motorola in the 
period 1991-1995, when its KB scored 0.95. Table 39, reported in the appendix A.5.1, lists the 
top 10% observations by KD. Among them, fifty-percent are US innovators, 26.47% are Japa-
nese, 11.76% Taiwanese, 8.82% are Korean and 2.94 are Singaporeans. About 65% are IDMs 
and circa 15% are foundries. The lower panels of Figure 33, reports the distribution of patent 
counts (i.e. the number of key patents granted to a given company in a single period) and of pe-
riods of experience as core innovator. Both are skewed to the left, with most observations hav-
ing less than 10 patents and showing up in the NMPs for the first time. 
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Figure 33: Distribution of knowledge breadth, depth, patent count and experience 
 
As discussed in Section 5.5, to test our third hypothesis we construct the categorical variable 
KNOWCLASS capturing the interaction between KB and KD. Given the nature of the distribution 
of these two variables, we created two versions of KNOWCLASS. The first one uses the median of 
KB and of the natural logarithm of KD as cut-off values. As this generates the four categories pre-
sented in Section 5.5 we label this version KNOWCLASS4. It follows that for an observation to be 
considered to have large knowledge breadth and depth it needs to be in the top-half of the dis-
tribution for both variables. We also construct a second version of KNOWCLASS (called 
KNOWCLASS6) which classifies the location of a core innovator in the KB-KD knowledge space 
into six categories. The boundaries of each category reflect the characteristics of the distribu-
tions of KB and KD. In particular we split KB in three groups, low, intermediate and high, using 
the peaks identified by the kernel estimated probability density function as cut-off values. KD is 
split using the geometric mean as cut-off value. As such, we can therefore distinguish core inno-
vators according the following six categories, whose boundaries are defined in Table 22: fully 
specialized followers (FSFs), fully specialized experts (FSEs), mildly diversified followers 
(MDFs), mildly diversified experts (MDEs), highly diversified followers (HDFs) and highly diver-
sified experts (HDEs). KNOWCLASS6 is the preferred classification as its cut-offs values respect 
the characteristics of the sample population in terms of KB and KD variable distributions. We 
need to note that only three observations fall within the HDF category. This is an interesting in-
sight as it tells that highly diversified players also tend to have relatively large levels of 
knowledge accumulation. However, it also makes the econometric estimation of the probability 
of survival for HDFs highly unreliable. Therefore, we shall not consider the estimate for this cat-
egory. The scarcity of observations for core innovators with very large values of KB and very low 
values of KD, but there are several players with very large KD and low KB. This possibly suggests 
the presence of unidirectional reinforcing effects of diversification on knowledge accumulation 
that do not hold in the opposite direction. A possible explanation might be due to a size effect. As 
firms’ technical knowledge base grows, diversification opportunities open up (due to smaller 
opportunity costs of exploration) and the increased experience allows for knowledge accumula-
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tion in several domains. The econometric regressions shall shed light on the presence of size ef-
fects.  
 The last pre-estimation diagnostic that we perform is the correlation and collinearity analy-
sis. Scatter plots of the relationship between continuous explanatory variables (i.e. KB, KD and 
PC) are shown in Figure 34 and their correlations are reported in Table 23. Although in all three 
cases the distribution of observations across the variable space follows a general pattern the 
corresponding correlation is not large enough to create worries in terms of collinearity. In each 
case, the variable on the horizontal axis explains around 30% of the variance of the variable on 
the vertical axis. Indeed the variance inflation factors (VIF), reported in Table 23 are low enough 
to exclude collinearity-induced estimation problems. Panels A and B of Figure 34 are also useful 
for an early diagnostic of a possible size-effect. We note that all players with a large technical 
knowledge base are diversified and knowledgeable. However, the variance of KB and KD even at 
very large levels of PC is sufficiently large to allow distinguishing the effect on survival chances 
caused by technological size from that caused by diversification or knowledge accumulation in 
the econometric analysis. This does not hold for the categorical variables KNOWCLASS4 and 
KNOWCLASS6, as shown by Figure 35. In particular, for values of PC greater or equal than 14 all 
players have the same level of KNOWCLASS4, whereas the threshold is PC≤24 for KNOWCLASS6. 
This means that regressions will not be able to properly distinguish the effect of size from the 
effect of diversification when we use these variables. Therefore, we will limit the sample to play-
ers with a value of PC lower than the identified thresholds in our regression models. 
 
Table 22: cutoff values of KB cat, KNOWCLASS4 and KNOWCLASS6 
Variable Range Count Freq. 
Knowledge classification (4)  
(KNOWCLASS4) 
Specialized follower (SF):  KBi≤MKB &  KDi≤MKD 113 0.340 
Specialized expert (SE):  KBi≤MKB &  KDi>MKD 52 0.157 
Diversified follower (DF):  KBi>MKB &  KDi≤MKD 53 0.160 
Diversified expert (DE):  KBi>MKB &  KDi>MKD 114 0.343 
Knowledge classification (6)  
(KNOWCLASS6) 
Fully specialized follower (FSF):  KBi=0 &  KDi≤geomµKD 95 0.286 
Fully specialized expert (FSE):  KBi=0 & KDi>geomµKD 34 0.102 
Mildly diversified follower (MDF):  0< KBi ≤0.77 & KDi≤geomµKD 54 0.163 
Mildly diversified expert (MDE):  0< KBi ≤0.77 & KDi>geomµKD 73 0.220 
Highly diversified follower (HDF):  KBi >0.77 & KDi≤geomµKD 3 0.009 
Highly diversified expert (HDE):  KBi >0.77 & KDi>geomµKD 73 0.220 
Note: MKB = median(KB) =0.4821 ;  MKD = median(lnKD) = 5.9879e-004 = e-7.42 ;  geomµKD =  5.2090e-004 = e-7.56 
 
Table 23: Correlation between independent variables and collinearity diagnostic 
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Figure 34: Scatter plot of continuous variables 
 
As a preliminary investigation of the univariate effects of our predictors on the probability of 
innovative survival, we have also computed the empirical conditional probability of survival for 
core innovators, given their values of KB, KD, PC, KNOWCLASS, experience and business type 
and the level of knowledge persistence. These are reported in the Appendix A.5.2. They show 
that diversification and knowledge accumulation are associated with better survival chances but 
only after a given threshold is passed. Having large values of both KB and KD as well as increas-
ing the size of the technological knowledge base is associated with a larger probability of surviv-
al. We have also assessed whether survivors and exiters can be legitimately be described as be-
longing to two different populations. We did that by testing whether the empirical cumulative 
distribution function of KB and KD for survivors is statistically dominated by the one for exiters. 
These tests are reported in the Appendix A.5.3. They show that indeed survivors are statistically 
more likely to have larger KB and KD than exiters. We shall see whether putting all these possi-
ble explanations of survival together into econometric regressions will confirm these prelimi-
nary insights. 
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Figure 35: Scatter plot of categorical variables versus technical knowledge base size 
5.8 Findings 
Hypothesis 1: Knowledge diversification 
Table 24 reports the estimated coefficients for a set of logit models. We start from the simplest 
possible model in which we estimate the linear effect of diversification and knowledge accumu-
lation without controlling for any other effect. This returns the coefficients reported in Model 1. 
We then progressively include control variables to assess how the sign and strength of the coef-
ficients of KB and KD change when we start controlling for alternative explanations. Once we 
have assessed the effect of the control variables, we add the last variable of interest, the level of 
knowledge persistence from period to period. This lead to the full model sketched in Section 5.4 
and reported in Table 24 as Model 5. This exercise confirms that knowledge diversification sig-
nificantly affects the probability of survival. However, this is statistically true only for large lev-
els of KB. Bins higher that the sixth one have higher and statistically significant better odds of 
survival than fully specialized players (the baseline is the first bin in which there are only obser-
vations with KB=0). As we discussed in the previous section, we refrain to conclude anything 
about the relationship between diversification and innovative survival in the range 0<KB≤0.4. 
However, we note that core innovators with a level of KB in the range 0.4<KB≤0.6 (i.e. bins 5 and 
6) do not enjoy better survival chances than fully specialized players. Bins 5 and 6 are not re-
ported to save space but their coefficient is not significant. The positive effect of technical 
knowledge diversification on innovative survival, emerges from the seventh bin of KB. The coef-
ficients reported in the tables are the slopes of the relationships. In a logit model, they can be 
easily related to the odds of survival. After controlling for technological size, business model, 
experience, and level of knowledge persistence, we estimate that, compared to the first KB bin 
(i.e. KB=0), the estimated odds of survival are e1.734=5.66 times higher for the seventh bin, 
e2.905=18.26 higher for the eight bin and e1.740=5.66 for the ninth one. The tenth bin had to be ex-
cluded from the estimation because it perfectly predicted survival (i.e. all observations with 
KB≥0.9 survived to the next period). These effects are all statistically significant at the 95% con-
fidence level. The coefficients for Model 7, where we assumed a relationship between the log-
  Do I fit? Innovative Survival, Technology Dynamics and the Evolution of Knowledge 117 
odds of survival and KB defined by a restricted cubic spline function, confirm the significant ef-
fect of KB. The joint effect of the restricted cubic spline coefficients is significant at the 95% lev-
el. However, the first coefficient is not. This suggests that this function does not perfectly capture 
the effect of KB. Most likely this is due to the scarcity of observation for low levels of knowledge 
diversification.  
 Because of this reason, it is particularly insightful to look at the estimated adjusted predict-
ed probability of survival and marginal effects of diversification. These are shown in Figure 36. 
The former is the estimated probability of survival conditional to the level of KB only, i.e. filtered 
by the estimated effect of the other variables included in the regression. The latter are the first 
derivative of the former, i.e. they indicate how much survival chances improve for a decimal unit 
change in KB. We compute adjusted probabilities and average marginal effects using observed 
values for the variables other than the one of interest. This means that for each observation we 
fix the variable of interest at a given value (e.g. we increment KB from zero to one of one decimal 
point at the time), keep the other variables at their observed value and compute the predicted 
probability of innovative survival using the coefficients estimated by the regression. Finally, we 
average the predicted values24. This is preferable than using the means values of the other pre-
dictors as the observed values allow estimating the effect of the variable of interests more pre-
cisely by replicating the economic and statistical logic of matching studies in which all else is 
equal. In Panels A and C and E of Figure 36, we also overlay the scatter plot for the predicted 
probability of survival estimated for each observation including all possible variables. The com-
parison with the adjusted probability of survival for KB helps identifying what is the effect of KB 
on the overall probability of survival, given the combined effects of all the other variables. Panel 
A reports the estimations for Model 9 in Table 24. The conclusion emerged from the regression 
coefficients is confirmed. The probability of survival for diversified players is significantly larger 
than for fully specialized ones but only from the seventh bin onwards. In particular, the adjusted 
probability of survival is 0.65 for fully specialized innovators and increases to more than 0.89 for 
players with KB≥0.6. From this level on further increasing KB statistically improves survival 
chances, as confirmed by the estimated average marginal effects. Finally, we look at adjusted 
probability of survival and marginal effects for Model 10 in Table 24. These are shown in Panel C 
of Figure 36. The use of a restricted cubic spline function of KB, seems to let a U-shaped relation-
ship for the adjusted probability of survival to emerge. However, at no levels of KB the estimated 
P(S) for diversified players is statistically different from that of fully specialized ones. Yet, the 
marginal effects confirms the findings from Model 9, namely that starting from intermediate lev-
els of KB further diversifying increases the probability of survival, although with decreasing re-
turns.  
 We can derive the following conclusions out of the combined analysis of the estimated coef-
ficients for KB and the adjusted probabilities and marginal effects for all models. First, diversifi-
cation statistically increases survival chances only from intermediate levels of KB onwards and it 
seems to so with decreasing returns. Second, we cannot state any safe conclusion for what hap-
pens at lower levels of KB because the estimation is very inefficient in the range of values 
0<KB≤0.4 and particularly poor for KB equal to zero. Indeed, in all our models the predicted 
probability of survival for fully specialized players has a very high variance (as indicated by the 
high range of value taken by the scatter plots). Moreover, the adjusted probability of survival for 
                                                             
24 The procedure uses the STATA margins command as explained in Williams (2012). 
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fully specialized players greatly varies when we shift from a categorical variable of KB to a re-
stricted cubic spline function. It fluctuates from 0.65 to 0.95 depending on the model estimated. 
This, together with the scarcity of observations in the subsequent range 0<KB≤0.4, might strong-
ly affect the shape of the relationship for the restricted cubic spline model, whose U-shape could 
consequently just be an artefact.  
 In this respect, it is also worth highlighting that the coefficient for the Specialized dummy, 
which we add in the restricted cubic spline model to estimate the probability of survival for KB 
equal to zero, is not significant. This points to a lack of a peculiar effect of being fully specialized 
compared to being diversified at any level. This, together with the high variance of predicted 
P(S) for KB equal to zero, points to possibly idiosyncratic explanations of survival for fully spe-
cialized innovators. To control for the presence of firm-specific effects and the possibility that 
survival of fully specialized innovators follows different determinants than for diversified ones, 
we perform two distinct exercises. First, we break the sample into two sub-samples, one for 
KB=0 and one for KB>0. Second, we run the same set of regressions estimating a panel data ran-
dom effect logistic regression model.  
  Table 25 reports the coefficients of the models estimated using the two sub-samples for 
fully specialized and diversified core innovators. We comment on the first two models in the 
next sections, as there is obviously no diversification effect for the subsample of observations 
with KB equal to zero. Model 3 in Table 25 replicates Models 6reported in Table 24. The same 
conclusions emerged from the latter hold, namely that diversification significantly improves 
survival chances when innovators strongly diversify. Note that in Model 3 of Table 25 the base-
line is now bin 5, i.e. the first one that we can trust in the subsample of diversified players due to 
the scarcity of observations in bins 2, 3 and 4. This strongly indicates that our conclusions do not 
depend on the estimation of survival chances for fully specialized players.  
 Models 8 and 9 in Table 24 and 4, 5 and 6 in Table 25, report the panel data random ef-
fect logit version of the pooled data models discussed thus far. Results are broadly consistent 
with what emerged from the analysis of the pooled data with clustered errors. Coefficients for 
the KB variables are higher for KB bin 7 and 8 in the random effect panel data Model 8 than in 
the corresponding pooled data one (i.e. Model 6). However, the coefficient for Bin 9 loses signifi-
cance. This suggests that the high survival chances enjoyed by fully diversified players are idio-
syncratic to their capabilities and not related to their high level of KB. 
 The contribution of the panel level variance component σμ is highly significant. In both cas-
es (Models 8 and 9), rho is statistically different from zero and equal to 0.6. This means that 
around sixty percent of the variance in the probability of survival is explained by intra-cluster 
correlation between the probabilities of survival for a given player in different periods. As ex-
plained by Rodriguez and Elo (2003, p.43), “the estimate of σu can be interpreted as an ordinary 
logit coefficient by writing the random effect uij∼N(0,σu2) as σuzij, where zij∼N(0,1). In this formula-
tion, there is a parallel between the covariates xij, representing observed characteristics with coeffi-
cients β, and the standardized random effects zij, representing unobserved traits with coefficient 
σu”. More precisely, if we take Model 8 as an example, the odds of survival in a given year for a 
core innovator who has unobserved propensity to survive one standard deviation above the 
mean are almost nine times the corresponding odds for a core innovator with average unob-
served propensity and the same observed characteristics (eσμ = e2.185 = 8.89). 
 For the sake of comparison, we also computed adjusted predictions and marginal effects 
for the fixed-effect panel data model where we use the categorical variable for KB. Both are 
computed by setting the random intercept (i.e. the intra-class panel variance component 𝜇𝑗) to 
zero. In other words, they show the effect of diversification after we filter the unobserved play-
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er-specific effect out. They are shown in Panel E and F of Figure 36. They confirm the main con-
clusions discussed thus far. Technical knowledge diversification improves innovative survival 
chances from intermediate levels of KB onwards, even after controlling for firm-specific random 
effects. The figures also show that the random-effect panel data models failed to reduce the vari-
ance of predictions for fully specialized players. We perform the same exercise of splitting the 
sample done for the pooled data to see if random effects differently affect fully specialized and 
diversified players. The estimated coefficients are reported Models 4, 5 and 6 in Table 25. An 
interesting finding emerges. In principle, the inclusion of random effects wash out the signifi-
cance of diversification for the KB>0 sample. The strength of the effect actually increases (the 
coefficients are larger) but it loses significance. This might be easily interpreted as a sign that for 
diversified players the firm-specific effect is the actual determinant of survival that is masked as 
diversification effect when we neglect to consider both. However, the panel estimator is not sig-
nificantly different from zero. This means that for the split sample, the two random-effect panel 
data models are not better than the pooled data versions discussed before.  
 To sum up, considering the commonalities of findings about the effects of knowledge 
breadth on innovative survival we can conclude that starting from intermediate levels of 
knowledge breadth, further diversification significantly increases the resilience of core innova-
tors and their ability to survive. This emerged from the comprehensive analysis of estimated co-
efficients, adjusted probabilities, marginal effects, controlling for player-specific random effects 
and splitting the sample in fully specialized and diversified players. We therefore confirm our 
first hypothesis within these constraints. Due to the statistical characteristics of our sample, the 
peculiar distribution of KB and the lack of more detailed information at the company level, we 
are unable to derive any safe conclusion about the effect of diversification when players have 
small levels of diversification.  
Hypothesis 2: Knowledge accumulation 
Our second hypothesis focuses on the role of knowledge accumulation. If we look at Table 24, we 
notice that the effect of KD on the log-odds of survival is positive and significant as long as we do 
not control for experience and knowledge persistence. Both variables are related to time. Not 
surprisingly, this suggests that knowledge accumulation is at least partially correlated with time. 
In particular, the lack of significance of KD when we control for the time-related variables means 
that the informative content included in the former is actually just a manifestation of the latter. 
Table 25 provides the same findings regardless of the composition of the sample. The lack of 
significance for the coefficients of KD, no matter if we assume a linear or quadratic relationship 
between KD and the odds of innovative survival or if we look at the entire population or at spe-
cialized and diversified innovators separately, lead us to reject hypothesis two. 
 
Table 24: Pooled and panel data logit model estimation 
LOGIT 
MODEL 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(2) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(3) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(4) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(5)  
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(6) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(7) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
All obs. 
(8) 
Panel 
RandEff 
PC<24 
(9) 
Panel 
RandEff 
All obs. 
 survival survival survival survival survival survival survival survival survival 
KB bin category (base = bin 1 = KB=0) 
KB bin 7 
(0.6≤KB<0.7)  
1.398** 1.615** 1.715** 1.808*** 1.719** 1.734**  2.361**  
(0.630) (0.653) (0.691) (0.688) (0.688) (0.705)  (1.198)  
KB bin 8 
(0.7≤KB<0.8) 
2.679** 3.159** 3.207** 3.163** 2.925** 2.905**  4.244**  
(1.044) (1.331) (1.286) (1.317) (1.346) (1.347)  (1.928)  
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LOGIT 
MODEL 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(2) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(3) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(4) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(5)  
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(6) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(7) 
Pooled 
clust.VCE 
All obs. 
(8) 
Panel 
RandEff 
PC<24 
(9) 
Panel 
RandEff 
All obs. 
 survival survival survival survival survival survival survival survival survival 
KB bin 9 
(0.8≤KB<0.9) 
1.392* 2.130*** 2.032*** 2.049*** 1.725** 1.740**  3.093  
(0.800) (0.739) (0.732) (0.756) (0.761) (0.759)  (2.029)  
Specialized       -2.142  -3.853 
       (1.783)  (3.231) 
Restricted cubic spline (knots at KB = 0, 0.48, 0.89) 
r.c.s. KB1       -7.273  -13.52 
       (5.521)  (9.904) 
r.c.s. KB2       10.73*  18.46* 
       (5.701)  (10.38) 
ln(KD) 0.148* 0.166* 0.128 0.141 0.0974 -0.423 -0.390 -0.855 -0.822 
 (0.0827) (0.0877) (0.0914) (0.0981) (0.100) (0.443) (0.447) (0.683) (0.670) 
ln(KD)2      -0.0295 -0.0280 -0.0601 -0.0589 
      (0.0251) (0.0253) (0.0402) (0.0395) 
PC  -0.0626 -0.0262 -0.0355 -0.0146 -0.00655 0.0124 -0.0465 0.00340 
  (0.0639) (0.0687) (0.0715) (0.0721) (0.0729) (0.0351) (0.103) (0.0624) 
Experience (base = new entrants) 
  1 period   -1.367*** -1.320*** -1.340*** -1.345*** -1.271*** -2.208** -2.169** 
   (0.367) (0.395) (0.411) (0.410) (0.408) (0.964) (0.963) 
  2 periods   -1.302*** -1.279*** -1.118** -1.113** -1.039** -2.401* -2.433* 
   (0.456) (0.482) (0.486) (0.489) (0.477) (1.295) (1.325) 
  3 periods   -0.900 -0.956 -0.531 -0.426 -0.457 -1.793 -1.877 
   (0.593) (0.664) (0.677) (0.637) (0.621) (1.479) (1.497) 
  4 periods   -1.161* -1.175* -0.704 -0.707 -0.612 -2.493 -2.324 
   (0.602) (0.692) (0.699) (0.711) (0.693) (1.807) (1.738) 
Business cat. (base = IDMs) 
  Fabless    -0.579 -0.298 -0.285 -0.145 -0.915 -0.693 
     (0.535) (0.557) (0.575) (0.583) (1.429) (1.417) 
  Supplier    0.628 0.987 0.967 0.949 1.291 1.379 
    (0.852) (0.837) (0.853) (0.818) (1.387) (1.396) 
  Res.provider    -0.832* -0.686 -0.697 -0.727 -1.378 -1.321 
    (0.472) (0.499) (0.507) (0.486) (0.944) (0.929) 
  User    -0.429 -0.427 -0.405 -0.543 -0.856 -0.980 
    (0.426) (0.424) (0.423) (0.412) (0.861) (0.862) 
RK Persistence     18.19** 18.11** 18.15** 27.13* 28.73* 
(main traject.)     (7.919) (7.811) (7.625) (15.04) (15.15) 
Constant 1.882** 2.132** 2.646*** 2.977*** 0.559 -1.603 0.634 -2.465 1.331 
 (0.777) (0.861) (0.946) (0.999) (1.442) (2.214) (2.549) (3.323) (4.336) 
Observations 290 290 290 286 286 286 323 286 323 
# of companies        122 126 
Log-Likelihood -145.9 -145.4 -138.6 -135.3 -132.8 -132.1 -135.6 -129.8 -133.1 
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.117 0.158 0.173 0.188 0.192 0.220   
Sigma_u        2.185 2.273 
Rho        0.592 0.611 
Signif. of rho        0.016 0.013 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (errors clustered by company for the pooled data) 
Significance legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Vertical bars indicate joint significance of the variables reported to the left 
of the bar(s) (||| p<0.01, || p<0.05, | p<0.1). Business category ‘Foundry’ (in all models) and KB bins 2 and 10 (in Model 9) 
were omitted from the regressions as they predicted survival perfectly. For Model 9 only KB bins whose coefficient is 
statistically significant are reported. 
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Table 25: Pooled and panel data logit model estimation with split sample 
LOGIT 
MODEL  
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(2) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(3) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
PC<24 & KB>0 
(4) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(5) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(6) 
Panel  
RandEff 
PC<24 & KB>0 
 survival survival survival survival survival survival 
KB bin category (base = bin 5) 
KB bin 6  
(0.5≤KB<0.6) 
  0.660 
(0.585) 
  0.786 
(0.982) 
KB bin 7  
(0.6≤KB<0.7) 
  1.926** 
(0.902) 
  2.460 
(1.650) 
KB bin 8  
(0.7≤KB<0.8) 
  3.286** 
(1.293) 
  4.631 
(3.330) 
KB bin 9  
(0.8≤KB<0.9) 
  2.419** 
(0.968) 
  3.530 
(2.897) 
ln(KD) 0.0311 -0.819 1.793 0.0311 -0.819 2.086 
 (0.109) (0.508) (1.411) (0.110) (0.631) (1.879) 
ln(KD)2  -0.0466* 0.0940  -0.0466 0.103 
  (0.0283) (0.0812)  (0.0339) (0.108) 
PC 0.0523 0.0925 -0.0990 0.0525 0.0925 -0.158 
 (0.260) (0.249) (0.0714) (0.261) (0.265) (0.163) 
Experience (base = new entrants) 
  1 period -1.711** -1.730** -0.995 -1.710** -1.730** -1.598 
 (0.699) (0.706) (0.729) (0.684) (0.685) (1.746) 
  2 periods -1.921** -1.907** -0.224 -1.920*** -1.907*** -0.590 
 (0.769) (0.792) (0.801) (0.728) (0.736) (1.485) 
  3 periods -1.965* -1.674* 1.559 -1.965** -1.674* 1.735 
 (1.005) (0.994) (1.337) (0.921) (0.951) (1.803) 
  4 periods -1.586 -1.656 -0.0383 -1.585 -1.656 -0.539 
 (1.024) (1.024) (1.163) (1.012) (1.023) (2.132) 
Business cat. (base = IDMs) 
  Fabless -0.679 -0.683 - -0.679 -0.683 - 
  (0.789) (0.796)  (0.874) (0.871)  
  Supplier 0.550 0.513 0.712 0.550 0.513 1.164 
 (1.351) (1.376) (1.217) (1.261) (1.268) (2.201) 
  Res.provider -0.0841 -0.0752 -1.304** -0.0841 -0.0752 -2.004 
 (0.603) (0.628) (0.657) (0.611) (0.620) (1.872) 
  User -0.673 -0.647 -0.812 -0.673 -0.647 -1.308 
 (0.570) (0.559) (0.644) (0.626) (0.621) (1.460) 
RK Persistence  40.61*** 39.32*** 0.224 40.60*** 39.32*** 4.782 
(main traject.) (13.02) (12.55) (12.14) (14.62) (14.41) (21.71) 
Constant -1.787 -5.399** 9.586 -1.787 -5.399 11.82 
 (1.869) (2.752) (6.371) (2.149) (3.462) (9.515) 
Observations 128 128 155 128 128 155 
# of companies    84 84 83 
Log-Likelihood -66.36 -65.32 -54.71 -66.36 -65.32 -54.53 
Pseudo R2 0.211 0.224 0.237    
σu    0.0027 0.000978 1.866 
Rho    2.34e-06 2.91e-07 0.514 
Significance of rho    0.498 0.499 0.273 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (errors clustered by company for the pooled data) 
Significance legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Vertical bars indicates joint significance (||| p<0.01, || p<0.05, | p<0.1). 
Business category ‘Foundry’ (in all models), ‘Fabless’ and KB bins 2 and 10 (in Model 3 and 6) are omitted from the regressions 
as they predict survival perfectly. For Models 3 and 6 only KB bins others than 2, 3 and 4 are reported. Bin is 5 used as baseline.  
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Table 26: Pooled data logit models estimation with KNOWCLASS 
LOGIT  
MODEL 
(1) 
PC<15 
(2) 
PC<15 
(3) 
PC<15 
(4) 
PC<15 
(5) 
PC<24 
(6) 
PC<24 
(7) 
PC<24 
(8) 
PC<24 
(9) 
PC<24 
(10) 
PC<24 
VARIAB. survival survival survival survival survival survival survival survival survival survival 
Knowclass (4):          
Div. Expert 2.43*** 2.158** 1.836**        
 (0.872) (0.853) (0.813)        
Div. Follower 0.597 0.322  -1.83**       
(0.507) (0.462)  (0.813)       
Spec. Expert 0.275  -0.322 -2.15**       
(0.397)  (0.462) (0.853)       
Spec. Follower  -0.275 -0.597 -2.4***       
 (0.397) (0.507) (0.872)       
Knowclass (6):          
Highly div. expert     1.529** 1.271* 1.105* 0.406 2.780**  
    (0.612) (0.667) (0.623) (0.592) (1.373)  
Highly div. follow     -1.250 -1.508 -1.674 -2.374*  -2.78** 
    (1.483) (1.485) (1.386) (1.342)  (1.373) 
Inter. div. expert     1.124** 0.866 0.700  2.374* -0.406 
    (0.548) (0.629) (0.543)  (1.342) (0.592) 
Inter. div. follow.     0.424 0.166  -0.700 1.674 -1.105* 
    (0.431) (0.497)  (0.543) (1.386) (0.623) 
Spec. expert     0.258  -0.166 -0.866 1.508 -1.271* 
    (0.485)  (0.497) (0.629) (1.485) (0.667) 
Spec. follower      -0.258 -0.424 -1.12** 1.250 -1.52** 
     (0.485) (0.431) (0.548) (1.483) (0.612) 
PC 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.0826 0.0826 0.0826 0.0826 0.0826 0.0826 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
Experience           
  1 period -1.2*** -1.2*** -1.2*** -1.2*** -1.2*** -1.2*** -1.2*** -1.2*** -1.2*** -1.2*** 
 (0.446) (0.446) (0.446) (0.446) (0.427) (0.427) (0.427) (0.427) (0.427) (0.427) 
  2 periods -1.19** -1.19** -1.19** -1.19** -1.03** -1.03** -1.03** -1.03** -1.03** -1.03** 
 (0.488) (0.488) (0.488) (0.488) (0.487) (0.487) (0.487) (0.487) (0.487) (0.487) 
  3 periods -0.679 -0.679 -0.679 -0.679 -0.532 -0.532 -0.532 -0.532 -0.532 -0.532 
 (0.642) (0.642) (0.642) (0.642) (0.664) (0.664) (0.664) (0.664) (0.664) (0.664) 
  4 periods -0.802 -0.802 -0.802 -0.802 -0.350 -0.350 -0.350 -0.350 -0.350 -0.350 
 (0.708) (0.708) (0.708) (0.708) (0.700) (0.700) (0.700) (0.700) (0.700) (0.700) 
Business cat.          
  Foundry - - - - - - - - - - 
  Fabless -0.307 -0.307 -0.307 -0.307 -0.147 -0.147 -0.147 -0.147 -0.147 -0.147 
  (0.559) (0.559) (0.559) (0.559) (0.552) (0.552) (0.552) (0.552) (0.552) (0.552) 
  Supplier 0.907 0.907 0.907 0.907 1.068 1.068 1.068 1.068 1.068 1.068 
 (0.806) (0.806) (0.806) (0.806) (0.817) (0.817) (0.817) (0.817) (0.817) (0.817) 
Res. provider -0.750 -0.750 -0.750 -0.750 -0.689 -0.689 -0.689 -0.689 -0.689 -0.689 
(0.488) (0.488) (0.488) (0.488) (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) (0.465) 
  User -0.832* -0.832* -0.832* -0.832* -0.766* -0.766* -0.766* -0.766* -0.766* -0.766* 
 (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411) 
RK Persistence  21.79*** 21.79*** 21.79*** 21.79*** 20.54*** 20.54*** 20.54*** 20.54*** 20.54*** 20.54*** 
(main traject.) (7.509) (7.509) (7.509) (7.509) (7.451) (7.451) (7.451) (7.451) (7.451) (7.451) 
Constant -0.897 -0.622 -0.299 1.536 -0.795 -0.537 -0.371 0.329 -2.045 0.735 
 (0.875) (0.932) (1.012) (1.231) (0.880) (0.968) (0.942) (1.101) (1.792) (1.099) 
Observations 276 276 276 276 292 292 292 292 292 292 
Log-Likelihood -126.7 -126.7 -126.7 -126.7 -138.2 -138.2 -138.2 -138.2 -138.2 -138.2 
Pseudo R2 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (errors clustered by company). Significance legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Business category ‘Foundry’ (in all models) was omitted from the regressions as it predicts survival perfectly. 
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Table 27: Panel data random effect logit models estimation with KNOWCLASS  
RE XTLOGIT  
MODEL 
(1) 
PC<15 
(2) 
PC<15 
(3) 
PC<15 
(4) 
PC<15 
(5) 
PC<24 
(6) 
PC<24 
(7) 
PC<24 
(8) 
PC<24 
(9) 
PC<24 
(10) 
PC<24 
VARIAB. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. 
Knowclass (4):          
Div. Expert 2.93** 2.48** 2.13**        
 (1.205) (1.09) (1.04)        
Div. Follower 0.802 0.354  -2.132**       
(0.617) (0.60)  (1.047)       
Spec. Expert 0.448  -0.354 -2.485**       
 (0.556)  (0.60) (1.093)       
Spec. Follower  -0.448 -0.802 -2.934**       
 (0.55) (0.61) (1.205)       
Knowclass (6):          
Highly div. expert     1.846 1.416 1.334 0.537 2.795  
    (1.359) (1.335) (1.239) (1.153) (1.911)  
Highly div. follow     -0.949 -1.379 -1.461 -2.258  -2.795 
    (1.896) (1.905) (1.827) (1.812)  (1.911) 
Inter. div. expert     1.309* 0.879 0.797  2.258 -0.537 
    (0.680) (0.734) (0.626)  (1.812) (1.153) 
Inter. div. follow.     0.512 0.0821  -0.797 1.461 -1.334 
    (0.547) (0.687)  (0.626) (1.827) (1.239) 
Spec. expert     0.430  -0.0821 -0.879 1.379 -1.416 
    (0.639)  (0.687) (0.734) (1.905) (1.335) 
Spec. follower      -0.430 -0.512 -1.309* 0.949 -1.846 
     (0.639) (0.547) (0.680) (1.896) (1.359) 
PC 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.0819 0.0819 0.0819 0.0819 0.0819 0.0819 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.0831) 
Experience           
  1 period -1.52** -1.52** -1.52** -1.52** -1.53** -1.53** -1.53** -1.53** -1.53** -1.53** 
 (0.629) (0.629) (0.629) (0.629) (0.674) (0.674) (0.674) (0.674) (0.674) (0.674) 
  2 periods -1.75** -1.752** -1.75** -1.75** -1.605* -1.605* -1.605* -1.605* -1.605* -1.605* 
 (0.866) (0.866) (0.866) (0.866) (0.937) (0.937) (0.937) (0.937) (0.937) (0.937) 
  3 periods -1.232 -1.232 -1.232 -1.232 -1.154 -1.154 -1.154 -1.154 -1.154 -1.154 
 (1.020) (1.020) (1.020) (1.020) (1.125) (1.125) (1.125) (1.125) (1.125) (1.125) 
  4 periods -1.543 -1.543 -1.543 -1.543 -1.140 -1.140 -1.140 -1.140 -1.140 -1.140 
 (1.219) (1.219) (1.219) (1.219) (1.316) (1.316) (1.316) (1.316) (1.316) (1.316) 
Business cat.          
  Foundry - - - - - - - - - - 
  Fabless -0.551 -0.551 -0.551 -0.551 -0.398 -0.398 -0.398 -0.398 -0.398 -0.398 
  (1.021) (1.021) (1.021) (1.021) (1.051) (1.051) (1.051) (1.051) (1.051) (1.051) 
  Supplier 1.072 1.072 1.072 1.072 1.270 1.270 1.270 1.270 1.270 1.270 
 (1.038) (1.038) (1.038) (1.038) (1.077) (1.077) (1.077) (1.077) (1.077) (1.077) 
  Res. 
provider 
-1.018 -1.018 -1.018 -1.018 -1.036 -1.036 -1.036 -1.036 -1.036 -1.036 
(0.646) (0.646) (0.646) (0.646) (0.712) (0.712) (0.712) (0.712) (0.712) (0.712) 
  User -1.173* -1.173* -1.173* -1.173* -1.113 -1.113 -1.113 -1.113 -1.113 -1.113 
 (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.687) (0.687) (0.687) (0.687) (0.687) (0.687) 
RK Persistence  27.20** 27.20** 27.20** 27.20** 26.67** 26.67** 26.67** 26.67** 26.67** 26.67** 
(main traject.) (11.63) (11.63) (11.63) (11.63) (12.50) (12.50) (12.50) (12.50) (12.50) (12.50) 
Constant -0.946 -0.498 -0.144 1.988 -0.863 -0.433 -0.351 0.446 -1.812 0.983 
 (1.278) (1.326) (1.401) (1.713) (1.304) (1.442) (1.416) (1.546) (2.467) (1.945) 
Observations 276 276 276 276 296 296 296 296 296 296 
Num. of innovators 121 121 121 121 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Log-Likelihood -126.1 -126.1 -126.1 -126.1 -137.6 -137.6 -137.6 -137.6 -137.6 -137.6 
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RE XTLOGIT  
MODEL 
(1) 
PC<15 
(2) 
PC<15 
(3) 
PC<15 
(4) 
PC<15 
(5) 
PC<24 
(6) 
PC<24 
(7) 
PC<24 
(8) 
PC<24 
(9) 
PC<24 
(10) 
PC<24 
VARIAB. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. Surviv. 
Sigma_u 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.371 1.371 1.371 1.371 1.371 1.371 
Rho 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363 
Significance of rho 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 
Notes: Significance legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Business category ‘Foundry’ (in all models) was omitted from the 
regressions as it predicts survival perfectly. 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Adjusted predictions and average marginal effects of knowledge breadth 
Note: shaded areas and spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Adjusted probabilities and 
marginal effects computed at the observed values of the other predictors. 
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Hypothesis 3: Interaction effects between knowledge breadth and accumulation 
To test Hypothesis 3 regarding the presence of complementarities between diversification and 
knowledge accumulation, we estimate an equivalent version of the full model (Model 5, Table 
24) where the individual effects of knowledge breadth and depth are replaced by the categorical 
variable KNOWCLASS indicating the relative position in the knowledge breadth-depth space. As 
discussed in Section 5.7, we measure KNOWCLASS in two different ways, corresponding to 4 or 
6 categories. Results are reported in Table 26 for the pooled data and in Table 27 for the random 
effect panel data models. The first four columns report the same model estimated using four 
knowledge categories based on the median levels of KB and log-KD. The estimated coefficients in 
each column are computed using each of the four different categories as baseline. Being a diver-
sified expert provides significantly better odds of survival than anyone else. In particular, after 
controlling for other explanations, including player-specific random effects, diversified experts 
have e2.934=18.8 times better survival odds than specialized followers. However, moving from 
any of the other categories to anyone else, does not improve survival chances significantly. This 
confirms the importance to improve both breadth and depth at the same time, especially for ful-
ly specialized players. Yet this is true for the other categories as well. In fact, once you are an ex-
pert you can only improve the odds of survival by increasing breadth while maintaining high 
depth. The same reasoning holds for diversified followers, which need to improve depth while 
maintaining high breadth to see their odds of survival improving significantly. These conclusions 
hold true when we measure KNOWCLASS using six categories and pooled data. However, this 
time controlling for innovator-specific random effects washes significance of the movement 
across the breadth-depth space out, except for being an intermediate diversified expert com-
pared to a fully specialized follower.  
 The overall findings provide some evidence in favour of our third hypothesis. Yet we cannot 
fully confirm it because the results are not robust to the way we categorize the knowledge 
breadth-depth space, in particular when we control for innovator-specific random effects.  
Hypothesis 4: Knowledge persistence 
Hypothesis 4 postulated a positive relationship between knowledge persistence and resilience 
of core innovators. We measured knowledge persistence in several ways, distinguishing be-
tween recent and cumulated knowledge and between the main trajectories (identified by the 
main component of the NMP) and the whole NMP sample of influential patents (including the 
second component in selected periods). In Tables Table 24, Table 25, Table 26 and Table 27, we 
only reported recent knowledge persistence in the main technological trajectories. This is the 
only version of knowledge persistence that turned out significant. This finding is in itself very 
interesting as it shows that technological shocks that are able to provoke shakeouts come from 
changes in the approach to problem solving (i.e. the main engineering trajectories identified by 
the NMPs) concerning the set of problems that currently attracts most of the inventive effort by 
firms (i.e. the main component of the NMPs). 
 For the full sample, the variable measuring recent knowledge persistence on the main tra-
jectory is always strongly significant, regardless of the model estimated. The coefficients across 
the different models show that full recent knowledge persistence on the main trajectory increas-
es log-odds of survival by a value within the range 18.11 – 28.73, compared to zero persistence. 
As plotted in panel A of Figure 37, this translates in an increase in the probability of survival 
from 0.4 to 1. When we split the sample between fully specialized and diversified innovators, an 
interesting finding emerges. Recent knowledge persistence on the main trajectory significantly 
improves survival chances for the former only whereas it is not significant for the latter. All else 
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equal and after filtering player-specific random effects out, for fully specialized innovators a 
change from zero recent knowledge persistence on the main trajectory to full persistence im-
proves the probability of survival from 0.06 to 1, as shown in Paned D. We note from Panels B 
and C of Figure 37 that a level of about 0.2 is sufficient to achieve a probability of survival of 1 
for fully specialized innovators. This allows quantifying a guiding threshold that indicates the 
level of change in technical knowledge after which knowledge replacing technical change starts 
affecting the composition of the set of current core innovators. All else equal when less than 
twenty percent of the technical knowledge produced in the last 5 years persist on the current 
main technological trajectory the probability of survival for current fully specialized core inno-
vators start decreasing. This confirms our fourth hypothesis but only with respect of fully spe-
cialized core innovators. 
 
Figure 37: Adjusted predictions of Recent Knowledge Persistence (Main Trajectories) 
Hypothesis 5: Interaction between knowledge persistence, breadth and accumulation 
We have just learned that, when we split the sample into fully specialized and diversified play-
ers, persistence keeps being significant for the former and turn insignificant for the latter. This is 
a first evidence in support of our last hypothesis. A more formal test comes from the estimation 
of the average marginal effects (AMEs) of diversification at different persistence levels.  We es-
timated the AMEs for increasing levels of persistence ranging from zero to one, with increments 
of 0.05. We estimated them for each KB bin category with respect to the first bin, which included 
fully specialized players only and the fifth one, which is the first reliable bin category for inter-
mediate levels of KB. This way we can assess whether increasing KB starting from 0, or 0.5, sig-
nificantly improves survival chances conditional to the level of knowledge persistence. Table 28 
presents the results.  
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Table 28: Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) of diversification conditional on the level of knowledge persistence 
RK Persistence (MT) KB bin AME SE z p CI_lb CI_ub Significance
0 7 0.361 0.151 2.39 0.017 0.065 0.657 **
0.05 7 0.352 0.122 2.88 0.004 0.112 0.591 **
0.1 7 0.264 0.082 3.2 0.001 0.102 0.425 **
0.15 7 0.157 0.064 2.47 0.014 0.032 0.281 **
0 8 0.569 0.196 2.9 0.004 0.185 0.954 **
0.05 8 0.484 0.147 3.3 0.001 0.196 0.771 **
0.1 8 0.332 0.082 4.03 0 0.171 0.494 **
0.15 8 0.188 0.068 2.77 0.006 0.055 0.321 **
0 9 0.362 0.159 2.28 0.022 0.051 0.673 **
0.05 9 0.353 0.134 2.64 0.008 0.091 0.614 **
0.1 9 0.264 0.091 2.9 0.004 0.086 0.443 **
0.15 9 0.157 0.067 2.35 0.019 0.026 0.288 **
RK Persistence (MT) KB bin AME SE z p CI_lb CI_ub Significance
0 7 0.380 0.169 2.25 0.025 0.048 0.711 **
0.05 7 0.376 0.149 2.52 0.012 0.084 0.668 **
0.1 7 0.288 0.121 2.38 0.018 0.050 0.525 **
0 8 0.588 0.198 2.98 0.003 0.201 0.975 **
0.05 8 0.508 0.160 3.16 0.002 0.193 0.823 **
0.1 8 0.356 0.117 3.05 0.002 0.127 0.585 **
0.15 8 0.205 0.100 2.06 0.039 0.010 0.401 **
0 9 0.381 0.173 2.2 0.028 0.042 0.720 **
0.05 9 0.377 0.156 2.42 0.015 0.072 0.682 **
0.1 9 0.288 0.125 2.3 0.022 0.042 0.534 **
BASE LINE KB BIN 1 (KB=0)
BASE LINE KB BIN 5 (0.4<=KB<0.5)
 
 
To keep the table easily readable we only report AMEs statistically different from zero at the 
p<0.05 level. The first half of the table shows that, all else equal, the spread of survival chances 
compared to fully specialized players (i.e. the AME) is positive and significantly different from 
zero only for bins 7, 8 and 925 and only for levels of knowledge persistence smaller or equal than 
0.15. When knowledge persistence increases diversification does not significantly improves sur-
vival chances. The same holds when we compute the AMEs using the fifth bin as base line. Filter-
ing players-specific random effects out (i.e. computing the AMEs using Model 8 from Table 24), 
largely confirms the results. Only the AMEs for a persistent level of 0.15 turns insignificant. Yet, 
its p-value is very close to 0.1. Our fifth hypothesis was therefore too mild. The argument that 
the effect of diversification on survival is stronger when technological change is knowledge re-
placing is partially misleading. Our findings show that diversification only affects core innova-
tors’ resilience when technological change is strongly knowledge-replacing. 
Behaviour of the control variables 
Two additional findings emerge from our estimations. They come from the behaviour of the con-
trol variables. First, with the seldom and inconsistent exception of research providers and users 
in some of the models, there are no statistical differences across business models in terms of 
                                                             
25 Note that AMEs calculation is based on Model 6 from Table 24. KB bins 2 and 10 were omitted from the regressions 
as they predicted survival perfectly. Consequently, AMEs for these bins could not be computed. 
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probability to survive as core innovator compared to being an Integrated Device Manufacturer. 
Given that IDMs are usually financially much bigger than fabless, foundries and suppliers, this 
also suggests that there are no financial size effects. Second, fully specialized players with less 
than 10 years of experience as core innovators (i.e. with a presence on the NMPs for up to 2 pe-
riods), have significantly less chances of survival than new fully specialized innovators. This 
suggests that the negative effects of full specialization are particularly stronger in the medium 
term.  
Comparison with probit and complementary log-log models 
As a robustness check, we estimate the same models reported in Tables Table 24, Table 25 and 
Table 26 using probit and complementary log-log cross-section regressions. Results are report-
ed in the Appendices A.5.4 and A.5.5. Our findings are remarkably robust to the choice of the bi-
nary outcome regression model. None of the conclusions derived for our five hypothesis changes 
using the alternative estimation methods. 
5.9 Conclusions 
In this work, we analysed the effect of technical knowledge diversification and accumulation on 
firms’ innovative survival in the semiconductor industry. We hypothesized that diversification, 
accumulation and their joint occurrence are associated with firms’ survival in the set of core in-
novators. Moreover, we argued that knowledge-replacing technical change negatively affects 
firms’ innovative survival and that the diversification and accumulation-induced survival premi-
um should be larger in periods of technological turbulence. 
 We have proven that indeed diversification, significantly and positively affects innovative 
survival in the semiconductor industry, though only for large levels of knowledge breadth. In 
contrast, knowledge accumulation alone does not help to improve the probability to persist as 
core innovator. We also proved that when technological change is knowledge-replacing (i.e. 
when recently created technical knowledge is of no use for mastering the current engineering 
solutions), there is a higher hazard of innovative exit and the set of core innovators undergoes a 
phase of shakeout. In particular, our findings showed that diversification provides a premium in 
terms of resilience to changes in the main technological trajectories compared to specialization 
only when technical knowledge persistence is low. For high levels of persistence, differences in 
terms of knowledge breadth across the full sample of core innovators do not affect the probabil-
ity of survival. However, for players that are already mildly diversified, further increasing their 
knowledge breadth further widening their knowledge breadth provides a survival premium that 
is not conditional to the level of knowledge persistence. Our findings also showed that these 
conclusions holds after controlling for the size of the technical knowledge base and for the busi-
ness model followed by core innovators (IDMs, foundries, fabless, suppliers, users and research 
providers). This suggests that the benefits of technical knowledge diversification are independ-
ent from product diversification and from the stage of value-chain fragmentation. Finally, we 
also showed that the hazard of exit is particularly strong for mid-levels of innovative experience.  
 These findings have important managerial and policy implications. Concerning the former, 
it is clear that even in an industry characterized by large technology modularity, functional or 
product specialization should not necessarily lead to technical knowledge specialization. When 
knowledge persistence is low, knowledge specialization increases the hazard of being locked-out 
from the new technological developments, putting long-run market survival at risk. This raises 
the question of how to pursuit knowledge diversification when technology is highly modular. 
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Since in such a technological space it might not be obvious to move across domains, as they 
share little knowledge and capabilities, it might be necessary to heavily rely on external sources 
of knowledge, especially for small players. The history of the global semiconductor industry has 
shown how R&D alliances and technology licensing have been instrumental in the catching-up 
processes of latecomer firms. Our results suggest that they might also have allowed firms to di-
versify into poorly related technological domains. This hypothesis can serve as a base for future 
research.  
 The policy implications of our findings are particularly important for small catching-up 
countries characterized by few firms with limited R&D resources. Such firms might face serious 
difficulties to pursuit a strategy of technology diversification and knowledge accumulation at the 
same time. How can the government help? There are two policy options. First, diversification at 
the country level can be achieved through specialization at the firm level. When firms’ specializa-
tion patterns are not overlapping (i.e. when firms are specialized in different areas), country’s 
knowledge is diversified. Such strategy can be called ‘diversified specialization’. Such outcome 
can hardly emerge through self-organization as Marshallian externalities, coming from 
knowledge spillovers and economies of co-specialization, might induce firms to focus on similar 
technological domains. Therefore, diversified specialization requires external coordination by 
the local government, which should provide incentives for firms to conduct R&D in non-
overlapping areas. This would allow achieving, at the country level, Jacobian externalities com-
ing from related variety. As we show in the Appendix A.5.7, the data suggests that this aggregate 
diversification pattern was achieved in S.Korea and Taiwan. However, further work is necessary 
to confirm this. A second policy option has more to do with the structure of the technological 
space. We argued that modularity and knowledge-replacing technical change represent evolu-
tionary traps that expose specialized innovators at risk of innovative extinction. The drop in 
knowledge persistence urges players to upgrade their knowledge to master emerging domains 
but high modularity makes knowledge less portable across the technological space. The second 
policy option in this scenario requires direct government intervention. Public research centres 
can engage in R&D project that lay at the interface of technological domains. By doing so, the 
government is providing a technological infrastructure that connects otherwise poorly connect-
ed areas in the technology space. The rational is similar to the argument that sees the provision 
of physical infrastructure (like railroads or highways) connecting isolated cities or regions as a 
government’s task. Similarly, venturing into research projects whose goal is to create bridges 
across technology domains is too costly, and possibly not profitable in the short to medium run, 
to be performed by private firms. Reasons to explore inter-domain connections might not be ob-
vious for profit maximizing firms. Government intervention, in this second policy option, should 
focus on creating escape paths that can be travelled to move from declining domains to emerg-
ing ones. 
 A major limitation of our study come from the lack of financial information about the com-
panies in the sample and of data able to better discriminate firms-specific technical capabilities. 
In particular, data on R&D investments, number of researchers, years of experience of the re-
searchers, being engaged in a strategic alliance, would have greatly helped improve the preci-
sion of the estimation of survival chances for fully specialized players, which suffered from a 
very large variance. In absence of such data, we need to accept that survival of fully specialized 
players cannot be explained with sufficient confidence just by looking at their level of knowledge 
accumulation. A second limitation comes from the nature of the study. By focusing only on the 
semiconductor industry, we are unable to compare our findings with alternative cases charac-
terized by lower knowledge modularity. However, this approach can be easily applied to multi-
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industry studies, as long as we can safely rely on their propensity to patent. This provides a sec-
ond field of future research. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this PhD Thesis, we analysed the complex relationship between technology, industrial dynam-
ics and catching-up in the Semiconductor industry. We did so by developing a new theoretical 
and methodological framework to study the evolution of the space of engineering solutions 
along two dimensions, the structure of the system of engineering problems and the paths of 
problem solving approaches. We argued that changes in these two dimensions are intertwined 
with the evolution of technological trajectories that are defined at the product level. This novel 
theoretical framework, and the network analysis methods developed to analyse it empirically, 
provided the possibility to quantitatively investigate the co-evolution of technology and firms’ 
inventive strategies with previously unmatched resolution and level of statistical rigour. In this 
conclusive chapter, we summarize the main contributions and findings of the thesis, discuss the 
implications of this PhD dissertation on evolutionary economics and innovation studies and 
briefly present its key policy and managerial implications. Finally, we introduce the research 
agenda sparked by this work. 
6.1 Summary of the thesis’ contributions and findings 
This thesis provides a variety of methodological contributions to the analysis of technology dy-
namics and catching-up. We designed a set of patent citation network analysis methods to un-
fold sources and speed of technical improvements of catching-up firms (Ch.2), measure the sta-
bility of the ranking of engineering problems and the paths of problem-solving approaches 
(Ch.3), identify firms that are able to influence the direction of technological change (Ch.3), re-
veal significant path- and ranking -changers and followers (Ch.3), identify technology domains, 
trace their life cycle and measure firms dynamic technical comparative advantages (Ch.4), 
measure the extent to which technical change is knowledge replacing (Ch.5) measure firms’ 
technical knowledge breadth and depth (Ch.5), and quantify the premium in innovative survival 
chances associated with firms’ technical knowledge diversification and accumulation (Ch.5). We 
applied these methodologies to study technology and industrial dynamics in the semiconductors 
using patent data from the USPTO-NBER database between 1976 and 2006. The choice of the 
Semiconductor industry as field of study allowed validating the findings of our methodologies 
against the breadth of literature on latecomer catching-up strategies that builds on anecdotal 
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evidences, policy analysis and case studies. Our quantitative methods proved to be able to repli-
cate these qualitative evidences.  
 New theoretical insights on the co-evolution of technology and firms’ inventive strategies in 
the Semiconductors were achieved. The network analysis of semiconductor patent citations also 
shed light on the paths followed by firms from successful latecomer countries (Taiwan, Korea 
and Singapore). In Chapter 2, we unfold how, despite sharing relatively similar initial national 
conditions in terms of technology environment at the time of their first USPTO patents, firms 
from successful and unsuccessful catching-up countries followed different inventive strategies 
with respect of the sources and speed of technical improvements. In Taiwan, Singapore and Ko-
rea, we could observe the rise of an industry, with many players that progressively learned from 
each other and adopted a strategy of rapid technical improvements. In Chapter 3, we showed 
that the main paths of engineering improvements have been disrupted twice in the last four dec-
ades. A temporary but substantial disruption in the approaches to problems solving occurred in 
the first half of the 1990s. This change was caused by attempts to look for alternative ways of 
improving integrating circuits’ computational power and energy efficiency. One of such attempts 
focused on circumventing second order problems caused by miniaturization, like power leakage 
due to heat dispersion. A second one explored the feasibility of stacking dies vertically rather 
than horizontally, to achieve a higher density of transistors on a chip. A milder change in the di-
rection of the main paths of engineering improvements was observed in the beginning of the 
2000s. This discontinuity was coupled to a change in the ranking of engineering problems, 
caused by the diffusion of new applications for semiconductor devices, such as LCD TV and com-
puter monitors, tablets and smartphones. Moreover, further improvements in metal–oxide–
semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) also stand behind these changes. Our findings 
also show that, in the 1990s and first half of the 2000s, firms from successful latecomer coun-
tries, especially Taiwanese and Singaporean foundries, were significantly more path and ranking 
followers than expected by their size and time of entry. Some of them, notably those engaged in 
LCD technology, proved to be significant ranking changers in the early 2000s. In most of the cas-
es, their strategy to initially follow well-established paths of improvements and respect the pre-
vailing perception on the ranking of engineering problems has granted them a very influential 
role. Their patents were significantly more central in the network of technical improvements 
than expected by firm size and time of entrance. The analysis in Chapter 4 confirmed that late-
comer countries were indeed able to upgrade their technical knowledge during the process of 
catching-up. Their technical comparative advantage initially laid in improving relatively mature 
and declining technologies. However, in the course of about a decade, it evolved into emerging 
technology domains, most notably in breakthroughs related to LCD technology. Our method to 
identify the life cycle stage of technology domains, developed in Chapter 4, also allowed investi-
gating significant differences in the comparative advantage of new innovators and incumbents 
along the life cycle. In accordance with what hypothesized in the literature on disruptive tech-
nology (e.g. Christensen, 1997) and industry life-cycles (e.g. Klepper, 1997), our findings re-
vealed that new innovators have a slightly higher comparative advantage than incumbent in 
breakthrough technology domains and a much larger one in disruptive technologies. Finally, in 
Chapter 5, we showed that technical knowledge is highly modular in the Semiconductor indus-
try. This makes knowledge and experience technology-specifics and therefore less portable 
across technology domains. Due to this configuration of the system, technical knowledge diversi-
fication provides better chances of innovative survival than specialization, in particular when 
technological change is knowledge-replacing. We also found that the knowledge base of semi-
conductor foundries from Taiwan and Singapore is broadly diversified, perhaps due to their role 
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of generalist manufacturers of microchips for a large set of chip-designers. This allowed them 
persisting in the club of core innovators uninterruptedly from the mid-1990s until at least 2006.  
6.2 Implications of this PhD dissertation for technology and innovation studies 
 What do the findings of this thesis collectively tell us about technology development dy-
namics, inventive strategies and catching-up pathways? A coherent story emerges from our em-
pirical analysis, which matches anecdotal evidences presented in the literature (Brown and Lin-
den 2009, Bell and Juma, 2008, Chang and Tsai, 2002, Lee and Lim 2001, Hobday 2000, Langlois 
and Steinmueller 1999, Mathews and Cho 1999, Cho et al., 1998, Chang et al., 1994). Catching-up 
firms from successful latecomer countries, initially preferentially focused on rapidly improving 
foreign and relatively obsolete technologies characterized by long and established engineering 
design trajectories. They then progressively started learning from national sources, fostering 
knowledge diffusion and industry building within their country, and upgrading their knowledge 
by shifting their comparative technical advantage to younger and emerging technology domains. 
At the same time, firms form these countries built a broadly diversified knowledge base, which 
allowed them to spread development risks and secure their role as core innovators. An obvious 
question emerges. Is this catching-up trajectory, which emerged from the careful analysis of pa-
tent records, the only possible one that could have allowed rapid development of frontier technical 
capabilities? As we discussed in the introduction of this thesis, attempting to answer this ques-
tion is not only hard but it is likely to provide misleading messages. Because of the complex na-
ture of technical and economic change, universally valid and replicable strategies hardly exist. 
However, the description of how the technological environment of the Semiconductor industry 
evolved and the analysis of what made successful latecomer firms special, allow better assessing 
if similar scenarios may exist in other industries in different moment in times. Therefore, we do 
not have a recipe for catching-up, but we at least have a carefully described benchmark. Such 
benchmark has a number of important implications for innovation studies and evolutionary 
economic theory. 
 Firstly, we showed how the interaction between demand, product evolution and changes in 
the space of engineering problems can explain the rise and decline of technology domains. We 
described technology domains as areas of research that define a set of common technological 
problems that are tackled applying similar mindsets and toolboxes. As such, technology domains 
can span product and component boundaries. In other words, the evolution of different products 
may depend on the solution of similar engineering challenges. We have discussed how this is the 
case in the Semiconductor industry, where, due to the ubiquitous application of semiconductors 
in modern electronics, solving some key design challenges related to their miniaturization affect 
performance improvements of several products. The key question then becomes, how do tech-
nology domains evolve? In this thesis, we answered it by discussing how two variables describe 
the entire life cycle of technology domains. These are the amount of firms’ inventive effort de-
voted to solving the central engineering problems behind a domain and the level of firms’ explo-
ration of unconventional problem solving approaches. These two variables can describe whether 
a technology domain is emerging, maturing, declining or renewing, as we showed in Chapter 4. 
The theoretical description of the life cycle of technology domains and the development of 
methodologies to empirically analyse it are a major contribution of this work. In fact, as we dis-
cussed, because technology domains affect different products one can now envisage ways of ex-
plaining and, possibly, predicting the life cycle of products and industries by looking at their en-
 134 Conclusions 
gineering design trajectories. These future research agenda is discussed in more details in the 
last section. 
 Secondly, by linking evolutionary dynamics of products and technology domains, the theo-
retical framework developed in this dissertation can potentially explain the clustering of big in-
novations in time, as theorize by Schumpeter and reported by Silverberg and Verspagen (2005). 
Therefore, it can contribute to identify a key driver of economic cycles. Realize that, at its very 
essence, technological progress is achieved by searching for the right approach to solve engi-
neering challenges allows us to focus on the cognitive process behind the search of design solu-
tions. Moreover, acknowledging that the space of engineering problems has a structure is the 
first step toward analysing how solutions propagate. Eventually, this can explain why we ob-
serve waves of new products. The analysis of the semiconductor industry, which we have devel-
oped in this thesis, shows how there is a cyclic dependence between product evolution, engi-
neering design trajectories and the evolution of technology domains. For instance, we have dis-
cussed how semiconductor devices (such as integrated circuits and memories) have evolved 
around a well-defined technological trajectory. Miniaturization is the product feature that must 
be imperatively achieved by any player in the industry. Miniaturizing microchips simultaneously 
allows increasing computing power and storage space. Therefore, the industry has certainly 
evolved along a technological trajectory that clearly defined the features of semiconductor de-
vices that need to be improved. Determining whether miniaturization is the result of consumer 
preferences or designers’ individual choices was beyond the scope of this work. Our goal was 
simply to analyse how the miniaturization technological trajectory has determined which design 
challenges needed to be addressed and how solutions were searched. Making microchips small-
er and smaller led to the emergence of a particular set of engineering problems, such as heat 
dispersion and deterioration in microchips. We showed how the search for solutions to these 
problems mostly followed established problem solving approaches except for a brief period in 
the mid-1990s coinciding with the entrance of latecomers. However, the miniaturization also 
allowed new products to emerge. These products introduced new design challenges. One exam-
ple of this is the application of light-emitting diodes (LCD) to displays. Ultimately new and better 
products (like flat screen televisions and monitors or small portable electronic devices) emerged 
because of miniaturization advances made possible by solving design challenges. We showed, in 
Chapter 3 and 4, how the structure of engineering problems and their ranking of importance 
evolved during this process because some players started devoting a larger share of inventive 
effort to searching solutions to these new challenges. These dynamics clearly show how product 
features, engineering design challenges and firms’ search for better approaches to tackle engi-
neering bottlenecks, co-evolve in a complex manner. It is precisely the process of searching 
across problem solving approaches that can lead to solutions that are able to expand the space of 
what is technically feasible. In particular, when solutions to engineering problems that are ubiq-
uitous across products are found, like those affecting the miniaturization of microchips, waves of 
new products can emerge. 
 Thirdly, the evolution of engineering design trajectories and technology domains can ex-
plain the emergence of catching-up pathways in an industry. Firms can apply different inventive 
strategies, which can be classified based on which engineering problems they try to tackle and in 
which way. Usually industries are characterized in the literature as relatively homogeneous enti-
ties that can be described by a single life cycle. This compresses information on the variety of 
technology domains that is present in a given industry. We showed that technology domains that 
are at different stages of their life-cycle co-exist in the Semiconductor industry. This implies that 
firms can choose among a variety of strategies, which may lead to different catching-up out-
  Conclusions 135 
comes. The strategy mix can be built around two dimensions. First, a firm has to decide which 
engineering challenges to tackle, i.e. in which technology domains she wants to focus on. Second, 
the firm needs to decide which explorative strategy to follow to navigate across the space of 
problem solving approaches. Expected payoff and their variance may differ according to the 
combination of strategies. For instance, one could focus on emerging domains while following a 
comparatively more conservative exploration strategy, or devote inventive effort to mature are-
as while pursuing new approaches to problem solving. We showed how successful catching-up 
firms evolved from a very risk-adverse strategy focused on relatively old technology domains 
and path-following problem solving to a riskier but potentially more rewarding comparative ad-
vantage in breakthrough technology domains, while still maintaining a relatively preference for 
conservative problem-solving approaches. However, this does not preclude the possibility that 
other strategies would have been effective. A more systematic study of the expected payoff and 
variance for each combination of strategies across industries is required to provide a sound and 
credible answer to this question. However, regardless of whether other strategies could have 
been equally viable and profitable, it is interesting to discuss why latecomers opted, at least ini-
tially, for a strategy mix based on devoting inventive effort to the then prevailing engineering 
challenges while following established problem-solving approaches and specializing in mature 
and renewing technology domains, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4. The common explanation that 
emerges from the literature (e.g. Lee and Lim, 2001) interprets following the path as a signal of 
progressive learning. However, there may be an alternative explanation, which emerged from an 
interview that the author has recently conducted to a former high-level technology development 
manager at Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing, Professor Lap Chan, from Singapore Uni-
versity of Technology and Design, who has three decades of working experience in the Semicon-
ductor industry, two of which in Singapore. A lot of the senior and junior managers in the newly 
established semiconductors firms in Singapore and Taiwan were people that had been trained in 
the US, as also confirmed by Chang and colleagues (1994) as well as Bell and Juma (2008). Many 
of them also worked for a significant period for top US companies. Therefore, they did not really 
need to learn from scratch. Initially local firms were not engaged in heavy patenting. However, 
as they started producing devices outsourced by US firms and using foreign developed manufac-
turing processes, they also started receiving the first requests of paying high licensing fees. This 
made them realize that, in order to survive, they needed to pile up patents as defensive weapons 
for cross-licensing agreements. This became a common strategy in the global Semiconductor 
industry, as discussed by Hall and Ziedonis (2001). To do that, they had to choose in which tech-
nology domains they needed to focus their inventive effort. The natural choice was to select the 
engineering challenges that were then prevailing in the industry, namely relatively mature do-
mains, as they provided better defensive value. Because many of the employees involved in the 
R&D process had been trained and worked in the US, the most obvious way of tackling such chal-
lenges was to apply the problem solving approaches that they were exposed to while in the 
States. This would explain why these firms were significant path-followers, focused on mature 
and renewing domains, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4. We can then speculate that the change in 
national and development context may have initially disconnected these inventors with the di-
rection of technical knowledge evolution in the industry. Furthermore, emerging domains may 
have been too risky, for newly founded firms in latecomer countries, that needed to quickly pile 
up patents for cross-licensing. This, could explain why these companies shifted their focus to 
emerging domains only later, at the beginning of the 2000s. Incidentally, it may also shed light 
on the apparently puzzling fact that, despite being specialized in manufacturing, foundries from 
Taiwan and Singapore are highly diversified across technology domains, including in areas that 
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are design-intensive, as shown in Chapter 5. In fact, if looked from this perspective, latecomer 
firms’ wide technical knowledge diversification may take a different meaning. In Chapter 5 we 
showed how early technical knowledge diversification is crucial for survival at the technological 
frontier. We provided three interpretations of this finding in the dissertation. First, knowledge 
diversification provides inventive risk sharing. Even for functionally specialized or mono-
product firms, being diversified at the technical knowledge level allows spreading the risk of 
knowledge obsolescence across domains. Second, it facilitates exploring in which domains the 
firm has a comparative advantage. Third, it provides absorptive capacity. Knowledge diversifica-
tion for firms specialized in manufacturing makes it easier to interact with many design part-
ners. However, as it emerged from the discussion with industry experts, there could be a fourth 
alternative explanation. Early technical knowledge diversification allowed latecomer companies 
in the Semiconductors to build up wide cross-licensing portfolio for defensive purposes. This 
strengthened their bargaining position when dealing with design partners operating in different 
technology domains. This last hypothesis is much less related to learning and has much more to 
do with incentives and competition. Further work is necessary to shed light on the theoretical 
implications of this counterintuitive finding.  
6.3 Policy and managerial implications 
 This thesis’ findings, theories and methods have a number of practical policy and manageri-
al implications. Understanding the structure of the system of engineering problems and describ-
ing the direction of evolution of engineering trajectories is of the outmost importance to design 
inventive strategies for firms, regions and countries that better fit with the evolution of the tech-
nology space. In particular, this dissertation has two types of policy and managerial implications. 
Firstly, we can now precisely quantify the impact of firms’ inventive strategies and of the innova-
tion output of geographic entities’ such as cities, regions and countries on future technology de-
velopments. Secondly, our analysis allows envisaging a range of strategic options that firms and 
geographic entities can choose to modify their location with respect to the prevailing engineer-
ing trajectories and their comparative advantage pattern across technology domains. 
 It is of great interest to firms and geographic entities to know their location on the main 
engineering trajectories and comparing their comparative advantage pattern with competitors. 
Our network analysis methods are able to measure firms’, cities’, regions’ and countries’ inven-
tions’ centrality on the main engineering design trajectories, assess the variety of problem-
solving approaches used within these entities and quantify their technological comparative ad-
vantage across technology domains that are in different life cycle stages. These are direct 
measures of how firms and geographic entities are performing in terms of technical capability 
building. They can also be used to identify competitors’ inventive strategies. It is worth mention-
ing that our study does not make any conclusion about which strategy ought to be followed. In 
particular, we have shown that being path-follower, rather than path-changer, or vice versa, 
does not predict the amount of further inventions that will connect to a given patent or to pa-
tents from a given entity above random expectations (as shown in Figure 45 in the Appendix 
A.3.2). This means that the future success of a given engineering trajectory does not depend on 
the centrality of the previous solutions.  
 However, even though being a path-follower and being specialized in mature and declining 
domains can be a viable strategy to exploit comparative advantage in the short run, it is reason-
able to state that it may endanger the ability of persist innovating at the frontier in the long run. 
Indeed, in Chapter 5, we have shown how knowledge diversification across domains provides 
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better survival chances as core innovator. Therefore, it becomes crucial to understand how in-
novators (be they firms or geographic entities) can turn to path-changers and upgrade their ad-
vantage to emerging technology domains. The first task is to identify emerging technology do-
mains and changes in engineering design trajectories. As we showed in this work, this can be 
done by looking at changes in the main paths of citations in a patent network and on clustering 
the invention space by similarity in approaches to problem-solving. Once emerging domains and 
trajectories have been detected, innovators then need to locate themselves in the space of engi-
neering solutions and find the direction to follow to build strength in the desired domain(s). The 
available options differ, depending on the unit of analysis. Suppose that a path-following firm 
wants to change the way its engineers tackle design problems and/or the very set of design chal-
lenges they focus on. Because learning is path-dependent it can be very difficult to make such 
turn by relying only on in-house researchers’ inventive effort. It may be more viable to hire ex-
ternal talents that have been exposed to different approaches to problem solving and/or work-
ing in different technology domains. If attracting such talents is unfeasible, reorganizing internal 
research teams may be more effective as a way to stimulate novel thinking, as shown by Uzzi et 
al. (2013). Access to a different pool of problem solving approaches may also be provided by ex-
ternal partnerships of different formal strength, ranging from alliances to mergers and acquisi-
tions. Being measured at the firm level, our path- and rank-changing indices, as well as the anal-
ysis of comparative advantage across technology domains, can provide managerial guidance in 
the process of identifying useful external sources of knowledge for partnerships, acquisitions 
and even hiring strategies. 
 Geographic entities have a similar set of strategic options to upgrade their comparative ad-
vantage to emerging domains and, if desired, to reposition themselves on more novel engineer-
ing design trajectories. External talents could be attracted with appropriate incentives or local 
talents can be sent for training purposes to other geographic areas that have expertise in emerg-
ing technology domains or new problem-solving approaches. Similarly, policies could be de-
signed to foster cross-boundary partnership among firms. The key goal of these policies should 
be to increase the variety of problem-solving approaches used within the given geographic area 
and make sure that the comparative advantage is not exclusively focused on mature and declin-
ing technology domains. Obviously, this is a much more difficult task for entities that have lim-
ited resources. In Chapter 5, we suggested how bridge formation and diversified specialization 
might facilitate achieving these goals. The former refers to the local or national government ac-
tion of investing in research projects or laboratories whose goal is the generation of knowledge 
at the crossroad between technology domains. This would create a path that local firms can fol-
low to move their specialization from one domain to a previously unrelated one. Diversified spe-
cialization is a different way of achieving risk sharing at the local or national level while keep 
having strongly specialized firms. As we discussed in Chapter 5 (see Appendix A.5.7), the data 
suggests that this was done in S.Korea and Taiwan, where, at least between 1990 and 2006, 
knowledge diversification at the national level was achieved through knowledge specialization 
at the firm level with narrow inter-firm knowledge overlap. 
 In the knowledge valorisation addendum reported at the end of the manuscript, we thor-
oughly discuss possible consulting service packages addressing policy makers’ and practitioners’ 
need to evaluate the impact of their inventive strategies and identify diversification pathways to 
emerging domains. 
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6.4 Research agenda 
 A very promising research agenda can be built starting from the theoretical framework de-
veloped in this thesis to analyse the co-evolution of technology and firms’ inventive strategies 
and the network analysis methods designed to empirically study this co-evolution. Such agenda 
is composed of three parts: causes, effects and prediction. First, in the thesis we have shown how 
to identify changes in engineering trajectories, ranking of design problems and trace the evolu-
tion of technology domains. It must be then understood which are the causes of these changes. 
Second, it is equally important to study the effects that such phenomena have on industrial dy-
namics and economic cycles. Third, if a sound understanding of these phenomena is achieved, it 
may be possible to predict upcoming changes in trajectory, the emergence of new technology 
domains and the decline of old ones. 
6.4.1 Causes 
 The indices that we developed in Chapter 3, allow measuring changes in the ranking of en-
gineering problems and the paths of problem-solving approaches, and identifying path- and 
ranking-changers. Once we identified who path- and ranking-changers are, we can then look for 
predictors of their strategic behaviour. In other words, we can investigate if firms falling within 
these categories have a common profile that can explain their strategic choices. We have already 
shown how firm size, measured by number of patents, is not a good predictor of their inventive 
strategies (as reported in Figure 45 in the Appendix A.3.2). One possible candidate is the firm’s 
age and its relative performance compared to competitors. Spinoffs and firms that are less suc-
cessful might have more incentives to explore new paths. An alternative explanation of path-
changing and rank-changing behaviour may be provided by the previous working experience 
and social network of a firm’s research workforce. Learning is path-dependent and tacit 
knowledge is sticky. Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the way firms tackle engi-
neering challenges depend on what type of problem-solving approaches their researchers have 
been exposed to during their career, either personally or by social influence from their close 
peers. The availability of harmonized inventors and firms identification numbers (Li et al., 2014) 
now makes it possible to pursue this line of research. 
6.4.2 Effects 
Changes in the allocation of inventive effort across engineering problems and in the way firms 
tackle them can have wider consequences on industrial and economic dynamics. Evolutionary 
economic theory predicts that large waves of firm entry can be observed when there are changes 
in the technological regime of an industry (Klepper, 1997 and 1996; Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1997). Similarly, one possible line of research could seek to assess whether technology domains 
that witness a change in their engineering design trajectory also attract more innovators. A fur-
ther study could focus on investigating how the stability of the ranking of innovators in a given 
domain is affected by changes in the set of engineering challenges and in the problem solving 
approaches followed to tackle them. 
 We have also highlighted how the structure, topology and evolution of the system of tech-
nology domains, are important determinants of firms’ innovative survival. Furthermore, we 
showed how new entrants, in general, tend to have a comparative advantage in emerging tech-
nology domains, but latecomers tend to initially specialize in following established paths in rela-
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tive more mature technologies. This suggests the importance of analysing how technological 
change propagates. The availability of patent data, coupled with advances in network analysis 
technique, text mining, latent semantic analysis and computational power, allow envisaging 
ways to disentangle the system of engineering problems and study change propagation across 
technology domains. This can potentially explain clustering of big innovations in time and the 
formation of economic cycles. 
 Finally, the ability to identify firms’ inventive strategies opens the door to the possibility of 
studying how the expected payoffs are related to the external context. For instance, the tech-
nique described in Chapter 4, to identify the life cycle stage of technology domains, can be used 
to investigate whether the type of diversification strategies that provides better chances to be 
successful is affected by the stage of development of a technology domain, or how life cycles of 
related domains affect each other’s fate.  
6.4.3 Predictions 
A common criticism that economists hear from the public is the poor predicting performance of 
many economic theories, especially when abrupt economic change occur. Therefore, an obvious 
line of research that could follow up this thesis work addresses the possibility of developing a 
predicting model of changes in the structure and ranking of the system of engineering problems 
and in the engineering design trajectories followed in an industry. The first two parts of the re-
search agenda focused on describing studies that can potentially improve our understanding of 
what causes changes in engineering trajectory and in the space of technology domains and 
which effect these changes have on industrial and economic dynamics. Reaching a sound under-
standing of causes and effects of technical change would allow us to design studies that would 
seek to identify early signals of changes in engineering trajectories and in the relative im-
portance of engineering problems and predict their effects. For instance, if one has identified 
which factors affect firms’ decision to allocate inventive effort to new design challenges or to 
start exploring alternative paths to search for design solutions, it becomes possible to estimate 
the probability that these phenomena will happen. In addition, knowledge of the effects that 
these phenomena have on industrial and economic dynamics can help to associate probabilities 
of occurrence for other events, such as industry shakeouts, or to predict rates of performance 
improvements for different technologies, given the characteristics of their engineering design 
trajectory. 
 
 The technical feasibility of pursuing this rich and ambitious research agenda makes us op-
timistic about the existence of something that eminent scholars described as the PhD afterlife.  
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
A.2.1 Normalization of the number of between-firms, within-country citations by 
randomizing citation networks 
To assess the extent to which patenting organizations are building upon foreign or locally in-
vented technologies we need to have an expectation of the number of citations that falls between 
countries and one of the number of within-country citations. One way of building an expectation 
for these values is to shuffle citations randomly and then compute the expected value and stand-
ard deviation of the number of inter- and intra-country citations. When doing so it is crucial to 
create random realizations of the system that are plausible given what we observe in the real 
world. There are a number of phenomena that must be preserved in the randomized networks. 
First, the distribution of citations made and received by patents are strongly skewed (most of 
their cumulative distribution function follows a power-law). Second, the probability of receiving 
a citation is a function of the age of the patent. Inventions needs time to be recognized and old 
inventions are usually considered obsolete. Therefore, the probability of receiving a citation ini-
tially increase with age, pick at around 4 years and then rapidly decrease, as shown by Jaffe and 
Trajetenberg (2002) and Hall et al. (2001). Finally, patenting organizations have a markedly 
tendency to cite their previous patents. This is because learning is path-dependent and many 
technical improvements are incremental in nature. Consequently, firms tend to improve upon 
technical solutions that they have developed in the past. Therefore, to generate plausible ran-
dom realization of the real world, the randomization process must reproduce the in- and out-
degree distributions, the typical aging function of citations and the share of self-citations. The 
easier way of doing so is to swap inter-firm citations for each citing-cited year pair. For each cit-
ing-cited year pair our algorithm swap all inter-firm citations. This preserves both the in- and 
out-degree of each patent (and therefore their distribution) and the lag between the citing and 
the cited grant year of each citation. The number of inter-firm between-country citations and its 
counterpart for within-country citations then becomes random variables. If we repeat the pro-
cess 1000 times we obtain a mean and a standard deviation for these statistics. The mean ap-
proximate their true expected value. We can then compute the z-scores for the number of inter-
firm between- and within-country citations reported in Chapter 2.  Note that, under certain con-
ditions the expected value and the standard deviation can be predicted by the sum of hypergeo-
metric random variables. This is discussed in details in another paper of the same author of this 
thesis (Alstott et al., 2015).  
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A.2.2 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of the probability of citing a 
patent as a function of its age by citing country 
 
Figure 38: Empirical cumulative distribution functions of the probability of citing 
a patent as a function of its age by citing country. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
A.3.1 Visual analysis of the main component of the Network of Main Paths 
We inspect the composition of the main component of the NMPs, by plotting its visual appear-
ance for each of the six periods considered. These graphs are reported in figures from Figure 30 
to Figure 44. Table 29 reports the legend of nodes’ colour, shape and size, to help interpreting 
the graphs. We can group the insights provided by the visual analysis of the NMPs along two 
themes: technological classes and countries. If we look at shapes of the nodes we can notice that 
patents belonging to class 438 (process innovation) have always been the majority, especially 
among the highly connected nodes (those bigger in size). However, from 1976-1995 they virtu-
ally overthrown other classes, except for a few largely connected US and Japanese patents as-
signed to class 257 (product innovation), which show up in the main component of the NMPs in 
periods 1976-2000 and 1976-2006. This reveals an increasing innovative effort devoted to en-
gineering problems related to process innovation. Indeed, in the first three periods, it was still 
possible to find well connected patents related to product innovation (class 257). Furthermore, 
in periods 1976-1985 and 1976-1990, there were also areas of the network of main paths al-
most entirely populated by patents belonging to class 326. These areas almost disappear from 
the main component of the NMPs in the last three periods. The second important insight comes 
from comparing location of assignees from different countries. The NMPs in the first three peri-
ods is dominated by US and Japanese patents, with the presence of a few patents granted to 
German assignees. In the period 1976-1995 the reader can notice the appearance of many red 
nodes (standing for Taiwanese assignees), and a few lilac ones (South Korean assignees) located 
in crucial parts of the network (on the backbone and in the key junctions). This becomes much 
more visible in the period 1976-2000, when the size of Taiwanese and Korean patents increases, 
revealing an increased centrality of their technological solutions. Interestingly, in the final peri-
od 1976-2006, US patents seem to regain the lead in terms of centrality.  
 
Table 29: Legend of nodes' colour, shape and size 
Colour Assignee’s country Shape U.S. main technology class 
Blue U.S.A. Circle 438 – Process 
Green Japan Square 257 – Product 
Yellow Germany Up-triangle 326 - Programmability 
Cyan Italy and France Diamond 716 - Design 
Purple S.Korea Down-triangle 505 – Material 
Red Taiwan Size Proportional to PathC Index 
Black Singapore   
Orange Netherlands   
Grey No assignee   
Brown Others   
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Figure 39: Main component of the NMPs 1976-1980 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Main component of the NMPs 1976-1985 
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Figure 41: Main component of the NMPs 1976-1990 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Main component of the NMPs 1976-1995 
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Figure 43: Main component of the NMPs 1976-2000 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: Main component of the NMPs 1976-2006 
 
  
 156 Appendices 
A.3.2  Statistical analysis of the relationship between PFI, POP, PathC and patent 
count 
We report here the statistical analysis of the relationship between the path-following (PFI) and 
the power-of-pull (POP) indices. We also show how the bootstrapping technique used to clean 
the POP, PFI and Path-centrality (PathC) indices from firm size effects, effectively reveals the 
lack of a true relationship between firms size and innovation strategies. 
 No curve could be meaningfully fitted on the data (the R2 for the best fit was on average 
0.1). The solid line indicates the mean of the y variable for each bin of the x variable. Dashed 
lines are drown above and below two standard deviations from the mean. When the variable on 
the horizontal axis was patent count, logarithmic binning was used to reduce noise due to scarci-
ty of observations in the right tail of the distribution. 
 
 
Figure 45: Statistical relationship between PFI, POP, PathC indices and firms' patent count 
 
 
 
  Appendices 157 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
A.4.1  Alternative beginning and end of the archetypal life-cycle of technology 
domains 
 
Figure 46: Archetypal life-cycle of a given technology domain with resistance to decline 
 
 
Figure 47: Archetypal life-cycle of a given technology domain starting with a disruption 
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A.4.2 Plots of the main component of the network of main paths (NMPs) 
 
 
Figure 48: The space of technology domains between 1976 and 1980 
 
 
 
Figure 49: The space of technology domains between 1976 and 1985 
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Figure 50: The space of technology domains between 1976 and 1990 
 
 
 
Figure 51: The space of technology domains between 1976 and 1995 
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Figure 52: The space of technology domains between 1976 and 2000 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53: The space of technology domains between 1976 and 2006 
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A.4.3  Newman’s community detection algorithm 
To identify technology domains we used Newman’s algorithm (Newman, 2004). The algorithm 
maximizes modularity Q, which is defined as follows: 
𝑄 =  ∑(𝑒𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖
2)
𝑖
 (A.4.1) 
Where eii is the fraction of edges falling within community i and ai2 is equal to the squared sum 
of edges falling between communities, as  𝑎𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑗 . Newman (2004) explains that modularity Q 
can be also calculated as the fraction of edges that fall within communities, minus the expected 
value of the same quantity if edges fall at random without regard for the community structure. 
The author highlights that if a particular division gives no more within-community edges than 
would be expected by random chance modularity Q would be equal to zero. This approach al-
lows optimizing modularity Q without the need to try all possible partition combinations (which 
would take an amount of time exponential to the number of nodes in the network). The optimi-
zation approach starts from the worse possible combination. It then begins an iterative aggrega-
tion process that stops when the increase of modularity becomes negative. Obviously, as ex-
plained by Newman (2004), since the joining of a pair of communities between which there are 
no edges at all can never result in an increase in Q, one needs only consider those pairs between 
which there are edges. Then the change in Q upon joining two communities is given by: 
∆𝑄 =  𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗𝑖 −  2𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 = 2 (𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗) (A.4.2) 
One possible drawback of Newman’s algorithm is that it is not specifically thought for citations 
network, which have the peculiarity to be acyclical directed graphs. Yet, symmetrizing the adja-
cency matrix makes citations a univocal measure of relatedness from patent to patent. This al-
lows using the algorithm. The second possible limitation consists in the fact that a real-world 
citation networks are sparser than the random counterparts that are used as benchmark to max-
imize modularity. This is due to the well-known shape of the distribution of citation-lags for pa-
tent networks. Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) showed that citations received by the average pa-
tent peaks after 3-4 years and then sharply decline. This is because constant streams of technical 
improvements make older patents irrelevant for the legal definition of the prior-art. Potentially 
this bias can identify communities on the network purely based on their age structure of patent 
citations, without considering the true relationship of similarity that might exist with older pa-
tents. To assess the strength of this bias we analysed the age structure of the communities (i.e. 
technology domains) identified by the algorithm. Results are shown in Figure 54.  The domains’ 
density of patents for each time cohort is shown by mean of a density plot where darker colours 
represent higher density. We can clearly see that a few domains that are time dependent are vis-
ible only in the last period. Since there are few examples we cannot discard the possibility that 
these domains are indeed declining, i.e. their underlying engineering problems failed to attract 
further attention. The fact that age dependent communities are very rare proves that the poten-
tial bias in the algorithm does not affect the quality and validity of our results.  
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Figure 54: Age structure of technology domains 
A.4.4 Anderson-Darling test results 
In this section, we report the results of the non-parametric two-sample Anderson-Darling test 
for statistical difference. 
Andersen-Darling test Ninc Nnew Test result p-value 
Breakthrough 201 213 H1:Fnew(SRTA) ≠ Finc(SRTA) 0.0000 
Disruptive 381 368 H1:Fnew(SRTA) ≠ Finc(SRTA) 0.0039 
Early growth 266 287 H1:Fnew(SRTA) ≠ Finc(SRTA) 0.0000 
Mature 381 368 H1:Fnew(SRTA) ≠ Finc(SRTA) 0.0000 
Renewing 336 314 H1:Fnew(SRTA) ≠ Finc(SRTA) 0.0000 
Exhausting 336 314 H0: Fnew(SRTA) = Finc(SRTA) 0.8460 
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A.4.5  Topic analysis of the main technology domains of the Semiconductor 
Industry between 2001 and 2006 
In this section, we report the title of the most central patents within each technology domain 
identified by the Newman’s modularity maximization algorithm. 
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Table 30: Topic analysis of the main technology domains of the Semiconductor industry between 2001 and 2006 
Patent grant 
year 
Cluster LC stage NMP 
comp 
PathC Title Assignee 
6451641 2002 3 Exhausting 1 13.40 Non-reducing process for deposition of polysilicon gate electrode over high-K gate dielectric material AMD 
6297539 2001 3 Exhausting 1 2.49 Zicronium or hafnium oxide doped with calcium, strontium, aluminum, lanthanum, yttrium, or scandium SHARP 
6407435 2002 3 Exhausting 1 2.16 Because the layers reduce the effects of crystalline structures within individual layers, the overall tunneling 
current is reduced.  
SHARP 
6207589 2001 3 Exhausting 1 0.20 Method of forming a doped metal oxide dielectric film  SHARP 
6297107 2001 6 Exhausting 1 12.96 High dielectric constant materials as gate dielectrics  AMD 
6200865 2001 6 Exhausting 1 7.57 Use of sacrificial dielectric structure to form semiconductor device with a self-aligned threshold adjust and 
overlying low-resistance gate  
AMD 
6391785 2002 7 Mature 1 1.85 Method for bottomless deposition of barrier layers in integrated circuit metallization schemes  ASM/IMEC 
6184128 2001 7 Mature 1 2.61 Method using a thin resist mask for dual damascene stop layer etch  AMD 
6468924 2002 7 Mature 1 0.73 Methods of forming thin films by atomic layer deposition SAMSUNG 
6750066 2004 7 Mature 1 2.32 Precision high-K intergate dielectric layer  AMD 
6534395 2003 7 Mature 1 0.83 Method of forming graded thin films using alternating pulses of vapor phase reactants  ASM 
6424001 2002 9 Renewing 1 1.34 Flash memory with ultra thin vertical body transistors MICRON 
6639268 2003 9 Renewing 1 0.61 Flash memory with ultra thin vertical body transistors  MICRON 
6680508 2004 9 Renewing 1 1.36 Vertical floating gate transistor  MICRON 
6903367 2005 9 Renewing 1 0.32 Programmable memory address and decode circuits with vertical body transistors  MICRON 
6979857 2005 9 Renewing 1 0.32 Apparatus and method for split gate NROM memory MICRON 
6303523 2001 11 Exhausting 1 1.02 Plasma processes for depositing low dielectric constant films APPLIED MATERIALS 
6410462 2002 11 Exhausting 1 0.57 Method of making low-K carbon doped silicon oxide SHARP 
6287990 2001 11 Exhausting 1 0.90 CVD plasma assisted low dielectric constant films APPLIED MATERIALS 
6534397 2003 12 Disruptive 1 1.65 Pre-treatment of low-k dielectric for prevention of photoresist poisoning  AMD 
6656837 2003 12 Disruptive 1 1.78 Method of eliminating photoresist poisoning in damascene applications  APPLIED MATERIALS 
6406994 2002 12 Disruptive 1 1.79 Triple-layered low dielectric constant dielectric dual damascene approach  CHARTERED 
6593247 2003 12 Disruptive 1 0.87 Method of depositing low k films using an oxidizing plasma  APPLIED MATERIALS 
6784119 2004 12 Disruptive 1 0.37 Method of decreasing the K value in SIOC layer deposited by chemical vapor deposition APPLIED MATERIALS 
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Patent grant 
year 
Cluster LC stage NMP 
comp 
PathC Title Assignee 
6979855 2005 15 Renewing 1 8.45 High-quality praseodymium gate dielectrics MICRON 
7045430 2006 15 Renewing 1 3.68 Atomic layer-deposited LaAlO3 films for gate dielectrics  MICRON 
6767795 2004 15 Renewing 1 6.70 Highly reliable amorphous high-k gate dielectric ZrOXNY  MICRON 
6921702 2005 15 Renewing 1 5.47 Atomic layer deposited nanolaminates of HfO2/ZrO2 films as gate dielectrics MICRON 
6660657 2003 15 Renewing 1 0.68 Methods of incorporating nitrogen into silicon-oxide-containing layers MICRON 
6429061 2002 16 Renewing 2 5.66 Complimentary metal oxide semiconductor (cmos); producing higher perfomance device; forming a relaxed 
silicon germanium layer with isolation and well implant regions  
IBM 
6291845 2001 16 Renewing 2 1.87 Fully-dielectric-isolated FET technology  STMICROELECTRONICS 
6841457 2005 16 Renewing 2 1.42 Use of hydrogen implantation to improve material properties of silicon-germanium-on-insulator material made 
by thermal diffusion  
IBM 
6724008 2004 16 Renewing 2 1.07 Relaxed silicon germanium platform for high speed CMOS electronics and high speed analog circuits  AMBERWAVE 
6713326 2004 16 Renewing 2 0.91 Process for producing semiconductor article using graded epitaxial growth  MIT 
6524920 2003 17 Exhausting 2 22.14 Low temperature process for a transistor with elevated source and drain  AMD INC 
6300201 2001 17 Exhausting 2 6.20 Method to form a high K dielectric gate insulator layer, a metal gate structure, and self-aligned channel regions, 
post source/drain formation  
CHARTERED 
6194748 2001 17 Exhausting 2 4.46 MOSFET with suppressed gate-edge fringing field effect  AMD INC 
6171910 2001 17 Exhausting 2 2.81 Method for forming a semiconductor device  MOTOROLA 
6380043 2002 17 Exhausting 2 1.71 Low temperature process to form elevated drain and source of a field effect transistor having high-K gate 
dielectric  
AMD INC 
6933525 2005 18 Breakthrough 2 1.12 Display device and manufacturing method of the same  HITACHI 
7084428 2006 18 Breakthrough 2 0.88 Transistor, integrated circuit, electro-optic device, electronic instrument and method of manufacturing a 
transistor  
SEIKO EPSON CORP 
6218219 2001 18 Breakthrough 2 0.60 Semiconductor device and fabrication method thereof  S.E.L 
6407431 2002 18 Breakthrough 2 0.48 Semiconductor device and fabrication method thereof  S.E.L 
6762468 2004 18 Breakthrough 2 0.21 Semiconductor device and method of manufacturing the same  TOSHIBA 
6251738 2001 19 Exhausting 2 0.92 Process for forming a silicon-germanium base of heterojunction bipolar transistor  IBM 
6521502 2003 20 Renewing 2 12.74 Solid phase epitaxy activation process for source/drain junction extensions and halo regions  AMD INC 
6365476 2002 20 Renewing 2 8.07 Laser thermal process for fabricating field-effect transistors  ULTRATECH STEPPER 
 166 Appendices 
Patent grant 
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comp 
PathC Title Assignee 
6660605 2003 20 Renewing 2 6.72 Method to fabricate optimal HDD with dual diffusion process to optimize transistor drive current junction 
capacitance, tunneling current and channel dopant loss  
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 
6225173 2001 20 Renewing 2 5.80 Recessed channel structure for manufacturing shallow source/drain extensions AMD INC 
6218250 2001 20 Renewing 2 5.41 Method and apparatus for minimizing parasitic resistance of semiconductor devices  AMD INC 
6440793 2002 21 Disruptive 2 6.47 Vertical MOSFET  IBM 
6261894 2001 21 Disruptive 2 3.63 Method for forming dual workfunction high-performance support MOSFETs in EDRAM arrays  IBM 
6964897 2005 21 Disruptive 2 2.28 SOI trench capacitor cell incorporating a low-leakage floating body array transistor  IBM 
7122840 2006 21 Disruptive 2 1.23 Image sensor with optical guard ring and fabrication method thereof  TSMC 
7098146 2006 21 Disruptive 2 1.11 Semiconductor device having patterned SOI structure and method for fabricating the same  TOSHIBA 
6703648 2004 22 Disruptive 2 18.24 Strained silicon PMOS having silicon germanium source/drain extensions and method for its fabrication  AMD INC 
6743684 2004 22 Disruptive 2 14.29 Method to produce localized halo for MOS transistor  TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 
6881632 2005 22 Disruptive 2 10.56 Method of fabricating CMOS inverter and integrated circuits utilizing strained surface channel MOSFETS  AMBERWAVE 
7074623 2006 22 Disruptive 2 8.70 Methods of forming strained-semiconductor-on-insulator finFET device structures  AMBERWAVE 
7122449 2006 22 Disruptive 2 7.24 Methods of fabricating semiconductor structures having epitaxially grown source and drain elements  AMBERWAVE 
6190977 2001 24 Exhausting 2 28.94 Method for forming MOSFET with an elevated source/drain  TEXAS INSTRUMENTS - 
ACER 
6303450 2001 24 Exhausting 2 8.48 CMOS device structures and method of making same  IBM 
6284657 2001 25 Mature 2 1.52 Non-metallic barrier formation for copper damascene type interconnects  CHARTERED 
7122442 2006 25 Mature 2 0.47 Method and system for dopant containment  TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 
6611045 2003 25 Mature 2 0.17 Method of forming an integrated circuit device using dummy features and structure thereof  MOTOROLA 
6642579 2003 25 Mature 2 0.16 Method of reducing the extrinsic body resistance in a silicon-on-insulator body contacted MOSFET  IBM 
6864155 2005 25 Mature 2 0.14 Methods of forming silicon-on-insulator comprising integrated circuitry, and wafer bonding methods of forming 
silicon-on-insulator comprising integrated circuitry 
MICRON 
6555839 2003 26 Renewing 2 1.43 Buried channel strained silicon FET using a supply layer created through ion implantation  AMBERWAVE 
6350993 2002 26 Renewing 2 0.41 High speed composite p-channel Si/SiGe heterostructure for field effect devices  IBM 
6207977 2001 26 Renewing 2 0.04 Vertical MISFET devices  IMEC 
6204126 2001 27 Exhausting 2 2.52 Method to fabricate a new structure with multi-self-aligned for split-gate flash  TSMC 
6573126 2003 28 Renewing 2 0.81 Process for producing semiconductor article using graded epitaxial growth  MIT 
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6323108 2001 28 Renewing 2 0.24 Fabrication ultra-thin bonded semiconductor layers US NAVY 
6261929 2001 28 Renewing 2 0.23 Methods of forming a plurality of semiconductor layers using spaced trench arrays  NORTHCAR. ST. UNI. 
6191007 2001 28 Renewing 2 0.12 Method for manufacturing a semiconductor substrate  DENSO CORP LTD 
6235567 2001 28 Renewing 2 0.06 Silicon-germanium bicmos on soi  IBM 
6413802 2002 29 Disruptive 2 29.61 Finfet transistor structures having a double gate channel extending vertically from a substrate and methods of 
manufacture  
UNIV OF CALIFORNIA 
6214670 2001 29 Disruptive 2 18.48 Method for manufacturing short-channel, metal-gate CMOS devices with superior hot carrier performance  TSMC 
6686231 2004 29 Disruptive 2 13.00 Damascene gate process with sacrificial oxide in semiconductor devices  AMD INC 
7084018 2006 29 Disruptive 2 10.55 Sacrificial oxide for minimizing box undercut in damascene FinFET  AMD INC 
6962843 2005 29 Disruptive 2 8.79 Method of fabricating a finfet  IBM 
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A.4.6  SRTA tables at the firm level 
In this section we report the SRTA values calculated for a selection of firms from the US, Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. To keep the analysis short we do that only for the last three peri-
ods. Tables from Table 31 to Table 38 reports the SRTA values for the main US, Japanese, Tai-
wanese, Korean and Singaporean players over time. We highlight values of the SRTA greater 
than 0.2 in bold. Firms are distinguished between new and incumbent innovators and also based 
on their business area (IDM=Integrated Device Manufacturer, GRO=Government Research Or-
ganization, NGRO=Non-Governmental Research Organization, Equipm.=Equipment supplier). 
The tables confirm comparative technological advantage patterns as discussed in Section 4.5.2. 
However, they provide further details for those interested to track specialization trends for par-
ticular firms or research institutes.  
 
Table 31: SRTA for the top Taiwanese, Korean and Singaporean firms (1991-1995) 
Company New Inn vs Inc Type #Patents Disruptive Early growth Mature Renewing Exhausting 
UMC (TW) New innovator Foundry 31 -0,477 0,230 -0,087 0,597 0,597 
SAMSUNG (KR) Incumbent IDM 8 0,046 0,300 -0,365 -1,000 -1,000 
TITRI (TW) Incumbent GRO 7 0,112 -0,171 -0,306 0,490 -1,000 
HYUNDAI ELEC. (KR) New innovator IDM 7 -0,523 0,359 -0,306 0,708 -1,000 
LG ELEC. (KR) New innovator IDM 7 -0,230 -0,171 0,360 -1,000 -1,000 
TSMC (TW) New innovator Foundry 6 -0,155 0,245 0,107 -1,000 -1,000 
CHARTERED (SG) New innovator Foundry 4 -1,000 0,664 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
KETRI (KR) Incumbent GRO 3 0,188 -1,000 0,107 -1,000 -1,000 
WINBOND (TW) New innovator IDM 2 -1,000 -1,000 0,576 -1,000 -1,000 
 
Table 32: SRTA for the top US and Japanese players (1991-1995) 
Company New Inn vs Inc Type #Patents Disruptive Early growth Mature Renewing Exhausting 
TEXAS INSTR. (US) Incumbent IDM 39 -0,053 -0,223 0,177 -0,312 0,355 
MOTOROLA (US) Incumbent IDM 38 -0,040 -0,211 -0,010 0,235 0,623 
MICRON (US) New innovator IDM 38 0,096 0,132 -0,546 0,235 0,037 
IBM (US) Incumbent IDM 35 0,159 -0,005 -0,221 -1,000 -1,000 
MITSUBISHI (JP) Incumbent IDM 33 -0,073 -0,052 0,189 -0,234 -1,000 
TOSHIBA (JP) Incumbent IDM 33 -0,202 -0,538 0,340 0,301 -1,000 
NEC (JP) Incumbent IDM 22 -0,335 -0,052 0,375 -1,000 -1,000 
AT&T (US) Incumbent IDM 17 0,016 0,186 -0,207 0,093 -1,000 
SONY CORP (JP) Incumbent IDM 17 -0,051 -0,264 0,273 -1,000 -1,000 
FUJITSU (JP) Incumbent IDM 13 0,083 -0,135 -0,076 0,223 -1,000 
HITACHI (JP) Incumbent Equipm. 11 0,089 -0,052 0,007 -1,000 -1,000 
NATIONAL SEMICOND. 
(US) 
Incumbent IDM 11 -0,002 -1,000 0,340 -1,000 -1,000 
HARRIS (US) Incumbent User 7 0,374 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
LSI LOGIC (US) Incumbent Fabless 7 0,305 -0,171 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
APPLIED MATERIALS 
(US) 
Incumbent Equipm. 6 0,188 0,245 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
HUGHES (US) Incumbent User 6 -0,465 -1,000 0,425 0,547 -1,000 
MATSUSHITA (JP) Incumbent IDM 6 -0,465 0,245 0,107 -1,000 0,744 
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Company New Inn vs Inc Type #Patents Disruptive Early growth Mature Renewing Exhausting 
OKI ELECTRIC (JP) Incumbent IDM 6 -1,000 0,245 0,425 -1,000 -1,000 
SHARP (JP) Incumbent IDM 6 0,046 -0,096 -0,234 0,547 -1,000 
SIEMENS (DE) Incumbent IDM 6 0,046 -0,096 0,107 -1,000 -1,000 
HONEYWELL (US) Incumbent IDM 5 0,274 -0,005 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
SEIKO EPSON (JP) Incumbent IDM 5 -0,390 0,597 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
SEMICOND. ENERGY 
(JP) 
Incumbent NGRO 5 -0,065 0,329 -0,147 -1,000 -1,000 
 
Table 33: SRTA for the top Taiwanese, Korean and Singaporean players (1996-2000) 
Company New Inn vs 
Inc 
Type #Patents Break-
through 
Disruptive Early  
growth 
Mature Renewing Exhausting 
TSMC (TW) Incumbent Foundry 92 -0,429 -0,310 -0,018 0,004 0,361 -1,000 
UMC (TW) Incumbent Foundry 77 -0,725 -0,653 0,089 -0,248 0,101 0,748 
SAMSUNG (KR) Incumbent IDM 31 -0,117 -1,000 0,029 0,636 -0,033 -1,000 
CHARTERED (SG) Incumbent Foundry 29 -0,224 -0,284 -0,151 0,231 0,385 0,804 
VANGUARD (TW) New 
innovator 
Foundry 25 -1,000 -1,000 0,160 -1,000 0,075 -1,000 
LG ELEC. (KR) Incumbent IDM 21 0,187 -0,130 -0,122 0,377 0,161 -1,000 
HYUNDAI ELEC. (KR) Incumbent IDM 17 -0,470 -1,000 0,184 -1,000 -0,402 -1,000 
ACER (TW) New 
innovator 
IDM 13 -1,000 0,426 0,065 -1,000 0,055 -1,000 
TITRI (TW) Incumbent GRO 9 -0,190 -1,000 -0,045 -1,000 0,415 -1,000 
MOSEL VITELIC (TW) New 
innovator 
IDM 6 0,011 -1,000 -0,098 -1,000 0,415 -1,000 
WINBOND (TW) Incumbent IDM 5 0,102 -1,000 -0,007 -1,000 0,184 -1,000 
 
Table 34: SRTA for the top US and Japanese players (1996-2000) 
Company New Inn vs 
Inc 
Type #Patents Break-
through 
Disruptive Early  
growth 
Mature Renewing Exhausting 
AMD (US) Incumbent IDM 93 -0,117 -0,704 0,029 0,332 0,111 -1,000 
MICRON (US) Incumbent IDM 66 0,011 -0,606 0,068 0,169 -0,205 -1,000 
NEC (JP) Incumbent IDM 49 0,239 -0,504 -0,031 -0,027 -0,059 -1,000 
IBM (US) Incumbent IDM 37 0,140 -0,392 0,053 0,113 -0,436 -1,000 
TEXAS INSTR. (US) Incumbent IDM 36 -0,190 -1,000 0,086 0,126 0,004 -1,000 
MOTOROLA (US) Incumbent IDM 35 0,102 -1,000 -0,007 0,598 -0,093 -1,000 
TOSHIBA (JP) Incumbent IDM 25 -0,010 -1,000 0,084 -1,000 -0,069 -1,000 
MITSUBISHI (JP) Incumbent IDM 21 0,078 -1,000 0,046 -1,000 0,018 -1,000 
MATSUSHITA (JP) Incumbent IDM 18 0,463 -1,000 -0,098 0,441 -1,000 -1,000 
NATIONAL SEMICOND. 
(US) 
Incumbent IDM 17 0,433 -1,000 -0,128 -1,000 -0,079 -1,000 
LSI LOGIC (US) Incumbent Fabless 16 -1,000 -1,000 0,244 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
SHARP (JP) Incumbent IDM 15 0,241 -1,000 -0,007 -1,000 -0,016 -1,000 
INTEL (US) Incumbent IDM 12 0,343 -1,000 -0,292 -1,000 0,415 -1,000 
LUCENT (US) New 
innovator 
User 12 -1,000 -1,000 0,202 -1,000 -0,246 -1,000 
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Company New Inn vs 
Inc 
Type #Patents Break-
through 
Disruptive Early  
growth 
Mature Renewing Exhausting 
SONY CORP (JP) Incumbent IDM 11 0,252 -1,000 0,023 0,617 -1,000 -1,000 
HITACHI (JP) Incumbent Equipm. 10 -0,240 0,236 0,070 -1,000 -0,159 -1,000 
VLSI TECH (US) Incumbent IDM 9 0,154 -1,000 0,046 -1,000 -0,107 -1,000 
SEMICOND. ENERGY (JP) Incumbent NGRO 7 -1,000 -1,000 0,244 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
YAMAHA (JP) Incumbent IDM 7 -0,066 -1,000 -0,031 -1,000 0,349 -1,000 
SIEMENS (DE) Incumbent IDM 6 0,508 0,459 -0,570 0,771 -1,000 -1,000 
APPLIED MATERIALS (US) Incumbent Equipm. 5 0,421 -1,000 -0,007 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
UNIV CALIFORNIA (US) Incumbent University 5 -1,000 0,528 -0,007 -1,000 0,184 -1,000 
SANYO ELECTRIC (JP) Incumbent IDM 5 0,102 0,732 -0,207 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
AMERICAN 
SUPERCOND.(US) 
New 
innovator 
User 5 -1,000 0,883 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
FOVEONICS (US) New 
innovator 
User 5 -1,000 -1,000 0,244 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
 
Table 35: SRTA for the top Taiwanese, Korean and Singaporean players 
(2001-2006 - Main component of  the network of main paths) 
Company New Inn vs Inc Type #Patents Disruptive Mature Renewing Exhausting 
TSMC (TW) Incumbent Foundry 13 0,196 0,397 -0,165 -1,000 
SAMSUNG (KR) Incumbent IDM 9 -1,000 0,540 0,095 -1,000 
CHARTERED (SG) Incumbent Foundry 4 -0,017 0,580 -0,125 -1,000 
UMC (TW) Incumbent Foundry 4 0,318 -1,000 -0,125 -1,000 
HYUNDAI ELEC. (KR) Incumbent IDM 3 -1,000 -1,000 0,217 -1,000 
VANGUARD (TW) Incumbent Foundry 1 0,589 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
HYNIX (KR) New innovator IDM 1 -1,000 -1,000 0,217 -1,000 
 
Table 36: SRTA for the top US and Japanese players 
(2001-2006 - Main component of the network of main paths) 
Company New Inn vs Inc Type #Patents Disruptive Mature Renewing Exhausting 
MICRON (US) Incumbent IDM 75 -0,276 -0,666 0,133 -1,000 
AMD (US) Incumbent IDM 31 -0,068 0,489 -0,141 0,509 
IBM (US) Incumbent IDM 22 -0,175 0,345 0,029 -1,000 
APPLIED MATERIALS (US) Incumbent Equipm. 17 0,494 -1,000 -0,691 0,578 
TEXAS INSTR. (US) Incumbent IDM 15 0,015 -1,000 0,065 -1,000 
MOTOROLA (US) Incumbent IDM 14 -0,567 0,036 0,142 -1,000 
SHARP (JP) Incumbent IDM 11 -1,000 -1,000 -0,005 0,841 
INFINEON (DE) Incumbent IDM 4 -0,017 -1,000 0,077 -1,000 
NOVELIUS SYSTEMS (US) New innovator Equipm. 4 0,487 -1,000 -0,440 -1,000 
LAM (US) Incumbent Equipm. 3 0,589 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
MATSUSHITA (JP) Incumbent IDM 3 0,126 -1,000 0,018 -1,000 
GENUS (US) New innovator Equipm. 3 -1,000 -1,000 0,217 -1,000 
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Table 37: SRTA for the top Taiwanese, Korean and Singaporean players 
(2001-2006 - Second component of the network of main paths) 
Company New Inn vs Inc Type #Patents Breakthrough Disruptive Mature Renewing Exhausting 
TSMC (TW) Incumbent Foundry 40 -0,700 0,100 -0,131 0,000 0,084 
SAMSUNG (KR) Incumbent IDM 18 0,594 -0,347 -1,000 -0,091 -1,000 
LG PHILIPS (KR) New innovator IDM 13 0,752 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
UMC (TW) Incumbent Foundry 10 -1,000 0,024 -1,000 0,333 -1,000 
HYUNDAI ELEC. (KR) Incumbent IDM 9 -1,000 0,152 0,262 -0,286 -1,000 
CHARTERED (SG) Incumbent Foundry 7 -1,000 -0,001 0,374 -0,167 0,742 
HANN STAR (TW) New innovator IDM 5 0,752 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
KETRI (KR) Incumbent GRO 3 -1,000 0,076 -1,000 0,250 -1,000 
MACRONIOX  (TW) Incumbent IDM 3 -1,000 0,076 -1,000 0,250 -1,000 
CHUNGHWA (TW) New innovator IDM 3 0,752 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
HYNIX (KR) New innovator IDM 3 -1,000 -0,264 0,673 0,250 -1,000 
TITRI (TW) Incumbent GRO 2 0,559 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 0,919 
VANGUARD (TW) Incumbent Foundry 2 -1,000 0,272 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
AU OPTRONIC (TW) New innovator IDM 2 0,752 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
 
Table 38: SRTA for the top US and Japanese players 
(2001-2006 - Second component of the network of main paths) 
Company New Inn vs Inc Type #Patents Breakthrough Disruptive Mature Renewing Exhausting 
AMD (US) Incumbent IDM 81 -1,000 0,038 -0,026 0,152 0,401 
IBM (US) Incumbent IDM 73 -0,348 0,118 -0,226 -0,187 0,129 
TOSHIBA (JP) Incumbent IDM 33 -0,218 0,003 -1,000 0,250 -1,000 
TEXAS INSTR. (US) Incumbent IDM 23 -1,000 -0,046 0,335 0,270 -1,000 
SEMICOND. ENERGY (JP) Incumbent NGRO 18 0,725 -0,823 -1,000 -0,565 -1,000 
MICRON (US) Incumbent IDM 17 -1,000 0,061 -0,050 0,190 -1,000 
NEC (JP) Incumbent IDM 13 -0,296 0,193 0,084 -1,000 -1,000 
AMBERWAVE SYSTEMS (US) New innovator Equipm. 13 -1,000 0,147 -1,000 0,071 -1,000 
INTEL (US) Incumbent IDM 12 -1,000 0,186 -1,000 -0,412 0,595 
MITSUBISHI (JP) Incumbent IDM 9 0,404 -0,264 0,547 -0,286 -1,000 
SHARP (JP) Incumbent IDM 9 -0,120 -0,675 -1,000 0,591 -1,000 
MATSUSHITA (JP) Incumbent IDM 7 -1,000 0,272 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
FUJITSU (JP) Incumbent IDM 6 0,082 -0,264 0,673 -0,091 -1,000 
LSI LOGIC (US) Incumbent Fabless 6 -1,000 0,076 0,673 -1,000 -1,000 
MIT (US) Incumbent University 6 -1,000 -0,067 -1,000 0,429 -1,000 
CANON (JP) Incumbent User 5 -1,000 0,272 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
HITACHI (JP) Incumbent Equipm. 5 0,171 0,024 -1,000 0,000 -1,000 
HUGHES (US) Incumbent User 5 -1,000 0,272 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
MOTOROLA (US) Incumbent IDM 5 -1,000 0,024 0,509 -1,000 0,809 
FREESCALE (US) New innovator IDM 5 -1,000 0,166 -1,000 0,000 -1,000 
INFINEON (DE) Incumbent IDM 4 -1,000 0,134 0,587 -1,000 -1,000 
APPLIED MATERIALS (US) Incumbent Equipm. 3 0,650 -0,264 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
OKI ELECTRIC (JP) Incumbent IDM 3 -1,000 -0,264 -1,000 0,538 -1,000 
SONY CORP (JP) Incumbent IDM 3 -1,000 0,076 -1,000 0,250 -1,000 
AGERE SYSTEM (US) New innovator Fabless 3 -1,000 0,076 -1,000 0,250 -1,000 
E INK (US) New innovator IDM 3 0,752 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
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HONEYWELL (US) Incumbent User 3 -1,000 0,272 -1,000 -1,000 -1,000 
RENESAS ELECTR. (JP) New innovator IDM 3 -1,000 -0,264 0,673 0,250 -1,000 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
A.5.1 Ranking of observations by knowledge depth 
Table 39: top 10% observations by ln(KD) 
Time period Company label Country Business cat. ln(KD) KD KB PC 
1995 MOTOROLA US IDM -2.467234 0.0848191 0.9521546 45 
1990 TEXASINST US IDM -2.827807 0.0591424 0.9250826 56 
1995 ANALOGDEV US IDM -2.942266 0.052746 0 1 
1995 FUJITSU JP IDM -2.958791 0.0518816 0.8963358 14 
1995 AMD US IDM -3.080825 0.0459213 0.7635733 6 
1995 SPRAGUE US IDM -3.116289 0.0443213 0 1 
1995 TEXASINST US IDM -3.262161 0.0383055 0.9281647 43 
2000 AMD US IDM -3.466486 0.0312266 0.905466 93 
2000 UMC TW Foundry -3.493906 0.030382 0.8842815 77 
1985 EATON US User -3.521066 0.0295679 0.2231109 4 
1990 TOSHIBA JP IDM -3.535164 0.029154 0.9613467 74 
1995 MITSUBISHI JP IDM -3.635369 0.0263742 0.8210678 33 
1995 KE&T KR Res.prov. -3.748003 0.0235648 0.6802697 4 
1985 IBM US IDM -3.760301 0.0232767 0.8622844 96 
1995 MICRON US IDM -3.983842 0.018614 0.8571347 41 
1995 HYUNDAI KR IDM -4.020535 0.0179434 0.8265074 8 
1995 UMC TW Foundry -4.050233 0.0174183 0.8781988 32 
2000 MICRON US IDM -4.120855 0.0162306 0.9006752 66 
1990 MOTOROLA US IDM -4.195992 0.0150558 0.9330899 35 
1985 RCA US IDM -4.212543 0.0148087 0.8940903 28 
1995 TSMC TW Foundry -4.299595 0.0135741 0.7682303 8 
2000 TSMC TW Foundry -4.333607 0.0131201 0.9048561 88 
1995 LG KR IDM -4.33592 0.0130898 0.8020592 9 
2000 CHARTERED SG Foundry -4.474548 0.0113954 0.9203129 29 
1985 AT&T US IDM -4.487476 0.011249 0.8634174 42 
1995 IBM US IDM -4.487646 0.0112471 0.8455559 36 
1985 TOSHIBA JP IDM -4.52588 0.0108252 0.8843337 57 
1995 NEC JP IDM -4.596872 0.0100833 0.784089 23 
1985 FUJI_XEROX JP User -4.653471 0.0095285 0 1 
1995 LSILOGIC US Fabless -4.697524 0.0091178 0.6320425 7 
1995 TOSHIBA JP IDM -4.763703 0.0085339 0.8766038 35 
1990 HITACHI JP Supplier -4.765155 0.0085216 0.9206975 43 
1990 NCR US User -4.809824 0.0081493 0.620767 9 
1985 HITACHI JP Supplier -4.83981 0.0079086 0.9408442 24 
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A.5.2 Empirical conditional probabilities of survival 
To provide preliminary insights about the strength and functional form of the association be-
tween the probability of survival and our explanatory variables we computed the empirical con-
ditional probabilities of survival for each of our variables. We broke continuous variables (KB, 
KD, PC) into bins and calculated the survival rate (i.e. the ratio between the number of survivors 
and the number of observations) within each bin. The conditional probability of survival for cat-
egorical variables is straightforward and computed as the survival rate within the given catego-
ry. Figure 55 shows the results.  
 The conditional probability of survival for knowledge breadth follows a very irregular trend 
up to the fifth bin (i.e. up to KB<0.4). This might be an interesting insight in itself or, contrarily it 
might be purely induced by the scarcity of observations for values of KB in the range 0≤KB<0.4 
(i.e. bins 2-4). Indeed from the fifth bin onwards P(S|KB) follows an upward sloping trend, with 
the exception of bin 9, in which it mildly decreases. The irregular trend poses some challenges in 
terms of the estimation of the functional form of the relationship between diversification and 
survival, particularly because we cannot safely rely on the information provided within the 0-0.4 
range of KB.  
 
Figure 55: Empirical conditional probabilities of survival 
 
The relationship between survival and knowledge accumulation seems to be clearer. However 
also in this case some of the bins have too little observations to provide sound conjectures. 
These are bins 1, 2 and 10, in which there are only 7, 6 and 11 observations respectively. If we 
do not consider those bins, the observed probability of survival conditional to the level of 
knowledge accumulation seems to show a similar dynamic as for the knowledge breadth, with a 
clear increasing trend appearing only after a given threshold, which happens to be once again 
the fifth bin. 
 The size of the technological knowledge base seems to positively affect survival. In this case, 
given that the distribution of PC is highly skewed to the left we computed log-bins (i.e. bins of 
increasing width), in order to obtain more reliable and meaningful survival rates. The second 
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row of subplots of Figure 55 shows that larger values of both KB and KD seem to be associated 
with higher survival rates. Indeed the upper right corner of the KB-KD knowledge space has sur-
vival rates of 100% or close. Note that white spots in the figure indicate lack of observations in 
that region of the knowledge space. The business model followed and the years of experience 
does not seem to have any effect on survival chances. Furthermore, contrary to what expected a 
clear relationship between survival and knowledge persistence does not emerge if we only look 
at the empirical conditional probability observed in our sample. 
A.5.3  Kolmogorov-Smirnof, Anderson-Darling and Student’s T tests of the 
associations of knowledge breadth and depth with innovative survival 
Here we assess whether diversification and knowledge accumulation alone are associated with 
survival, without controlling for other explanations or determine the functional form of the rela-
tionship. This boils down to evaluate the correlation between the binary variable Survival and 
the continuous variables KB and KD. The simplest way to do it is to test whether the probability 
to observe larger values of KB or KD in the sample of innovators that survive is statistically larg-
er than for the sample of innovators that exit. The top panels of Figure 56 plot the empirical cu-
mulative distribution functions (ECDFs) of KB and the logged-KD for the two samples. The ECDF 
computes the observed probability of finding values of the given variable lower or equal than a 
given level. It does so by calculating the left-cumulated frequency of observations. For this pur-
pose, we run two tests, the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test and the Anderson-Darling test 
to assess whether the difference between the distributions of the two groups is statistically sig-
nificant. The distribution of KB and KD for the survival group might be inflated by the values of 
the two variables for those players that survive for several periods. In order to assess whether 
this effect biases the results we first perform the tests for the distributions of KB and KD ac-
counting for all observations and giving them equal weight. Then we do the same but this time 
computing a distribution in which each player (not each observation) has equal weight. In other 
words, we first calculate the average values of KB and KD for surviving players and then com-
pute the ECDFs for the average values. Obviously the average values of KB and KD for players 
that survive for only one period is trivially equal to the values scored in that period. These EC-
DFs are plotted in the bottom panels of Figure 56. 
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Figure 56: Empirical left-cumulative distribution functions of KB and KD for surviving and exiting core 
innovators 
 
In all four panels, we can see that, for the whole range of values the distribution of knowledge 
breadth and logged-depth for the survival group is stochastically dominated by the distribution 
of the exit group. This means that the probability to find larger values of KB and KD is higher for 
the survival group than for the exit group, for any value of KB and KD larger than zero. For in-
stance, one can immediately see from the upper-left panel that larger values of knowledge 
breadth are more likely to be found in the survival group, where about 40% of the observations 
have a value of KB larger than 0.5, whereas this holds for only less than 20% of the observations 
in the exit group. Moreover, the crossing point with the vertical axis for the ECDF of KB shows 
that the probability to find fully specialized core innovators (i.e. with KB=0) is only about 35% in 
the survival group and nearly 60% in the exit one. This holds whether we filter the effect of long-
lasting survival or not. We computed the probabilities to find observations with values of 
knowledge breadth and depth above the arithmetic and geometric mean26 of the distribution 
respectively. They further confirm the visual impression that the distribution of knowledge 
depth is more skewed than the one of knowledge breadth. Fifty-three percent of all observations 
have a value higher than the arithmetic mean of KB and sixty percent higher than its geometric 
mean. To the contrary, only 19% of the observations have a value larger than the arithmetic 
mean of knowledge depth and 54% have a KD larger than the geometric mean. This means that 
for a randomly selected core innovator is easier to outperform the average competitor in terms 
of knowledge breadth than depth. We compute the same distributions for PC but not plot them 
here for the sake of synthesis. We perform three tests, the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnof test, 
the Anderson-Darling test and the t-test of paired differences, to compare whether the differ-
ences between the survival and exit group in terms of KB and KD are statistically significant. The 
                                                             
26 The geometric mean is the mean of the log-transformed distribution 
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tests confirm that surviving innovators are statistically more likely to have broader and deeper 
knowledge base than exit ones. Table 40 summarizes the results for the two-sample Kolmogo-
rov-Smirnoff test (KS-test). The null hypothesis of the KS-test is that the two groups belong to 
the same population, i.e. that there are no statistically significant differences between the ECDFs 
of the survival and exit group. The alternative hypothesis is that the ECDFs of the survival group 
is statistically smaller than the ECDF of the exit group (i.e. that the right tail of the distribution is 
heavier for the survival group than for the exit one). Fs(x) stands for the cumulative distribution 
function of the survival group, i.e. the share of observations in the survival group with a value 
lower or equal than x. Fe(x) is the cumulative distribution of the exit group. The t-statistic of the 
test corresponds to the highest difference found between the two curves. This is compared to 
the highest difference that could be found if one would randomly select two groups out of the 
same population. The value x* corresponds to the value (of KB, KD, KB*KD or PC) for which the 
largest possible difference Fe(x*)-Fs(x*) is found. The value s* is equal to the ratio x*/max(x) and 
is helpful to assess how large x* is.  The KS-tests confirms that surviving core innovators are 
more likely to have large values of KB and KD than exiting ones. 
 We perform the same kind of analysis with the Anderson-Darling test (AD test). The KS test 
does not take into account at which level of the variable under consideration the highest differ-
ence in the two ECDFs is achieved. Since by definition the two curves have to converge to one, it 
is unlikely for x* and s* to have a large value. For our purposes, the AD test has the important 
advantage to give more weight to differences between the curves happening closer to the con-
vergence point. The AD test results are reported in Table 40. They confirm the findings from the 
KS test. 
 Finally, we performed one last test based on a different approach. So far, we have compared 
probabilities to observe diversification and knowledge accumulation across surviving and exit-
ing core innovators. However, there might be firm-specific effects that we are not capturing with 
the KS and AD tests. We therefore want to compare exiting core innovators with themselves at 
the time of survival. In other words, the control group is made by the same players and we can 
test whether exit can be explained by the fact that the given player has reduced its knowledge 
breadth or depth. We now consider core innovators that survived at least one period and exit at 
some point. We then compute the difference between their value of KB and KD and plot the dis-
tribution of these differences. The test becomes a one-sample t-test of paired differences with 
the null hypothesis that the data has zero mean and the alternative hypothesis that the data 
comes from a population with a mean greater than zero. Table 40 reports the results. The test 
confirms what found so far for diversification but rejects findings for knowledge accumulation. 
This means that exiting innovators had a significant lower value of diversification at the period 
before exit than in periods before survival.   
  
 178 Appendices 
 
Table 40: Statistical tests for differences in the empirical cumulative distributions of 
knowledge breadth and depth between survival and exit groups 
 
 
 
A.5.4 Regression results using probit models 
In the following, we report the analogous probit estimation of the logit models presented in the 
paper. The same findings discussed in the paper holds.   
 
Table 41: Pooled and panel data probit model estimation 
PROBIT 
MODEL 
(1) 
Pooled clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(2) 
Pooled clust.VCE 
All obs. 
(3) 
Panel Ran.Eff. 
PC<24 
(4) 
Panel Ran.Eff. 
All obs. 
VARIABLES survival survival survival survival 
     
Specialized  -1.036  -2.180 
  (0.968)  (1.849) 
KB bin category 
KB bin 7 (0.6≤KB<0.7)  0.978*** 
(0.369) 
 1.348** 
(0.670) 
 
KB bin 8 (0.7≤KB<0.8) 1.469** 
(0.602) 
 2.359** 
(1.062) 
 
KB bin 9 (0.8≤KB<0.9) 0.994** 
(0.414) 
   
Restricted cubic spline (knots at KB = 0, 0.48, 0.89) 
r.c.s. KB1  -3.423  -7.643 
  (2.940)  (5.667) 
r.c.s. KB2  5.213*  10.44* 
  (2.892)  (5.903) 
ln(KD) -0.215 -0.189 -0.484 -0.464 
 (0.248) (0.251) (0.389) (0.383) 
ln(KD)2 -0.0159 -0.0147 -0.0344 -0.0336 
 (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0228) (0.0225) 
PC -0.00533 0.00272 -0.0253 0.00156 
 (0.0363) (0.0142) (0.0590) (0.0347) 
Model Variable Ns Ne Result p-value significance test statistic x* s* Fs(x*) Fe(x*)
KB 116 73 H1: Fs(x) < Fe(x) 0.0002 *** 0.299 0.6208 0.6208 0.3534 0.0548
KD 116 73 H1: Fs(x) < Fe(x) 0.0000 *** 0.378 0.000 0.0076 0.7069 0.3288
All core innovators                
(all periods)
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Test
Model Variable Ns Ne Result p-value significance rank statistics std. rank stat
KB 116 73 H1: Fs(x) ≠ Fe(x) 0.0000 *** 11.039 13.316
KD 116 73 H1: Fs(x) ≠ Fe(x) 0.0000 *** 14.066 17.332
All core innovators                
(all periods)
Anderson-Darling Test (adjusted for ties)
Model Variable N Mean St.Dev Skewness st.error of difference p-value significance t-stat df
KB 56 0.1006 0.326 0.204 0.3263 0.0124 ** 2.3068 55
KD 56 0.0001 0.010 -3.570 0.0103 0.4659 0.086 55
All core innovators                
(all periods)
One sample T-test of Paired Differences
Survival-Exit One-sample t-test of paired differences
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PROBIT 
MODEL 
(1) 
Pooled clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(2) 
Pooled clust.VCE 
All obs. 
(3) 
Panel Ran.Eff. 
PC<24 
(4) 
Panel Ran.Eff. 
All obs. 
VARIABLES survival survival survival survival 
Experience (base = new entrants) 
  1 period 0.754*** 0.704*** -1.276** -1.257** 
 (0.224) (0.221) (0.528) (0.529) 
  2 periods -0.612** -0.548** -1.389* -1.415* 
 (0.277) (0.269) (0.716) (0.734) 
  3 periods -0.207 -0.197 -1.043 -1.093 
 (0.357) (0.350) (0.824) (0.838) 
  4 periods -0.363 -0.283 -1.444 -1.352 
 (0.401) (0.390) (1.004) (0.973) 
Business cat. (base = IDMs) 
  Fabless -0.154 -0.0595 -0.528 -0.400 
  (0.350) (0.361) (0.820) (0.818) 
  Supplier 0.547 0.564 0.738 0.796 
 (0.455) (0.438) (0.787) (0.798) 
  Res.provider -0.433 -0.429 -0.799 -0.762 
 (0.287) (0.280) (0.533) (0.531) 
  User -0.243 -0.319 -0.494 -0.566 
 (0.244) (0.240) (0.492) (0.496) 
RK Persistence  9.502** 9.923** 15.43* 16.59* 
(main traject.) (4.251) (4.356) (8.535) (8.573) 
Constant -0.664 0.406 -1.345 0.793 
 (1.243) (1.441) (1.904) (2.492) 
Observations 286 323 286 323 
Log-Likelihood -132.6 -136.3 -129.7 -133 
# of companies   122 126 
Sigma_u   1.276 1.336 
Rho   0.619 0.641 
Pseudo R2 0.189 0.216   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (errors clustered by company for the pooled data) 
Significance legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Vertical bars indicate joint significance of the variables reported to the left 
of the bar(s) (||| p<0.01, || p<0.05, | p<0.1). Business category ‘Foundry’ (in all models) and KB bins 2 and 10 (in Model 9) 
were omitted from the regressions as they predicted survival perfectly. For Model 9 only KB bins whose coefficient is 
statistically significant are reported.  
 
Table 42: Pooled and panel data probit model estimation with split sample 
PROBIT 
MODEL 
(1) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(2) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(3) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
PC<24 & KB>0 
(4) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(5) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(6) 
Panel  
RandEff 
PC<24 & KB>0 
VARIABLES survival survival survival survival survival survival 
       
KB bin category (base = bin 5) 
KB bin 6  
(0.5≤KB<0.6) 
  0.391 
(0.332) 
  0.391 
(0.332) 
KB bin 7  
(0.6≤KB<0.7) 
  1.075** 
(0.472) 
  1.075** 
(0.472) 
KB bin 8  
(0.7≤KB<0.8) 
  1.779*** 
(0.600) 
  1.779*** 
(0.600) 
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PROBIT 
MODEL 
(1) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(2) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(3) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
PC<24 & KB>0 
(4) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(5) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(6) 
Panel  
RandEff 
PC<24 & KB>0 
VARIABLES survival survival survival survival survival survival 
KB bin 9  
(0.8≤KB<0.9) 
  1.406** 
(0.546) 
  1.406** 
(0.546) 
ln(KD) 0.0194 -0.470 0.885 0.0194 -0.470 1.094 
 (0.0673) (0.305) (0.657) (0.0673) (0.379) (1.032) 
ln(KD)2  -0.0267 0.0451  -0.0267 0.0539 
  (0.0169) (0.0390)  (0.0203) (0.0588) 
PC 0.0302 0.0561 -0.0576 0.0302 0.0561 -0.0822 
 (0.163) (0.158) (0.0361) (0.161) (0.164) (0.0878) 
Experience (base = new entrants) 
  1 period -0.963** -0.964** -0.570 -0.964*** -0.964*** -0.826 
 (0.377) (0.379) (0.394) (0.373) (0.371) (0.907) 
  2 periods -1.073** -1.050** -0.164 -1.073*** -1.050*** -0.301 
 (0.421) (0.431) (0.433) (0.404) (0.405) (0.751) 
  3 periods -1.101* -0.932 0.903 -1.102** -0.932* 0.968 
 (0.566) (0.569) (0.647) (0.530) (0.552) (0.944) 
  4 periods -0.894 -0.926 0.0352 -0.895 -0.926 -0.217 
 (0.600) (0.599) (0.607) (0.597) (0.602) (1.157) 
Business cat. (base = IDMs) 
  Fabless -0.375 -0.359 - -0.375 -0.360 - 
  (0.456) (0.454)  (0.500) (0.500)  
  Supplier 0.359 0.344 0.454 0.359 0.344 0.621 
 (0.704) (0.714) (0.661) (0.654) (0.654) (1.114) 
  Res.provider -0.00645 0.00900 -0.773** -0.00647 0.00899 -1.051 
 (0.353) (0.360) (0.356) (0.369) (0.370) (0.955) 
  User -0.353 -0.318 -0.458 -0.353 -0.318 -0.669 
 (0.324) (0.316) (0.349) (0.372) (0.370) (0.766) 
RK Persistence  23.21*** 22.45*** 0.168 23.21*** 22.45*** 1.880 
(main traject.) (6.959) (6.764) (6.562) (8.031) (7.941) (11.09) 
Constant -1.047 -3.149* 4.964* -1.047 -3.149 6.238 
 (1.138) (1.644) (2.941) (1.267) (2.069) (5.193) 
Observations 128 128 155 128 128 155 
Log-Likelihood -66.73 -65.81 -54.53 -66.73 -65.81 83 
Sigma_u    0.00120 0.00272 0.899 
Rho    1.43e-06 7.42e-06 0.447 
Pseudo R2 0.207 0.218 0.239    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (errors clustered by company for the pooled data) 
Significance legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Vertical bars indicates joint significance (||| p<0.01, || p<0.05, | p<0.1). 
Business category ‘Foundry’ (in all models), ‘Fabless’ and KB bins 2 and 10 (in Model 3 and 6) are omitted from the regressions 
as they predict survival perfectly. For Models 3 and 6 only KB bins others than 2, 3 and 4 are reported. Bin is 5 used as baseline.  
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A.5.5 Regression results using complementary log-log models 
In the following, we report the analogous complementary log-log estimation of the logit models 
presented in the paper.  
 
Table 43: Pooled and panel data complementary log-log model estimation 
C LOG-LOG 
MODEL 
(1) 
Pooled clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(2) 
Pooled clust.VCE 
All obs. 
(3) 
Panel Ran.Eff. 
PC<24 
(4) 
Panel Ran.Eff. 
All obs. 
VARIABLES survival survival survival survival 
     
Specialized  2.206  -2.180 
  (1.621)  (1.849) 
KB bin category  
KB bin 7 (0.6≤KB<0.7)  -1.476** 
(0.641) 
 -1.76** 
(0.869) 
 
KB bin 8 (0.7≤KB<0.8) -2.641** 
(1.225) 
 -3.35** 
(1.421) 
 
KB bin 9 (0.8≤KB<0.9) -1.461** 
(0.646) 
 -2.33 
(1.464) 
 
Restricted cubic spline (knots at KB = 0, 0.48, 0.89) 
r.c.s. KB1  7.470  -7.643 
  (5.027)  (5.667) 
r.c.s. KB2  -10.53**  10.44* 
  (5.182)  (5.903) 
ln(KD) 0.318 0.293 0.624 -0.464 
 (0.372) (0.373) (0.500) (0.383) 
ln(KD)2 0.0204 0.0191 0.0428 -0.0336 
 (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0290) (0.0225) 
PC -0.00760 -0.0189 0.0358 0.00156 
 (0.0615) (0.0350) (0.0773) (0.0347) 
Experience (base = new entrants) 
  1 period 1.173*** 1.107*** 1.589** -1.257** 
 (0.343) (0.339) (0.638) (0.529) 
  2 periods 0.989** 0.952** 1.700** -1.415* 
 (0.414) (0.404) (0.862) (0.734) 
  3 periods 0.448 0.492 1.197 -1.093 
 (0.549) (0.536) (1.019) (0.838) 
  4 periods 0.648 0.613 1.690 -1.352 
 (0.572) (0.564) (1.237) (0.973) 
Business cat. (base = IDMs) 
  Fabless 0.272 0.182 0.621 -0.400 
  (0.429) (0.443) (1.007) (0.818) 
  Supplier -0.851 -0.816 -0.980 0.796 
 (0.771) (0.751) (1.033) (0.798) 
  Res.provider 0.438 0.487 0.922 -0.762 
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C LOG-LOG 
MODEL 
(1) 
Pooled clust.VCE 
PC<24 
(2) 
Pooled clust.VCE 
All obs. 
(3) 
Panel Ran.Eff. 
PC<24 
(4) 
Panel Ran.Eff. 
All obs. 
VARIABLES survival survival survival survival 
 (0.375) (0.363) (0.662) (0.531) 
  User 0.272 0.387 0.566 -0.566 
 (0.340) (0.328) (0.603) (0.496) 
RK Persistence  -16.60** -16.15** -20.4** 16.59* 
(main traject.) (6.688) (6.422) (10.41) (8.573) 
Constant 1.175 -1.161 1.537 0.793 
 (1.939) (2.262) (2.457) (2.492) 
Observations 286 323 286 323 
Log-Likelihood -131.7 -135.2 -129.7 -133.1 
# of companies   122 126 
Sigma_u   1.466 1.478 
Rho   0.566 0.571 
Significance of rho   0.023 0.019 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (errors clustered by company for the pooled data) 
Significance legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Vertical bars indicate joint significance of the variables reported to the left 
of the bar(s) (||| p<0.01, || p<0.05, | p<0.1). Business category ‘Foundry’ (in all models) and KB bins 2 and 10 (in Model 9) 
were omitted from the regressions as they predicted survival perfectly. For Model 9 only KB bins whose coefficient is 
statistically significant are reported.  
 
Table 44: Pooled and panel data complementary log-log model estimation with split sample 
C LOG-LOG 
MODEL 
(1) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(2) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(3) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
PC<24 & KB>0 
(4) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(5) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(6) 
Panel  
RandEff 
PC<24 & KB>0 
VARIABLES survival survival survival survival survival survival 
       
KB bin category (base = bin 5) 
KB bin 6  
(0.5≤KB<0.6) 
  -1.600** 
(0.785) 
  -1.961 
(1.347) 
KB bin 7  
(0.6≤KB<0.7) 
  -2.884** 
(1.193) 
  -3.824 
(2.669) 
KB bin 8  
(0.7≤KB<0.8) 
  -1.982** 
(0.839) 
  -2.851 
(2.426) 
KB bin 9  
(0.8≤KB<0.9) 
     -1.961 
(1.347) 
ln(KD) -0.00843 0.603* -1.558 -0.00842 0.603 -1.736 
 (0.0901) (0.331) (1.193) (0.0826) (0.408) (1.487) 
ln(KD)2  0.0330* -0.0832  0.0330 -0.0854 
  (0.0182) (0.0690)  (0.0216) (0.0853) 
PC -0.0343 -0.0550 0.0715 -0.0343 -0.0550 0.131 
 (0.191) (0.176) (0.0651) (0.189) (0.186) (0.142) 
Experience (base = new entrants) 
  1 period 1.492*** 1.514*** 0.913 1.492*** 1.514*** 1.338 
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C LOG-LOG 
MODEL 
(1) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(2) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
KB=0 
(3) 
Pooled  
clust.VCE 
PC<24 & KB>0 
(4) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(5) 
Panel  
RandEff 
KB=0 
(6) 
Panel  
RandEff 
PC<24 & KB>0 
VARIABLES survival survival survival survival survival survival 
 (0.578) (0.577) (0.686) (0.574) (0.575) (1.489) 
  2 periods 1.606** 1.576** 0.282 1.606*** 1.576** 0.492 
 (0.633) (0.643) (0.720) (0.608) (0.615) (1.264) 
  3 periods 1.548** 1.436** -1.148 1.548** 1.436** -1.360 
 (0.726) (0.726) (1.296) (0.697) (0.723) (1.500) 
  4 periods 1.326* 1.421* 0.305 1.326* 1.421* 0.529 
 (0.750) (0.753) (1.111) (0.765) (0.776) (1.761) 
Business cat. (base = IDMs) 
  Fabless 0.479 0.534 -0.516 0.479 0.479 - 
  (0.505) (0.522) (1.141) (0.612) (0.612)  
  Supplier -0.492 -0.437 1.085* -0.492 -0.492 -0.910 
 (1.205) (1.211) (0.596) (1.157) (1.157) (1.925) 
  Res.provider 0.0294 0.0197 0.621 0.0293 0.0293 1.617 
 (0.430) (0.439) (0.596) (0.438) (0.438) (1.666) 
  User 0.451 0.389 1.661 0.451 0.451 1.106 
 (0.379) (0.386) (11.93) (0.415) (0.415) (1.284) 
RK Persistence  -35.41*** -33.31*** -8.813 -35.41*** -35.41*** -4.539 
(main traject.) (11.53) (10.75) (5.522) (12.40) (12.40) (19.90) 
Constant 1.396 3.905** 155 1.396 1.396 -10.29 
 (1.559) (1.919) -54.91 (1.735) (1.735) (7.596) 
Observations 128 128 -0.516 128 128 155 
Log-Likelihood -65.79 -64.65 (1.141) -65.79 -64.65 -54.68 
# of companies    84 84 83 
Sigma_u    0.000740 0.00173 1.573 
Rho    3.33e-07 1.83e-06 0.601 
Significance or rho    1 0.498 0.251 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (errors clustered by company for the pooled data) 
Significance legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Vertical bars indicates joint significance (||| p<0.01, || p<0.05, | p<0.1). 
Business category ‘Foundry’ (in all models), ‘Fabless’ and KB bins 2 and 10 (in Model 3 and 6) are omitted from the regressions 
as they predict survival perfectly. For Models 3 and 6 only KB bins others than 2, 3 and 4 are reported. Bin is 5 used as baseline. 
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A.5.6 Scatterplot of core innovators in the KB-KD space 
 
Figure 57: Core innovators’ location in the knowledge breadth and depth space between 1986 and 1990 
 
 
Figure 58: Core innovators’ location in the knowledge breadth and depth space between 1991 and 1995 
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Figure 59: Core innovators’ location in the knowledge breadth and depth space between 1996 and 2000 
 
 
Figure 60: Core innovators’ location in the knowledge breadth and depth space between 2001 and 2006 
A.5.7  The linkage between micro- and macro-diversification strategies 
In this section, we present the results of the analysis of how countries achieve technical 
knowledge diversification. Aggregate diversification can be the results of two different scenari-
os. At any given level, aggregate knowledge breadth, can be achieved through the sum of firms’ 
individual non-overlapping specialization patterns in different domains or through pooling to-
gether partly or fully overlapping firms’ areas of specialization. Figure 61 shows the sources of 
aggregate technical knowledge diversification for S.Korea, Taiwan, Japan and US. On the vertical 
axis we report values of aggregate knowledge breadth, computed using the same formula intro-
 186 Appendices 
duced in equation 5.9, where the knowledge genetic heritage of a country in a given domain is 
calculated using all patents granted to firms from the given country. The horizontal axis reports 
values of the knowledge uniqueness index. This index measures to which extent aggregate 
knowledge breadth is the result of overlapping firms’ specialization patterns. The index takes a 
value of one (i.e. full knowledge uniqueness at the firm level) when a country’s knowledge in 
each of the domains in which it is active is entirely concentrated within one firm. It takes a value 
of zero when in each domains knowledge is equally spread across firms. The index is calculated 
as follows. 
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(A.5.1) 
Where, C is the country index, i goes from 1 to the number of firms in country C (Nc), J goes from 
1 to the number of technology domains (K) and proximityij is the amount of genetic proximity of 
firm i in area j, computed using equation 5.8. It is worth noting how the uniqueness index is  
normalized by the maximum possible value attainable if the sum of a country’s genetic proximity 
in each given domain would be randomly distributed across firms from the given country. 
Therefore it effectively control for the number of patenting entities in a country. 
 
 
Figure 61: Countries' knowledge diversification paths 
 
Dashed lines in Figure 61 are drawn to mark the average values of aggregate knowledge breadth 
and uniqueness across countries and time. The analysis highlights a big difference in the way 
former leaders (US and Japan) and successful latecomers (S.Korea and Taiwan) achieved tech-
nical knowledge diversification. US and Japan mainly followed a competing specialization pat-
tern, with large aggregate knowledge breadth attained through overlapping firms knowledge, 
even though Japan was diversily specialized in in the first half of the 1990s and of the 2000s. In 
contrast, Taiwan evolved from a narrow diversification pattern to a broad diversified specializa-
  Appendices 187 
tion, passing through a competing diversification stage. However, they are always located 
around the average boundaries of the space, therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
this specialization pattern may be random. Korea has a clearer trajectory instead. They start 
from narrow diversified specialization, then evolved to broad diversified specialization but then 
reduced their knowledge breadth and uniqueness a little.  Singapore is not reported due to the 
limited number of firms within the country. 
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9 VALORISATION 
In accordance with article 23.5 of the Regulation governing the attainment of doctoral degrees at 
Maastricht University, this addendum discusses the valorization opportunities presented by this 
PhD thesis. I will first discuss the degree of innovativeness of the theories and methods present-
ed here and then elaborate on the socio-economic relevance of this work for several target 
groups.  
9.1 Degree of innovativeness 
This thesis presented a number of novel insights about technology dynamics and latecomers’ 
technological catching-up by developing a new theoretical and methodological framework to 
study the evolution of technology and firms’ inventive strategies. The theoretical contribution of 
this thesis is the introduction of a new way of looking at catching up and technology dynamics 
that is grounded on the interaction between prevailing and emerging engineering problems and 
the variety of approaches to solve them. We also argued how changes in problem-solving ap-
proaches can lead to solve technical bottlenecks and spark the rise of new products. Ultimately, 
this can lead to the emergence of new engineering challenges that need to be tackled. In the the-
sis, we also developed a theoretical framework that links the level of technical knowledge modu-
larity in an industry, the extent to which technical change is knowledge replacing and the urge of 
knowledge diversification for survival at the technological frontier. 
 This dissertation also contributes new methods to identify changes in engineering design 
trajectories, i.e. in the way engineering problems are solved and how their importance is per-
ceived relative to other problems. We also introduced an algorithm to classify inventions, firms 
(and, potentially, regions and countries) with respect to the exploitation-exploration spectrum 
of problem-solving approaches and their focus on prevailing or emerging engineering problems. 
In addition, we designed a methodological framework to identify technology domains and assess 
their life cycle stage. Another main methodological contribution of this thesis lays in the creation 
of an index of specialization at the country level that provides a more realistic micro-founded pic-
ture of inventing activities by firms in a country than previously available indices. Finally, we also 
developed a model to the predict a firm’s probability of persisting innovating at the frontier given 
its level of knowledge breadth, depth and the extent to which past knowledge is useful today. 
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9.2 Socio-economic relevance 
The theoretical and methodological framework presented in this thesis has important implica-
tions for several target groups. First and foremost, they are the first step of a rich research agen-
da whose ambitious goal is to quantitatively study technology evolution at the level of engineer-
ing problems and problem-solving approaches. We argued in the thesis how this may be the key 
to understand and, possibly, predict technology dynamics that lead to clustering of big innova-
tions in time and contributes to the formation of economic cycles. This area of research is poten-
tially very fertile and has been explored only partially. The rich admixture of concepts, theories 
and methods from evolutionary economics, complexity studies and strategy, which is found in 
this dissertation, also testifies how this new direction of theoretical thinking could affect several 
fields. For instance, one could use the same theoretical and methodological framework to ana-
lyse the knowledge evolution of specific scientific domains of interest, using publication instead 
of patent data. A unifying theory of knowledge evolution could be searched. Such theory would 
be based on the central notions defined in this thesis, namely that science and technology ad-
vance by solving problems and that problems are tackled by a variety of approaches. It would 
then need to be integrated with a sociological explanation of why the variety of approaches 
changes over time. Such theory could then be validated with data by applying the methods de-
veloped in this thesis.  
 Secondly, the theoretical and methodological contributions of this dissertation should be of 
interest to technology development practitioners. In fact, the research agenda that this thesis 
started can potentially lead to commercially viable and empirically grounded consultancy ser-
vices in the field of strategy and business intelligence for technology development. A number of 
similar consultancy companies have been developed in the last few years attempting to consult 
firms about their location in the technology landscape. To the best of the author’s knowledge 
(which is fairly limited in this area), none of these services are based on a dynamic perspective 
on technology. Rather, they take the technology space as given and consult firms on their current 
position. In contrast, the notions of a constantly evolving structure of the system of engineering 
problems and of the changing variety of existing problem solving approaches provide a much 
more accurate way of describing technology dynamics. This is enormously more appealing for 
business practitioners as it can provide detailed suggestions on the firm’s position in the prevail-
ing engineering trajectories and consult on the existence of alternative approaches. The core of 
such consultancy service could be based on the algorithms developed in this thesis to identify 
the main paths of engineering improvements in a given industry, detect technology domains, 
assess their life cycle stage, reveal companies’ comparative advantage across technology do-
mains and predict the probability that a company persist innovating at the technology frontier. 
Further refinement of these algorithms would focus on converting them in predictive tools to 
forecast the probability of an upcoming change in trajectory and assess how the firm is posi-
tioned in the technology space to take advantage or react to that. An additional service could ad-
dress the problem of identifying useful external sources of knowledge. This could take the form 
of suggesting possible partners, acquisition targets, or individual inventors to hire, that have ex-
pertise in the new design trajectory or in emerging technology domains. 
 Similarly, the same kind of analysis could be of great interest to regional policy makers. The 
strength of a region’s knowledge base in the industry of choice could be evaluated given the di-
rection of technology evolution in terms of the current prevailing engineering problems and 
problem solving approaches, and the position of the region’s firms or research lab in the tech-
nology space. High-resolution policy suggestions could be derived on how to steer the evolution 
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of the region’s knowledge base toward the desired targets. Based on our analysis emerging areas 
of the technology space could be detected and targeted to build an early comparative advantage. 
Tailor-made subsidies to incentivize research and development effort and collaborations across 
firms in a given technology domain could be designed. For instance, if a region lacks any in-
ventive activity in an emerging area of research in an industry that used to be strong in the re-
gion, one could identify possible external partners for collaborations based on knowledge com-
plementarity. Alternatively, our method could also identify possible efficient research avenues, 
for firms that are currently in the region, to navigate the technology space until the desired 
emerging area is reached. 
 The pursuit of the commercialization avenues sketched above is not the author’s current 
priority. However, being him a scholar interested in evolution, he recognizes that preferences, 
opportunities and paths can change in ways that are sometimes difficult to foresee. Yet, at the 
moment, the author intends to focus mostly on accomplishing the rich research agenda that 
started with this thesis and disseminating the results prevalently within academia. Perhaps this 
will actually lead to build a stronger recognition in this field that would facilitate future possible 
consultancies.  
 
 
 192 About the author 
10 ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
Giorgio Triulzi was born in 1984 in Milan, Italy. He is a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of Da-
ta, System and Society at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an affiliated researcher 
at UNU-MERIT. His research interests focus on understanding drivers, direction and effects of 
technological change by applying theories and methods from complex system analysis, evolu-
tionary economics and strategy.  
 Giorgio previously held positions as postdoctoral research assistant at the International 
Design Centre of Singapore University of Technology and Design and MIT, part-time lecturer at 
the Maastricht School of Business and Economics (SBE), PhD fellow at UNU-MERIT and at SBE. 
Giorgio has a PhD in Economics and Policy Studies of Technical Change from UNU-MERIT and 
Maastricht University, a Master of Science (cum laude) degree in Economics of International Mar-
kets and New Technologies from Bocconi University and a Bachelor of Science degree in the same 
field from the same institution. He has spent visiting stays as junior research assistant (pre-
doctoral level) at the Institute of Institutional and Innovation Economics at the University of 
Bremen, as master student at the Eindhoven University of Technology (Netherlands) and as un-
dergraduate student at the Universite’ Louis Pasteur (France, now University of Strasbourg). 
 
	
									
	
2015
95. Giorgio Triulzi
Looking for the Right Path: Technology Dynamics,
Inventive Strategies and Catching-up in the
Semiconductor Industry
94. Abdul Baseer Qazi
Knowledge flows and networks in the ICT sector:
The case of Pakistan
93. Ajay Thutupalli
Technology Paradigm Shifts in Agriculture: Drivers
of Sustainability and Catch up
92. Eduardo Urias
Improving access to HIV/AIDS treatment in Brazil:
When are compulsory licenses effective in price
negotiations?
91. Francesca Guadagno
Why have so few countries industrialised?
90. Daniel Opolot
The evolution of beliefs and strategic behavior
89. Alejandro Lavopa
Structural Transformation and Economic
Development: Can Development Traps be Avoided?
88. Jinjin Zhao
Urban water management reform: The case of
China
2014
87. Dirk Crass
The Impact of Brands on Innovation and Firm
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Germany
86. Samyukta Bhupatiraju
The Geographic Dimensions of Growth and
Development
85. François Lafond
The evolution of knowledge systems
84. Annalisa Primi
Promoting Innovation in Latin America: What
Countries Have Learned (and What They Have Not)
in Designing and Implementing Innovation and
Intellectual Property Policies
83. Fatoumata Lamarana Diallo
Evaluation of Meal and Deworming Programs for
Primary Schools in Rural Senegal
2013
82. Anant Kamath
Information Sharing through Informal Interaction in
Low-Tech Clusters
81. Flavia Pereira de Carvalho
What we talk about when we talk about Brazilian
Mulitantionals: an investigation on Brazilian FDI,
economic structure, innovation and the relationship
between them
80. Jun Hou
Complementarity in Innovation and Development: A
Cross-country Comparison
79. Rufin Baghana
Impacts of Government Incentives to R&D,
Innovation and Productivity:
A Microeconometric Analysis of the Québec Case
78. Lilia I. Stubrin
High-Tech Activities in Emerging Countries: A
Network perspective on the Argentinean biotech
activity
2012
77. Abdul Waheed
Innovation Determinants
and Innovation as a Determinant:
Evidence from Developing Countries
76. Bilal Mirza
Energy Poverty and Rural Energy Markets in
Pakistan
75. Benjamin Engelstätter
Enterprise Software and Video Games: An Empirical
Analysis
193	
	
									
	
Fulvia Farinelli
Natural Resources, Innovation and Export Growth:
The Wine Industry in Chili and Argentina
Rodolfo Lauterbach
Innovation in Manufacturing: From Product Variety
and Labor Productivity Growth to Economic
Development in Chile
74. Kirsten Wiebe
Quantitative Assessment of Sustainable
Development and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
73. Julio Miguel Rosa
Organizational Strategies, Firms' Performance and
Spatial Spillovers. The Canadian Case in Research
and Development.
Johannes Wilhelmus Marie Boels
Joseph Schumpeter, honderd jaar economische
ontwikkeling. Een historisch-theoretische
beschouwing.
2011
72. Daniel Vertesy
Interrupted Innovation: Emerging economies in the
structure of the global aerospace industry.
71. Tina Saebi
Successfully managing alliance portfolios: an
alliance capability view.
70. Nora Engel
Tuberculosis in India - A case of innovation and
control.
69. Evans Mupela
Connectivity and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: The
role of communication satellites
68. Nantawan Kwanjai
Cross cultural intelligence amid intricate cultural
webs: A tale of the UnDutchables in the land of
1002 smiles
67. Lina Sonne
Innovation in Finance to Finance Innovation:
Supporting pro-poor entrepreneur-based
innovation
2010
66. Fernando Santiago
Human Resources Management Practices and
Learning for Innovation in Developing Countries:
Pharmaceutical Firms in Mexico
65. Zakaria Babutsidze
Essays on Economies with Heterogenous Interacting
Consumers
64. Bertha Vallejo
Learning and Innovation Under Changing Market
Conditions: The Auto Parts Industry in Mexico
63. Donatus Ayitey
Technical Change, Competitiveness and Poverty
Reduction: A Study of the Ghanaian Apparel
Industry
62. Sergey Fillipov
Multinational Subsidiary Evolution: Corporate
Change in New EU Member States
61. Asel Doranova
Technology Transfer and Learning under the Kyoto
regime; Exploring the Technological Impact of CDM
projects in developing countries
2009
60. Alexis Habiyaremye
From Primary Commodity Dependence to
Diversification and Growth. Absorptive Capacity
and Technological Catch Up in Botswana and
Mauritius.
59. Yoseph Getachew
The Role of Public Capital in Economic Development
58. Sandra Leitner
Embodied Technological Change and Patterns of
Investment in Austrian Manufacturing
57. Semih Akçomak
The Impact of Social Capital on Economic and Social
Outcomes
56. Abraham Garcia
The Role of Demand in Technical Change
194	
	
									
	
55. Saurabh Arora
Coherence in socio-technical systems: a network
perspective on the innovation process
2008
54. Rutger Daems
Medicines for the developing world
53. Johannes Hanel
Assessing Induced Technology: Sombart's
Understanding of Technical Change in the History of
Economics
52. Rifka Weehuizen
Mental Capital: the economic significance of mental
health
51. Danielle Cloodt
The relationship between R&D partnership
formation, social embeddedness and innovative
performance
50. Sabine Fuss
Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
2007
49. Tobias Kronenberg
Reconciling Environmental Conservation with
Economic Prosperity: The Feasibility of Double
Dividends in the Short and Long Run
48. Viktoria Kravtsova
Assessing the Impact of Foreign Direct Investment
in Transition Economies
47. Suhail Sultan
The Competitive Advantage of Small and Medium
Sized Enterprises: The Case of Jordan's Natural
Stone Industry
2006
46. Bulat Sanditov
Essays on Social Learning and Imitation
45. Mamata Parhi
Dynamics of New Technology Diffusion: A Study of
the Indian Automotive Industry
44. Andreas Reinstaller
Social structures and the innovation process: Their
role in the demand of firms and consumers
43. Rose Kiggundu
Innovation systems and development: the journey
of a Beleaguered Nile Perch Fishery in Uganda
42. Thomas Pogue
The Evolution of Research Collaboration in South
African Gold Mining: 1886-1933
41. Geoffrey Gachino
Foreign Direct Investment, Spillovers and
Innovation: The Case of Kenyan Manufacturing
Industry
40. Önder Nomaler
Technological Change, International Trade and
Growth: An Evolutionary, Multi-Agents-Based
Modeling Approach
2005
39. Samia Satti Osman Mohamed-Nour
Change and Skill Development in the Arab Gulf
Countries
38. Elad Harison
Intellectual Property Rights: Economics and Policy
Analysis
37. Daniel Dalohoun
The relationship between R&D partnership
formation, social embeddedness and innovative
performance: a multi-level approach of social
embeddedness
36. Müge Ozman
Networks, Organizations and Knowledge
35. Bas Straathof
Product variety and economic growth: The
counteracting effects of scale and idiosyncrasy
34. Wilfred Schoenmakers
Knowledge Flows between Multinational
Companies: A Patent Data Analysis
33. Myriam Cloodt
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in High-Tech
Industries: Measuring the Post-M&A Innovative
Performance of Companies
195	
	
									
	
2004
32. Paola Criscuolo
R&D Internationalisation and Knowledge Transfer.
Impact on MNEs and their Home Countries
31.  Maarten Verkerk
Trust and Power on the Shop Floor
30. Gottfried Leibbrandt
Adoption, harmonization and succession of network
technologies across countries
29. Mark Sanders
Skill Biased Technical change - Its Origins, the
Interaction with the Labour Market and Policy
Implications
2003
28. Nadine Roijakkers
Inter-firm cooperation in high-tech industries: a
study of R&D partnerships in pharmaceutical
biotechnology
27. Viki Sonntag
Speed, Scale and Sustainability
26. Masaru Yarime
From End-of-Pipe Technology to Clean Technology
25. Stéphane Malo
The combinatorial Chemistry Revolution -
Sustaining a Superior Performance Position through
Technological Learning
2002
24. Annelies Hogenbirk
Determinants of Inward Foreign Direct Investment:
the Case of the Netherlands
2001
23.  John Adeoti
Technology Investment in Pollution Control in Sub-
Saharan Africa: The Case of the Nigerian
Manufacturing Industry
22. Edward Huizenga
Innovation Management: How Frontrunners Stay
Ahead. An Empirical Study on Key Success Factors in
the ICT sector
2000
21.  Machiel van Dijk
Technological Change and the Dynamics of
Industries. Theoretical Issues and Empirical
evidence from Dutch Manufacturing
1999
20.  Jan Cobbenhagen
Managing Innovation at the Company Level: A Study
on Non-Sector-Specific Success Factors
19. Marjolein Caniëls
Regional Growth Differentials: The Impact of Locally
Bounded Knowledge Spillovers
1998
18. Aldo Geuna
Resource allocation and knowledge production:
Studies in the economics of university research
1996
17.  Reinoud Joosten
Dynamics, Equilibria, and Values
16. Hugo Kruiniger
Investment, R&D, and the Financing Decisions of
the Firm
1995
15. Hans van Meijl
Endogenous Technological Change: The Case of
Information Technology. Theoretical Considerations
and Empirical Results
14. René Kemp
Environmental Policy and Technical Change. A
Comparison of the Technological Impact of Policy
Instruments
13. Rohini Acharya
The Impact of New Technologies on Economic
Growth and Trade. A Case Study of Biotechnology
196	
	
									
	
12. Geert Duysters
The Evolution of Complex Industrial Systems. The
Dynamics of Major IT Sectors
11. Marjan Groen
Technology, Work and Organisation, A Study of the
Nursing Process in Intensive Care Units
1994
10.  Huub Meijers
On the Diffusion of Technologies in a Vintage
Framework; Theoretical Considerations and
Empirical Results
9. Theon van Dijk
The Limits of Patent Protection. Essays on the
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights
8. Hans Voordijk
Naar Integrale Logistiek in Bedrijfsketens,
Ontwikkelingen in de Bouw
1993
7.  Paul Diederen
Technological Progress in Enterprises and Diffusion
of Innovations. Theoretical Reflections and
Empirical Evidence.
6. Ben Dankbaar
Economic Crisis and Institutional Change. The crisis
of Fordism from the perspective of the automobile
industry
5. Hanno Roberts
Accountability and Responsibility: The Influence of
Organisation Design on Management Accounting
1992
4. Bart Verspagen
Uneven Growth Between Interdependent
Economies. An Evolutionary View on Technology
Gaps, Trade and Growth
3. Sjoerd Romme
A Self-organization Perspective on Strategy
Formation
1989
2. John Spangenberg
Economies of Scale, and Atmosphere in Research
Organisations
1988
1. John Hagedoorn
Evolutionary and heterodox innovation analysis: a
study of industrial and technological development
in process control and information technology
197	
